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Abstract 
The adaptive process can be considered as being driven by two fundamental forces: 
exploitation and exploration. While the explorative process may be deterministic, the 
resultant effect may be stochastic. Stochastic effects may also exist in the expoitative 
process. This thesis considers the effects of stochastic fluctuations inherent in the 
adaptive process on the behavioural dynamics of a population of interacting agents. It 
is hypothesied that in such systems, one or more attractors in the population space 
exist; and that transitions between these attractors can occur; either as a result of 
internal shocks (sampling fluctuations) or external shocks (environmental changes). It 
is further postulated that such transitions in the (microscopic) population space may 
be observable as phase transitions in the behaviour of macroscopic observables. 
A simple model of a stock market, driven by asexual reproduction (selection plus 
mutation) is put forward as a testbed. A statistical dynamics analysis of the behaviour 
of this market is then developed. Fixed points in the space of agent behaviours are 
located, and market dynamics are compared to the analytic predictions. Additionally, 
an analysis of the relative importance of internal shocks(sampling fluctuations) and ex-
ternal shocks( the stock dividend sequence) across varying population size is presented. 
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Chapter 1 
Background: The Evolution of 
Populations of Interacting Agents 
There is no such thing as society. There are only individuals.' Margaret 
Thatcher 
The above quote sums up a popular political ideology of the late twentieth century. 
It appears to reject notions of co-operative actions amongst groups in favour of action 
motivated only by individual gain. This thesis considers issues concerning individual vs. 
group actions in situations where individual agents adapt to the clianging environment 
they find themselves in. There may be no consideration by agents of the effects of their 
actions on other agents or the environment, but such effects do occur in the systems 
studied. Such a system is described as interactive, because the actions of agents affect 
other agents, and adaptive, because agents can change their response to adapt to the 
environment. 
The focus of this thesis is upon the behavioural dynamics of such systems: how the 
collective behaviour of the population changes as a result of adaptation driven by the 
results of interaction. In particular, questions of the stability of collective behaviours 
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are explored. Do collective behaviours remain constant, or are there sudden clianges, 
where the whole population seemingly 'clianges its mind' about how it will behave? 
This thesis explores the conditions under which collective behaviours change, and the 
roles played by the internal dynamics of the population, and by external, environmental 
forces acting on the population. 
1.0.1 Motivation and Justification 
The motivation for this work is the observation that many systems of adaptive inter-
active agents appear have a number of seemingly stable modes of collective operation. 
Such systems exhibit intermittent transitions between their modes. Systems that ex-
hibit this behaviour are described as meta-stable. 
The thesis proceeds from the underlying hypothesis that this common phenomenol-
ogy results from a common ontology. Examples of the phenomenon of meta-stability 
from a number of differing fields are presented and drawn together to give a coherent 
picture of the phenomenon of meta-stability. 
The purpose of this work is to explore this hypothesised common ontology of raeta-
stability in adaptive interacting agent populations. A mathematical model of raeta-
stability is put forwards, drawing heavily upon work on adaptation in various fields. 
This model posits that the cause of raetastability is stochastic, and explains why the 
stochasticities remain important even in relatively large populations. 
This work also explores the relationship between the internal fluctuations of the 
system, due to the interactions between agents, and the adaptation of individuals within 
the population, and the external forces such as environmental fluctuations. 
Existing models of interacting adaptive populations tend to have been heavily 
grounded in the social or biological sciences, concentrated mainly around economic-
13 
s, game theory and population biology. Due to the connplexity of interactions whicli 
taJce place between agents in these problem domains, these models have tended to be 
explanatory in nature, and they do not directly address meta-stability as sucli. 
The growth in computing power and connectivity in the past ten years has resulted 
in a vast increase in the number of systems organised in a bottom-up manner, wliere 
the control of the collective behaviour of the system is distributed between the elements 
of the system. Most notable in this field is the internet. However, other systems, sucli 
as air-traffic control systems can also be cast as collective or group behaviour problems. 
Not only have problems of group behaviour escaped from the social and biological 
spheres, but they have also begun to incorporate computational intelligence techniques. 
The manner in which 'intelligent systems' respond to what they perceive as fluctuations 
in their environment can have far-reaching consequences across wide areas. To follow 
the internet and air-traffic examples given above, the adaptations made in individual 
locations can affect the frequency and severity of network brownouts, or the speed and 
robustness of recovery of the USA's air-travel network after the closure of a major hub 
airport due to bad weather. 
Meta-stability is an important phenomenon to understand. Firstly, i t is a valid field 
of academic enquiry in its own right. But beyond that, an understanding of the causes 
of this phenomenon may allow the better design of systems of distributed adaptive 
agents, or distributed control systems. Given an understanding of the causes of metar 
stability, i t may be possible to predict and control the distribution of waiting times in 
particular modes, or the probable direction of transition between modes. 
This chapter provides an introduction to the field of adaptive systems of interacting 
agents. The evidence for meta-stability as a common phenomenology is reviewed here. 
The significance of the problem to evolutionary theorists and modellers is explained, 
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and recent research and theories are discussed. This cliapter does not seek to describe 
or explain mathematical models of evolutionary dynamics; these matters are covered in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
1.1 Fundamentfds of Adaptation 
Adaptation is the fundamental force that has driven life on Earth since its inception 
4500 million years ago. An adaptive drive underlies not only evolution, but also many 
forms of neural activity. At a higher level i t would not be inappropriate to describe 
the dynamics of many forms of group or group activities, such as corporations, market 
traders and other social or economic agents as being driven by adaptation. In Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (ALife) adaptation is recognised as central to the 
quest for more useful and intelligent agents. 
In broad terms, this thesis is concerned with the dynamics of populations of adap-
tive agents. In particular i t is concerned with populations whose adaptation is driven 
by interactive behaviours or social goals. The utility of an agent*s behaviour is defined 
either internally by that agent, or externally as the utili ty of the entire agent. Utili ty 
maximisation is the driving force behind adaptation at the individual or population lev-
el. A positive feedback process exists: adaptation informs behaviour, but the collective 
consequences of behaviours across the population in turn direct the adaptive process. 
1.1.1 A Definition of Adaptation 
The terra ^adaptation* has appeared in many contexts. In dictionary terms, i t has been 
defined as ^adjustment to environmental conditions'*. Here we consider adaptation as 
an active, rather than a passive process. Underlying the various definitions and contexts 
*Merriam-Webster (hhtp://www.m-w.com/dictionary.html). 
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are a number of important common themes: 
1. The agent must be situated within its environment. Agents cannot retreat from 
their world whilst the adaptive process takes place, but must continue to exist 
within i t . Adaptation therefore involves compromises globally optimal solutions 
may not have been discovered by an agent, therefore sub-optimal solutions must 
be used. Adaptive agents use the best solutions that they have to hand, whilst 
continuing to search for even better responses. 
2. Adaptation must in some way involve search. If an agent is to improve its re-
sponses to an environmental stimulus, i t must be free to explore novel responses 
to the stimulus, as well as to exploit existing solutions to the problem. 
3. Consequently, this search process must take place within the agent's environment. 
An agent is faced with the dilemma that on the one hand, its uti l i ty depends on 
correct responses to its environment, yet failure to risk trying novel responses 
may lead to ignorance of the best responses to the environment. This problem, 
referred to as the two armed bandit problem underlies all adaptive behaviours, 
and will be discussed further in Section 1.1.2. 
Henceforth, adaptation will be defined in terras of two fundamental forces, exploration 
and exploitation. A process will be considered to be adaptive i f i t can be shown that 
both these elements are present within in. 
1.1.2 The Statistics of Adaptive Behaviour 
Here the recognition of exploitative and exploratory tendencies will be considered, and 
a rationale for simplifying assumptions that will underlie the mathematical models of 
adaptation (chapters 2, 3 and 4) will be presented. 
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Choice and UncertEiinty: The n-armed Bandit 
Whether the agents exist in a noisy environment or not, they will all face a fundamental 
problem of adaptation, namely the problem of minimising their potential losses due to 
making poor decisions. Such a problem is known as an n-armed bandit In a fruit 
machine (the 1-armed bandit), the player faces a long term source of loss because the 
bandit is biased towards the operator. The n-armed bandit problem posits a machine 
with n arms. Eacli arm has its own bias, so there is a long terra source of loss associated 
with each arm. The problem is to provide a decision method to minimise one's losses, 
given only the history of your plays on the bandit. Note that each play one makes on 
the bandit gives further information about the bias of a particular arm or set of arms. 
This is a fundamental problem in adaptation, because with a limited number of 
historical precedents, associations between stimuli/responses and rewards may not be 
easily discernible, let alone correct. So the ability to minimise one's potential losses 
given an unknown situation, whilst gathering information, is important. 
The relationship between the forces of exploration and exploitation, has long been 
recognised as a two-armed-bandit problem, and underlies early theories of evolutionary 
search [42]. The usual presentation of the problem is in terms of a player betting on 
a coin-tossing game with a coin with an unknown weighting. The player can use the 
history of plays to inform his or her choice of play, but risks two possible sources of loss. 
On the one hand, by basing a decision on the game history (exploitation), there is a 
source of loss by assuming that the game history gives a fair representation of the coin's 
weighting. On the other hand, by ignoring the game's history (exploration), the player 
may lose because the game history does actually reflect the coin weighting. Both are 
possible sources of loss to the agent, although the sizes of the loss may vary. Any adap-
tive agent faces the problem of arranging its responses to the environment to minimise 
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its expected losses from these two forces. In practice, the adaptive techniques that are 
used by an agent may not make i t easy to separate the exploitative and exploratory 
modes, indeed both may be happening simultaneously. However i t is still possible to 
meaningfully discuss the kinds of behaviour that may be observed 
Exploitation 
The key to exploitation is the re-use of previously successfully responses to environmen-
tal stimuli. Depending on individual circumstances of the agent or system of agents, 
there may not be a necessity for an agent to re-use their own prior response; agents 
may instead chose to imitate successful strategies for dealing with particular situations 
that they have observed other agents using. This tends particularly to be the case when 
dealing with economic, social and ALife agents, and also underlies aspects of evolution. 
In evolutionary systems, agents with successful responses to their environment will pass 
on these responses, or the potential for these responses to their offspring. 
A distinction lies between global and local adaptation. Global adaptation is the 
response of an entire population to a changing environment. Individual agents do not 
adapt, but the composition of the entire population changes, so the response of members 
of the population to particular stimuli may change over time. Evolution systems are 
the prime exemplars of this category. In contrast, local adaptation is the adaptation 
of individual members of the population. Agents change their responses over their 
lifetime; the same agents may respond differently to the same environmental stimulus 
at different times. A population of learning agents exemplifies this type of adaptation. 
Exploration 
Exploration is the search for new, better, responses to environmental stimuli. As such i t 
has often been cast as a random, non-deterministic process. This is not necessarily the 
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case. AJcliian [1] points out that statistically, i t is quite possible that the set of actions 
of a community of exploring economic agents may appear to have been generated by a 
stochastic process, even i f this is not the case. He writes: 
"Where there is uncertainty, people's judgments and opinions, even when 
based upon the best available evidence, will differ; no one of them may be 
making his choice by tossing coins; yet the aggregate set of actions of the 
entire group of participants may be indistinguishable from a set of individual 
actions; each selected at random." 
This point is particularly important. On the one hand, the fact that there appears to 
be a stochastically driven exploration within a set of agents does not preclude agents 
from performing some form of intelligent or directed search. On the other hand, even 
i f agents are carrying out some form of intelligent or directed search, statistically i t 
may still be possible to model the exploration as a stochastic process. In the quest 
for mathematically tractable models of adaptation, this simplifying assumption is often 
made. 
Noise in the adaptive process 
Further to this point, there is also the question of information available to adaptive 
agents (for example, see Wi t t [84]). For instance, classical equilibrium economics makes 
strong assumptions about the information available to agents within the system; the 
usual assumption is that agents have access to perfect information immediately. In 
practice, information is not always instantly available, and even when i t is, i t is not 
always correct^. An assumption of a small amount of noise in the information that 
^The importance of immediate access to correct, relevant information is empirically confirmed by 
Reuters balance sheet. 
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agents are basing decisions upon, supports the notion of exploration as a stochastic 
process. Not only can agents with purely exploratory goals perform exploration, but 
agents attempting to exploit good situation-response pairs found by other agents may, as 
a result of imperfect information (either about the way that other agents have acted, or 
about the present state of the environment, or about the assumption of the environment 
in which a copied behaviour is favourable) perform exploration by mistake. 
1.2 Natural and Artificial Evolution 
In this section, the motivation behind using evolutionary models to describe the group 
dynamics of systems of interacting adaptive agents is considered. The basics of cur-
rent evolutionary theory, especially in terms of eirtificial evolution, and the relationship 
between current evolutionary theories and the computational models that they have 
engendered are also described. 
1.2,1 The Advantages of Evolutionary Models 
Evolution and evolutionary models are of particular interest in the study of the dynam-
ics of groups of interacting adaptive agents for three reasons. First, the study of the 
dynamics of evolutionary processes has a long and frui t ful history, and has been backed 
up by a number of well-tested and useful mathematical models. There has been a con-
tinual interplay between the biological and mathematical sciences, which means that 
the best mathematical models are well grounded in experimental fact. Mathematical 
models of evolution and evolutionary operators are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Second, there is the more recent use of artificial evolution (genetic algorithms, ge-
netic programming, etc.) as an A I and Alife technique. Techniques such as genetic 
algorithms, genetic programming, morphogenic codings, and co-evolving population-
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s are regularly used in many domains. A I and ALife are not restricted to following 
strictly biological pathways, so the research that has been done on evolution and evolu-
tionary operators has allowed many useful simplifications to be made whilst retaining 
the essence of the evolutionary algorithm. 
Third, evolution is necessarily a group technique. Technically, asexual reproduction 
(including mutation) from a single parent, producing a single offspring which replaces 
the parent, is possible. However, this is identical to a random walk over the search space. 
The power of evolution comes from its parallelism. Different types of adaptive search 
place alternate emphases on the explorative and exploitative processes, and exploit the 
parallelism is differing ways. This point is discussed in detail by Holland [42], although 
there has been recent criticism of Holland's analysis of the working of a particular 
evolutionary algorithm, the canonical genetic algorithm [79, 29, 35, 36]. 
I f the evolutionary algorithm is set up correctly, i t can be used as a model of the 
dynamics of a group of adaptive agents (for instance, the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Mar-
ket, discussed in Section 1.3.1). In particular, i t may be possible to use an evolutionary 
algorithm as a link between a given adaptive group and a mathematical model. I f an 
evolutionary algorithm can be found that successfully models the characteristic features 
of the system of interest, it may be possible to write down the operator that governs 
the evolution of that system. Mathematical approaches, particularly diffusion equa-
tion, stochastic system, and thermodynamic approaches (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
may then be used to model the trajectory of such a system under a given evolutionary 
operator, and a given utility or fitness measure. In this manner, i t is possible to consid-
er the group dynamics without reference to the particular circumstances of individual 
adaptive agents within the system. 
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1.2.2 Basics of Evolutionary Theory 
Broadly speaking, modern evolutionary theory may be summed up as a neo-Darwinian 
synthesis; that is to say that i t is a synthesis of ideas derived from and inspired by 
the ideas of Darwin and Wallace [20, 82], and filtered through the theory of molecular 
biology [67]. The bare bones of the theory are sketched out below. However i t should 
be stressed that the devil is in the detail; a broad approach can only fail to do justice 
to the intricacies of evolution. 
Darwinian evolution starts from the distinction between an individual's genotype 
and phenotype. Every individual contains a blueprint detailing its own construction, 
coded within the DNA in the nucleus of every cell. From this blueprint the pheno-
type, or physical form of the individual, is produced in a raorphogenic process. The 
central dogma of molecular biology is that information can only pass in one direction, 
from genotype to phenotype. I t is this central dogma that distinguishes neo-Darwinian 
evolution from earlier proposals such as those made by Lamarck [53]. 
Onto a population of individuals a selection pressure is postulated. This is a differ-
ential mechanism, which discriminates between members of the population, and results 
in differences in the probability, frequency or success of mating between members of 
the population. Such a pressure may be very simple and overt, for example predation 
removing weaker and older members of the population; alternatively, i t may be more 
subtle. For example, females may discriminate between potential mates on account of 
differences in plumage or display ^. Theorists (e.g. Hamilton & Zuk [40]) explain such 
discriminations in terms of their demonstrating the strength of such individuals. This 
great deal of effort has been expended by evolutionary biologists in expltuning how seeming-
ly extravagant plumage (for example, a male peacock's fan) either directly improve an individual's 
probability of survival, or serve to demonstrate to a potential mate the strength of that individual. 
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selection pressure can be summed up with the clich^d phrase 'the survival of the fittest'. 
This means no more, and no less than that those individuals whicli are best able to 
survive in the environment in which they find themselves are most likely to breed. 
Those individuals that do survive and find mates will breed, and pass on parts of 
their genetic material to their offspring, who will inherit physical characteristics from 
their parents''. 
1.2.3 Foundations of Genetic Algorithms 
The field of genetic algorithms (OA's) stems from the work of John Holland from the 
1960s onwards (summed up in [42]). Whilst the mathematical explanations offered 
by Holland for the workings of the GA (and in general to the processes of Dar\vinian 
evolution) have been subject to much recent criticism and re-examination [79, 29, 35, 
36], the basic model (known now as the canonical-GA) has become the basis of an 
expanding field of study. 
The description of the GA that is offered at this point is purposefully a simple 
sketch, sufficient only to enable the discussion in following sections. I t is not a pre-
cise description of any particular algorithm. The theory and mathematics of genetic 
algorithms and other evolutionary models will be discussed in much greater detail in 
Chapter 2. Algorithmically, the genetic algorithm is based upon a gross simplification 
of the processes described by modern evolutionary theory. The process begins with a 
fixed population of randomly chosen strings, each of which is a coding of a potential 
solution to the problem under consideration. This string may be considered as an indi-
vidual's genotype. Each of these strings undergoes an evaluation process which assigns 
variety of other processes, collectively described as mutation may introduce variations into the 
genetic material of offspring, which are not traceable back to the genotypes of their parents. 
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a numerical measure (the fitness) of the success of the string as a solution. This eval-
uation process can range from the naively simplistic (e.g. the number of blocks of bits 
all taking a given value in the case of the Royal Road Genetic Algorithm [60, 79]) to 
the computationally complex (e.g. many engineering design problems [68]). The eval-
uation process is commonly referred to as the fitness function. In a biological context, 
the fitness of an individual is usually expressed in terms of the number of offspring i t 
has; here the process is reversed. What is usually described as the 'fitness function' in 
GA theory is a conflation of two distinct mappings: a genotype to phenotype mapping, 
and a phenotype to utility mapping. This conflated mapping determines both the in-
dividual's chances of survival through to the next epoch, and the number of offspring 
that the individual is likely to have. These differences are usually glossed over in GA 
theory. 
Once the members of the population of potential solutions have been evaluated 
via the fitness function, the population is ranked, and a certain portion of the weaker 
members of the population is discarded. The population is brought back up strength 
by creating new members via a process analogous to sexual reproduction. A pair of 
individuals are chosen as 'parents', and the 'child' is formed by creating a string which 
incorporates elements of the genotypes of both parents. The following two processes 
are usually (but not always involved): 
Mutation 
This is an analogue of the set of processes mentioned in the preceding section and 
referred to collectively as mutation. In the theory of natural systems, there may be 
valid explanations for sections of DNA not conforming to the DNA of either parent, 
which do not invoke any non-deterministic explanation such as damage to the DNA from 
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cosmic rays. In GA theory sucli explanations are usually discarded, and the mutation 
operator is considered as a stochastic process, which acts with a fixed probability on 
each site in the genome, changing the allele at that site to a random state (where there 
are more than two possible states of the allele), or to the opposite value of the one it 
presently holds (in the case that the allele can only take two possible values). Mutation 
is a purely exploratory operator; i t uses no information about the possible location of 
optima in the search space, but picks a random point in the space according to some 
distribution, and places an individual at that point. 
As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the mutation of a population of 
individuals away from a given state can be considered as a diffusion process, capable of 
being modelled via partial differential operators. In the absence of any selective pressure 
or fitness function, mutation will cause a population to spread across the available space 
to a macroscopic entropy maximising state. 
Mutation can be considered to be the most fundamental genetic operator, and in 
natural terras i t is certainly the most ancient, having a role in the reproduction of all 
organisms in the history of life on earth. 
Crossover 
This is the process which combines the genomes of two parents to form a child. In the 
simplest version, 1-point crossover, a single cut point is picked at random; the child's 
genome consists of a copy of the first portion of one parent's genome, concatenated 
with the second portion of the other parent's genome. In more complex versions, n-
point crossover, the genome string is considered to be a loop, and a total of n cut points 
are chosen. The child's genome consists of alternate portions of the parents' genomes. 
Crossover operators have also been produced to fit specific types of genome used in 
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particular problems. The best known examples are the re-ordering crossover operators, 
used in evolutionary approaches to travelling salesman type problems. These alternate 
operators are tailored for problems where constraints on phenotypic structure have been 
resolved by imposing the constraints at a genotypic level. In the travelling salesman 
problem, the constraint of not visiting any city more than once is imposed at a genotypic 
level, by restricting each allele to appear once and once only. 
The theory of the canonical crossover operator is very controversial, and is generally 
held to be not fully understood at this time. Rival theories as to the operation of 
the crossover operator are discussed briefly in Section 6.3.3. Early theories [42] held 
crossover to build up larger areas of (potentially) favourable genes on the genome from 
smaller, favourable 'building blocks'. More recent work [79] indicates that crossover 
may act to spread the genes of the best individuals through the population quicker 
than would be possible than by a policy of replacement with mutation. 
Crossover is a combination operator, i t implements both exploration and exploita-
tion. The offspring of a pair of agents has a genome which lies between its parents. 
Whilst i t is assumed that both parents implement good solutions that have been found, 
there is no absolute guarantee that the offspring will , although i t can be shown [42] that 
if the landscape has sufficient exploitable regularities, the offspring will probably con-
tain beneficial aspects of its parents genetic makeup. Thus, there is both an exploitative 
and an exploratory aspect to crossover. 
Asexual Reproduction 
Asexual reproduction is the simplest possible reproductive scheme. Here there is only 
one parent, and its offspring inherit all the genetic material of that parent. Whilst 
this operator is only used in the simplest organisms in nature (the so called 'ancient 
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asexuals' group), i t has an important place in GA theory, particularly in the analysis of 
evolutionary search. This is because asexual reproduction implements pure exploitation: 
there is no opportunity to explore the genome space when this operator is used. 
By using a combination of asexual reproduction plus mutation, and replacing the 
entire population at each generation, a simple evolutionary search is implemented, in 
which the exploratory and exploitative operators are separated. Whilst this is not the 
most efficient evolutionary search algorithm, i t is the one which most easily submits to 
a mathematical treatment. The exploitative and exploratory operators can be consid-
ered separately, and written down. The resulting evolutionary operator is the result 
of an exploitative operator applied to the existing population, then modified by an 
exploratory operator. 
1.2.4 Selection Pressures from Within a Population 
Classical evolutionary theory conceives of abstract selection pressures. In the study 
of individual organisms, or of specific webs of organisms, some of these pressures may 
be identified and/or quantified. In cases where mating or breeding success appears 
dependent upon some interaction between members of the population (e.g. some form 
of courtship ritual), the purpose of the interaction is explained as a demonstration of 
that individuals fitness to face some external pressure. 
I t is not the case that all pressures may be directly externalised. Organisms that 
lie at the top of food chains tend not to have any predators, and their population 
is limited by their food sources; they are unable to sustain a population beyond the 
limits of their prey*s sustainability. In many cases this can lead to unstable populations 
following Lotka-Volterra dynamics [62]. In many cases the selection pressure is now not 
imposed externally by the predations of other species, but internally by members of the 
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population choosing mates^. 
Recent work with artificial evolution (GA theory) has also involved selection pres-
sures within a population. There exist a number of papers describing work in which 
populations of agents play various economic games (especially the Iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma (IPD) game [10, 65, 11, 56, 77] and artificial stock markets [5]). 
The common feature of all these models is that the fitness of an individual is no 
longer solely a function of that individual's phenotype (and therefore genotype), but is 
rather determined by one or more interactions with another member or members of the 
population. I f members of the population cannot choose which other members of the 
population they interact with, and the behaviour of an agent during an interaction is 
under genetic control in some way, then the fitness of an individual is determined not 
only by its own genotype, but also by the distribution of the genotypes of the whole 
population. The result is that (in terms of GA theory) the fitness function is dependent 
upon the population distribution, and yet serves as the selection pressure which dictates 
the evolution of this same population. I t is by no means clear that the dynamics of the 
population will follow those in GA models without interactions. 
1.2.5 Co-evolution vs. Interaction Within a Population 
As stated previously, this thesis concerns populations of agents whose adaptation is 
determined by their utility in achieving interactive or social goals. Contrast this study 
with the field of co-evolutionary theory, which seeks to describe how species evolve under 
selection pressures imposed by each other. The difference lies in the adaptative sclieme. 
In an interacting population, mating takes place in the entire population, whereas in 
^In natural evolution, it is usual that all the females breed, but only the strongest males get to 
breed. 
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co-evolutionary models, the subpopulations represent different species, unable to mate 
across species boundaries. 
The siraplest raodel of co-evolution is of two species, for exaraple a predator and a 
prey. The species interact in a siraple raanner: the predators atterapt to kil l and eat the 
prey. I t is this interaction that drives the selection of individuals within both species. 
Fitter members of the prey are more likely to avoid the predators, and thus pass on 
their genes to the next generation. In a similar manner, fitter predators are more likely 
to catch the prey, and thus survive to pass on their genes, whereas the weaker predators 
die of starvation. 
The dynamics of such a co-evolutionary system are commonly described as the 
'Red Queen effect' [80] or as an 'evolutionary arms-race'. Both species are constantly 
seeking improveraents to counteract the new iraproveraents in their opponent; they are 
constantly running to stand still . 
Co-evolutionary phenoraena are an expanding and fast moving field of study at 
present. Much of the work is based around the Bak-Sneppen model (original paper 
[8], review paper [66]). This is a siraple mathematical model of co-evolution whicli 
displays self-organised criticality. A co-evolutionary system appears to evolve towards a 
critical state in which 'avalanches' of changes caused by changes at individual sites ripple 
across the entire system. These avalanches are of all scales. This raodel demonstrates 
the phenomena of punctuated evolution observed in the historical record [73, 74, 75]. 
Extinction events on all scales take place, the frequency of extinction events scaling with 
event size by a power law. The Bak-Sneppen model, and other work (e.g. Newman 
63]) detail models of extinction which duplicate the historical record, and which do not 
need to invoke external environmental shocks (e.g. meteor strike) in order to explain 
the fossil record. 
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Borgine & Snyers [14] produce a formulation of what they describe as a co-evolutionary 
model, based on Lokta-Volterra dynamics [62], using an Eigen-Fisher model. This 
model reduces to a Schrodinger wave equation. Whilst this model claims to be co-
evolutionary, the experimental results presented (based on Kaneko & Suzuki's bird 
model [44]) are based on a population of interacting agents; there being a single popu-
lation under an asexual reproduction plus mutation operator. Bourgine & Snyers claim 
that their study indicates that the co-evolutionary dynamics (hill climbing on a sinking 
landscape), which gives rise to punctuated equilibria is a general feature of exploitation 
plus exploration processes, rather than a consequence of the discreteness of mutations. 
Their analysis appears to conflate two separate effects. First, evolution on plateaued 
landscapes is punctuated due to entropic effects analogous to a first passage time in a 
random walk. This is discussed further in Section 2.2.4. Second, there is the Fisher 
Law, which posits species undertaking a hill-climbing evolution on a sinking landscape 
caused by co-evolution. They appear to rule out the possibility that a meta-stable 
symbiotic relationship between species occupying various niches can ensue: This has 
been observed in discrete phenotypic spaces (Section 1.3.2). I t is not clear that sucli a 
symbiotic relationship cannot occur in a continuous phenotypic space. 
In the following section, a number of models are reviewed which demonstrate meta-
stability. These are examples of interactive systems which would appear stable in the 
infinite population limit, but which display raeta-stability only in finite populations. 
The main difference between co-evolution of a number of species and interaction within 
a population is one of stability. Co-evolutionary systems tend to follow Lokta-Volterra 
dynamics, that is to say that the evolution of each species is regulated by the other. 
Whilst, as is discussed above, this can lead to interesting dynamics including punctuated 
equilibria, i t differs from an interactive system in that a co-evolutionary system generally 
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only has a one-way dependence (e.g. predator eats prey), whereas in an interactive 
population the dependencies run in both directions. Here the utility of each agent can 
be dependent on the actions of all agents**. 
A fundamental question, whose answer lies beyond the scope of this thesis, is whether 
co-evolutionary systems and interacting adaptive populations share the same dynamics, 
or belong to different classes of dynamical systems. On the one hand, an interacting 
adaptive system might be pictured as a co-evolutionary system with a large number 
of co-evolving species (mapping each individual in the interacting adaptive system to 
a species in the co-evolutionary system). This can be countered by an argument that 
there is still an essential difference in that co-evolutionary systems are not stable in the 
infinite population limit, but continue to evolve in a deterministic manner, based on 
the relative fitnesses of members of the mutational cloud of each separate species. In 
contrast, members of an interacting adaptive system may make mutational as well as 
selective moves across the landscape; the mutational moves are stochastic as opposed 
to deterministic. However; the dynamics of both types of system can be captured using 
statistical dynamics formulations, the Bak-Sneppen model [8, 66] in co-evolutionary 
systems, and various approaches in the case of interacting adaptive systems (see Sec-
tion 2.2). I t is an open question as to whether both types of system can be described 
by the same statistical dynamics formulation. 
1.3 Models of Interacting Populations 
There are a number of well established lines of research into the evolution of interact-
ing populations. Whilst the directions and aims of these models are varied, they all 
**This will vary with the system. In the system considered by this thesis, this is the case. In other 
systems reviewed in this thesis, the dependency is stochastic. 
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use evolutionary computing methods to optimise a population of agents whose utili ty 
depends on their effectiveness at performing some form of social interaction. Their 
purpose is either to draw conclusions about the optimaJ ways in which the population 
self-organises under the given fitness function, or to test theories about the nature of the 
interactive regimes. In short, these lines of researcli seek to use evolutionary methods 
on populations of interacting agents as a means of exploring the nature of the interac-
tions, or to find the types of populations that are engendered by using success at these 
particular interactions, not to investigate the more general issues of how populations of 
interacting agents evolve. 
1.3.1 Artificial Stock Markets 
The theory of stock markets is one of the primary examples of the adaptation of a 
population of interacting agents. Arthur [4] explains the problem succinctly: An a-
gent*s optimal strategy is dependent upon its expectation of the strategies of other 
agents. To quote Keynes [48], the problem of valuing stocks depends upon "what aver-
age opinion expects the average opinion to be". Clearly the payoff (or fitness) received 
by any particular agent is dependent not only on that agent, but upon the rest of the 
population. 
One very interesting strand of work that has been pursued over the past few years is 
the use of Alife techniques to produce an artificial stock market (ASM). The rationale 
for this work is that by creating an ASM, researchers have a laboratory in which they 
can test theories concerning the interaction of economic agents. The advantages of this 
approach over on using real stock market data to test economic theories are that: 
1. The rationality of the agents is known, that is to say the computational power of 
the agents is known. 
32 
2. The trading strategy of the agents is known. 
3. In a real stock market the markets in different stocks are not independent; the 
effect of one stock on other stocks (in unrelated industries) is well known. An 
artificial market can be created in a single stock. 
4. An artificial stock market is insulated from external factors that influence real 
markets and which add 'noise' to the market. The efficient market hypothesis 
asserts that there is no such thing as noise in a stock market, all changes in asset 
prices are due to new information entering the market, and being discounted by 
traders into the asset prices. Whilst the timing and effects of individual items 
of information entering the market may not be predictable, the resultant effects 
may have a well defined distribution. 
Not all ASM's use evolutionary techniques to modify the populations of agents, 
most of the recent ALife models are adaptive in that they allow agents to modify 
their strategies to improve their performance. Various adaptive processes have been 
used, including reinforcement learning and imitation of the strategies of more successful 
agents, as well as evolution under a GA. For example, Bak et al. [7] have allowed agents 
to modify their trading strategies to reflect current market conditions, and have also 
allowed agents to change their strategies to imitations of the strategies of more successful 
agents. Whilst this latter method is not strictly evolutionary, it is still adaptive; the 
composition of the population is under a pressure to mutate towards more successful 
areas of the space of traders. 
FVora the standpoint of investigating the dynamics of evolution in populations of 
interacting agents, perhaps the most interesting model is the one that has been devel-
oped by Arthur and colleagues based at the Santa Fe Institute [4, 5]. In this model, a 
population of agents trade in a single asset. Whilst the details of asset pricing theory 
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are of limited interest here, the nature of the agent interactions requires some explana-
tion. All the agents have a choice between investing their assets in a stock which pays 
a randomly chosen dividend from a given distribution at each time period, or placing 
their assets in a risk free investment. Based upon price and dividend information, the 
agents each predict the next price of the stock. Classical economic theory predicts each 
agent*s optimal distribution of their assets between the stock and the investments, given 
a knowledge of each agent's degree of risk aversion and prediction of the next price. 
These demands are then passed to an independent market supervisor, or specialist who 
determines the price of the stock, given that the stock must all be taken up at eacli 
time period. The new price and the next dividend are then passed to all the agents, 
who can then update their demands. 
In the model used by Arthur et al. [4, 5], the market consists of a fixed number of 
agents, all of whom have a bank of possible strategies, each of which is a classifier (a 
decision rule coded as a binary string^). At regular intervals, each agent uses a GA to 
eliminate its weaker strategies and replace them with new, exploratory strategies based 
on its most successful current strategies. Whilst the thrust of this work is directed at 
explaining particular aspects of markets, there is a point which is particularly notewor-
thy in the present context. There appear to be two regimes available within the market, 
dependent upon the initial conditions of the model: 
A fundamental trading regime. The model is set up so that all investors start with 
a common set of expectations (i.e. strategies), and these expectations are that 
the stock will have its fundamental value, the value that classical economic theory 
predicts that the stock should have. 
" I f a large majority of investors believe the fundamentalist model, 
*^ see Holland [42] and Goldberg [37] for details of classifier systems. 
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the resulting prices will validate i t , and deviant predictions that arise 
by mutation in the population of expectational models will be rendered 
inaccurate. Thus in our market, the homogeneous rational expectations 
equilibrium of the standard literature is evolutionarily stable: i t cannot 
be invaded by small numbers of deviating expectations."® 
Thus, i f the population of available strategies is clustered closely enough around 
a particular stationary point (predicted by the standard theory), then that point 
will lie in a deep attractor basin, i.e. members of the population will be unable 
to escape from the environs of that point. 
A technical trading regime. In an identical model, i f there is a wider distribution of 
initial strategies, then the fundamental regime will no longer be stable. I t is now 
possible that non-fundamental strategies can be successful. These strategies will 
spread through the market, forming a bubble, where the stock value deviates sys-
tematically from its fundamental value. Other strategies may now arise to exploit 
the bubble, and a crush will result, as the fundamental stock value is reasserted. 
This regime is known as a technical trading regime, and is characterised by agents 
making predictions of future prices based on the recent price history. 
The existence of these two regimes demonstrates that stationary points in the popu-
lation space do actually exist when adaptive agents interact, and that these stationary 
points are not Umited to fixed points, but include limit cycles, and possibly strange 
attractors as well. Arthur et al. have noted informally that once the technical regime 
(which they also describe as a complex regime) has been entered, then the market 
appears to be trapped in i t . 
^Arthur [5]. 
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Payoff 
pl/p2 C D 
p2 C R/R T/S 
D S/T P/P 
Table 1.1: Payoffs in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. A Prisoner's Dilemma is any game 
in whicli T > R > P > S a.n6 2R > T-\-S. The plays C, D stand for Co-operate and 
Defect respectively. 
1.3.2 The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is a well established game that has been used to 
model interactions between individuals within a number of fields. I t is a single shot 
non-zero sum game with payoff table given by Table 1.3.2. 
I t is well established that in the single shot game, the strategy of mutual defection 
DD is evolutionarily stable [77]. However, when the game is repeated indefinitely^ the 
dynamics become more complex. Axelrod [6] has shown that there is no optimal strategy 
independent of an opponent's strategy. In an adaptive population, the adaptation will 
be directed by the results of the games recently played, and hence by the composition 
of that population 
Evolutionary techniques have been widely used in studies of the iterated (IPD) game 
to establish which strategies are viable in evolutionary terms, and to investigate the 
way that various strategies interact with each other. A number of these studies are of 
particular interest, either because they demonstrate the raeta-stability of populations, 
or because they demonstrate other features of interest. These studies have used a variety 
of means of enumerating strategies in such a way that they may be encoded in a binary 
''Either played ad infinitum, or with a fixed (small) probability of halting after each play. 
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genome. The most common are to encode various forms of finite state automata [2, 28 
and game tree hierarchies or histories [54, 55, 56]. There have also been studies of both 
spatial cind non-spatial IPD games. Here attention will be restricted to non-spatial 
versions of the game. 
Lindgren [54] and Lindgren & Nordahl [55] coded the genome based on responses to 
possible recent game histories. The experimental set-up was designed to allow mutations 
which lengthened the genome, thus allowing for the evolution of memory by players. 
They note that the results of their simulations show the evolutionary dynamics of 
the system to consist of "a succession of stable periods separated by periods of rapid 
evolution ... reminiscent of punctuated equilibria" [55]. Moreover, their experiments 
show that i t is not just individual strategies that can dominate the population. There 
is evidence of 'species* of agent rising to prominence together, displaying apparently 
correlated evolutionary dynamics, and becoming extinct together^^. This indicates that 
the population is shifting between areas of the space of population distributions, first 
favouring one distribution of populations for a while, then moving to another area of 
this space where another distribution of agents between possible genotypes is favoured. 
The work of Lomborg [56, 57] is significant in this context. He demonstrates the 
results of a large evolutionary simulation, where the genome uses a similar technique 
(but different implementational details) to that of Lindgren [54] and Lindgren & Nor-
dalil [55] discussed above. In these experiments the history length is fixed, and Markov 
techniques are used to calculate the limit scores of agents within the population playing 
each other. In this way, he has managed to produce results for infinite game lengths 
without a major computational load. The results are very interesting: rather than any 
'°This can unfortunately only be inferred from the diagrams accompanying their text. There is 
no mention of this feature in the text, but examination of the diagrams shows these dynamics quite 
clearly. 
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one 'species' dominating the population, the system settles down in a meta-stable state 
comprising of a mixture of possible strategies in constant proportions. Lomborg*s anal-
ysis indicates that the populations consists of two elements, a nucleus of co-operative 
strategies which are easily exploitable, and a shield of unforgiving strategies (e.g. similar 
to TIT-FOR-TAT) which will respond to defection with mutual defection. The shield 
and nucleus remain in approximately fixed proportions, because the shield exploits the 
nucleus slightly, but not enough to become dominant. Lomborg discusses the evolu-
tionary stability of such a population: The population can initially easily be invaded 
by any strategy that defects against co-operators. The proportion of co-operators in 
the population declines, and is replaced by the invading strategy and shield strategies. 
The invader will however trigger the defection of the shield strategies, which in turn 
leads to its own downfall, and the re-emergence of the exploitable nucleus strategies. 
"the answer to Axelrod's question, of what is the most robust strategy in the 
IPD game, has never been a single strategy, but is instead a set of strategies 
internally partitioned between a highly co-operative nucleus and a diverse 
and cautious shield." 
Lomborg too notices the meta-stability of the population: an evolutionary stable 
mix of strategies will persist for a large number of generations. However, i t will not 
persist forever: catastrophic changes in the population occur occasionally, and one 
evolutionary stable mix is replaced by another one. His analysis of this is that in 
the period during which a meta-stable population is fighting off one intruder, another 
intruder may then exploit the combination i f i t arrives at the right moment. Lomborg 
points out that the most destabilising strategies are in fact the 'too nice' strategies 
which co-operate willingly. A population that is invaded by this form of mutant is far 
"Lomborg [57]. 
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more vulnerable than a population that is 'too harsh'. The gentle exploitation of the 
nucleus by the shield has the effect of keeping the *too nice' mutants at bay, but i t 
is occasionally exploitable, and it is here that the systemic meta-stable nature of the 
population becomes apparent. 
Batali & Kitcher [11] also note the meta-stability of populations of IPD playing 
agents in their simulations involving optional^^ and compulsory versions of the IPD. 
They note the long periods where the population appears trapped, with various s-
trategies maintaining approximately fixed percentages, and the sudden shifts between 
population compositions. As they point out, in any situation where no phenotypic dif-
ferences are observable, there is a possibility of genetic drif t (see Section 1.4.1); neutral 
sites on the genome can mutate causing the genotype to vary massively without any 
effect on the phenotype, and therefore the performance of individuals. In this case the 
phenotypic similarities are that agents play the same when (for example) faced with 
co-operating opponents. Here their potential responses to non co-operators may face 
extensive genetic dr if t over a period of time, so an exploitative mutant in fact faces a 
genetically diverse population which may seek a diflferent meta-stable configuration to 
its original one. They point out that, 
"The only way that a population playing the compulsory game can es-
cape from a state of high defection is for several favorable mutations to 
occur at once ... 
In thinking about the evolution of social behaviour i t is important to 
recognise that such behaviour occurs against a changing environment con-
sisting of the behaviours of other members of the populations. Thus such an 
*^In the optional version of the IPD game, there is a third possible play, 'N' which indicates that 
the player refuses to take part in that round. 
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evolutionary process is a feedback system, and the global properties should 
be expected to fluctuate, perhaps chaotically ... 
... In the long run, the evolutionary dynamical properties of strategies 
and their genetic representations may have the most significant effect on the 
careers of populations using those strategies." 
Similarly, in simulations using the n-player version of the IPD game (otherwise 
known as the public goods problem), both Bankes [10] and Glance & Hubermann [34] 
observed populations with high levels of co-operation, and with high levels of defection, 
with sudden intermittent shifts between these two types of population. They also note 
that a number of diff'ering levels of co-operation in the multi-player game are stable, 
which leads to what they describe as a 'terraced* mean score/play trajectory. This 
trajectory has a number of similarities to that observed in studies of the Royal Road 
GA [79]. Again, the notion of genetic drif t is invoked to explain these results. 
Hubermann & Glance [43] explored conditional co-operation in a public goods prob-
lem, where individual agents decide whether to co-operate or not stochastically, based 
on the percieved fraction of agents co-operating in a previous epoch, and their percep-
tion of the effect of their decisions on other agents future decisions. A mathematical 
formulation has been devised, based on earlier work by Ceccatto & Huberman [17]. 
They show that in such a system there may be more than one optima (corresponding 
to alternate Nash equilibria), although only one is global. They then consider transi-
tions between optima caused by agents misperceptions of the environment (the number 
of agents co-operating). This system is not truly adaptive, agents update their proba-
bility of co-operation to the optimal ratio based on the information they have. However, 
because this information may be erroneous, a degree of stochasticity is added to the 
^^Batali&Kitcher [11]. 
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system, because agents* perceptions of the optimal strategy may now differ. 
Based on the formulation from Ceccatto & Huberman [17], Huberraan & Glance 
[43] show that metarStability may be present. Furthermore, they consider the transi-
tion times between the local optima. They note that the utili ty barrier separating local 
optima may have differing heights on each side. This means that the transition prob-
ability between optima is asymmetric. In the system they consider, there are only two 
optima. The system finds i t fairly easy to jump from the local to the global optimum, 
and this is observed regularly. However, the transition time from the global to the local 
optima is a number of orders of magnitude larger, and this event is rarely observed. 
1.3.3 The E l Parol Problem and Other Co-ordination Prob-
lems 
The El Farol problem, put forwards by Arthur [3] is a co-ordination problem under the 
constraint of bounded rationality. This means that i t is a problem where agents must 
co-ordinate their responses, in a situation where they cannot make perfect predictions. 
Consider the original problem: 
There is a bar in downtown Santa Fe called the EI Farol. They have a fine salsa 
band playing on a Thursday night, and people go there to dance. Now obviously, i t is 
a better night out when i t is busy, but when i t gets too busy i t becomes less enjoyable. 
This is formalised as follows. There are a population of N agents, each of whom can 
make a choice A (go out), or B (stay in). There is a fixed small utility to staying in, 
and a greater utility to going out - i f there are k or fewer other agents at the bar. If 
there are more than k agents at the bar, then there is zero utili ty to going out. The 
only information that all agents have, is the historical record of numbers at the bar on 
previous occasions. There is no direct communication between agents. 
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This problem, and other similar problems such as the spatial minority game [19, 
88, 18] have profound consequences. The bounded rationality of agents limits their 
predictive powers; yet co-ordination emerges. Arthur [3] points out that whilst the 
number of agents in the bar (choice A) varies around / c , the set of agent strategies is 
continually altering: i f agents can find pattern in the collective behaviour, then they 
can exploit that pattern, causing i t disappear: 
"K several people expect many to go because many went three weeks 
ago, they will stay at home" '^* 
This underlies the efficient market hypothesis mentioned in Section 1.3.1. Al l pertinent 
information about stock prices in a market is discounted immediately. I f agents can 
find a pattern in market prices which they can exploit, then that exploitation will 
tend to destroy the pattern. Markets are thus seen as moving under Gaussian noise, 
hypothesised (from experimental evidence) to approximate the distribution of changes 
in market prices due to new information being discounted. 
Despite the apparent near stasis that emerges, approximately k agents going to the 
bar on each occasion, there is a rich dynamical structure underlying the system: 
"After some initial learning time, the hypotheses or mental models are 
mutually co-adapted. Thus we can think of a consistent set of mental models 
as a set of hypotheses that work well with each other under some criterion 
- that they have a high degree of mutual adaptedness. Sometimes there is a 
unique such set... IVIore often there is a high, possibly very high, multiplicity 
of such sets. In this case we might expect... [such systems] to cycle through 
or temporarily lock into psychological patterns that may be non-recurrent. 
Arthur [3]. 
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path dependent and increasingly complicated »15 
In this type of system, the collective dynamics remain stable, whilst the population 
may undergo shifts between various distributions of agent hypotheses. This will not 
always be the case. In the IPD, changes in agent hypothesis set can change the collective 
response of the system, affecting not just the utility of individual agents or hypotheses, 
but the collective behaviour of the entire population. 
1.4 The Instability of Interacting Populations 
In the above section, i t has been established that the phenomenon of meta-stability in 
populations of interacting agents exists, and that i t has been noted across a variety of 
simulations on a number of differing games. In the ASM's that have been discussed, 
differing initial conditions can result in either technical or fundamental trading regimes 
becoming prevalent. In the case of the technical regime there appears to be a quasi-cyclic 
behaviour consisting of bubbles and crashes. Whether this is a true cyclic behaviour, 
or is the result of systemic properties of the ASM simulation is an open question. That 
is to say that i t is not known whether the quasi-cycle of bubbles and crashes should 
be considered as a cyclic behaviour with some stochasticity in the period, or whether 
they are two different regimes, with a stochastic process determining the transition 
between them. This question will be further discussed in section 6.1, in the light of 
experimental evidence. In the case of the IPD simulations the instabilities have been 
noted by a number of researcliers, and take the form of sudden catastrophic shifts in 
the way that members of the population play against each other. 
This section explores the idea of stochasticity within populations from a non tech-
nical angle. The first notion considered is genetic drift , wliich has been held by many 
'^Arthur [3]. 
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(e.g. [11, 10, 34, 43]) to be responsible for the instability in populations of IPD playing 
agents. This is followed by an exploration of the basics of statistical dynamics, whicli 
has been used very successfully in thermodynamics, and a consideration of how its 
techniques might be of practical use in explaining evolutionary dynamics. 
1.4.1 Genetic Drift: Mutation as a Diffusive Operator 
Consider a population of individuals all sharing the same genotype. The mutation 
operator wil l , over time, alter various sites on the genomes of particular individuals, so 
the population now forms a cloud around the original genotype in the genome space. 
I t will be shown in Section 2.1.1 that this is a Fokker-Planck process, i.e. the simple 
diffusion of the population around its original position. Obviously, whilst the genotypic 
cloud maintains the same phenotype, diffusion will continue unabated. However, i f the 
phenotype alters at some point then there may be a drif t towards the new phenotype (if 
i t is favourable). A mathematical treatment of the probability of a favourable mutant 
becoming fixed within the population is given in Section 2.1.6. 
Let us now further suppose that it is not possible to mutate from the original 
phenotype to a more favourable phenotype without first mutating to a less favourable 
phenotype. There is no path from the present genotype to one corresponding to a 
more favourable phenotype that does not first cross an area of lowered fitness. Now 
the diffusive mutation will spread the population until (in the l imit) the population 
tends towards an entropy maximising distribution across this area. Clearly then, if the 
original genotype was not in the centre of the iso-phenotypic area, then the diffusion 
of the population across that area can lead to a population with a high variance and a 
mean at some distance from the original genotype. 
This phenomenon is further discussed in Section 2.1.3. There are cases where rather 
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than gaining a maximal entropy distribution, fixation of neutral alleles may occur with-
in such a population. A neutral allele is one which confers neither an evolutionary 
advantage or disadvantage on its possessor. Biologists still argue about whether neu-
tral alleles actually exist, but in GA theory the existence of neutral sites on the genome 
is accepted. In this case, a neutral site on the genome will lead to a plateau, or neutral 
area, in the fitness landscape; the favourability of the phenotype is unaffected by the 
contents of this particular site. There is no constraint on the point in the neutral area 
around which the population becomes fixed. 
I t is this phenomenon that accounts for the so-called genetic drift . When there is a 
change in the environment, which leads to different aspects of the phenotype becoming 
selected for, the population can respond in unexpected ways, because the continued 
phenotypic invariance is not reflected at a genotypic level. The sites that are neutral 
in the original environment may not remain neutral in a changed environment. Over a 
period of time, a population can forget its optimal response to an environment, because 
the genes that code for that response are no longer selected for. I f the environment 
then returns to the original environment, the population may no longer respond in the 
original manner, and this can lead to events as extreme as extinctions. Even i f the 
new environment mirrors the environment out of which the original genotype emerged, 
there is no guarantee that the population will still be viable in this new environment, 
as the genome cloud is centred about a different point in the space, which may now 
have differing characteristics. In the case of an interacting population this effect may 
be more pronounced as the variance of the population cloud can have a profound effect 
on the performance of individuals within that cloud. 
Diffusive mutation can not only take place across neutral landscapes (i.e. areas 
of the genome space which are equi-fitness under currently obtaining environmental 
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conditions), but also takes place where there is a fitness gradient. The drift can occur 
either in parallel or normal to the direction of the gradient. Whilst the population raay 
be moving in a specific direction, the diffusion around the centre of that population 
will still occur, and can still be modelled using a Fokker-Planck process. The most 
interesting case detailed by Kauffraan [46], is where the population is initially centred 
about a local fitness-maxima. The rate at which the population spreads is determined 
by the local gradient of the fitness landscape and the mutation rate. 
Assume that the centre of the cloud remains static. The cloud now surrounds a 
peak within the fitness landscape. The population is attempting to diffuse across the 
landscape by a process of point mutations on individual sites on the genomes of each 
member of the population; each site on every genome having a small, finite chance of 
mutation. Against this pressure outwards away from the peak is the selection pressure, 
forcing the population to stay on the peak. Assume that the selection is deterministi-
cally based upon the fitness, which is in turn deterministic. Then only the k individuals 
closest to the fitness peak will survive each generation. There will be some turnover and 
movement within this population, caused by mutation of the population. This fairly 
static population will occupy the area closest to the fitness peak, and its area will be 
determined by the relative strengths of the selection and mutation pressures. Around 
this area is a second zone which also contains members of the population, which are the 
mutated offspring of the surviving population. Individuals within this population are 
very unlikely to survive to reproduce. In the case that none of the individuals within this 
zone survive to reproduce, the distribution of the portion of the population within this 
zone is dependent only upon the mutation rate. The stochastic process used to model 
mutation is capable of producing jumps across the landscape of arbitrary l e n g t h I t is 
Although this may not be true in every case. 
^^When measured using some appropriate metric, such as the Hamming metric. 
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thus possible for the population to become established on peaks in distant parts of the 
landscape, given a sufficient waiting time. This principal will be of prime importance 
in Chapter 3. 
1.4.2 Statistical and Thermodynamic Formulations 
In Section 1,3 a number of systems have been discussed as systems of interacting a-
gents. In some of these systems, a discrepancy can be observed between the collective 
behaviour of the system, and the behaviour of individuals. Most striking in this respect 
are the co-ordination problems, where a stable collective behaviour emerges despite the 
rich dynamics of the underlying population. This is analogous to thermodynamics and 
statistical physics, where order at a macroscopic or collective level can hide stochasticity 
or disorder at a lower, microscopic level. In this section, the approaches of statistical 
physics and thermodynamics are discussed at a non-technical level. The relationship 
between events at the micro- and macroscopic levels will be discussed, especially the 
influence of microscopic events on macroscopic behaviours. 
Statistical dynamics is based upon the premise that when dealing with a system 
containing a very large number of identical parts, it is possible to describe some aspects 
of the system (usually some functions of the lower order cumulants or moments of some 
property of individuals) without knowing the state of the entire system. For example, in 
thermodynamics, six real parameters (a six dimensional vector) are required to describe 
the state of an individual molecule (3 for position and 3 for momentum) at any point 
in time. In a gas with the order of 10^ ** or so molecules it would require a massive state 
space to describe the state of the gas fully, and this would be far beyond conceptual 
or computational resources. The alternative is to try and describe the gas using, for 
example, statistical measures of the energy of the particles, to provide information 
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on temperature and pressure. The mathematics of this is rather involved (using the 
calculus of variations), but leads to models of the behaviour of gases which account 
very well for the observed behaviour of gases. 
The statistical techniques applied usually involve a reduction in the dimensionality 
of the problem by binning the elements of the system. The statistics of the ensemble 
can be considered by taking the statistics of the set of bins. Stochastic approaclies 
can be used to model the transition probabilities of individual elements between bins 
(the so-called master-equation approach, which will be used in Chapter 2), even when 
these elements behave deterministically. In very large populations, the accuracy of the 
approximations is usually good, because the affects of individual transitions wash each 
other out. Macroscopic stability can thus emerge, despite the rich dynamical behaviour 
at a microscopic level. 
There are two ways in which this separation between levels can break down, allowing 
microscopic events to determine macroscopic structure: 
Reduction in Population Size If the number of elements in the system is not suf-
ficiency large, the dynamics of groups of individual elements are no longer well 
approximated by a stochastic approach. The stochastic fluctuations in macro-
scopic structure are usually considered to be of order l / y / u j in a system of n 
elements. As n becomes small, the magnitude of these fluctuations can become 
significant; discrepancies between observed and predicted behaviour are observed 
within finite waiting times. This can lead to bifurcations in finite systems. This 
point will be returned to in Section 3.3. 
Breakdown of the Strong Law of Large Numbers There are majiy systems for 
which the stocliastic approach fails to accurately model the dynamics of the sys-
tem. This is because, even with increasing numbers of elements, the variance of 
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the approximating distribution fails to converge to zero. In this case, the micro-
scopic dynamics play a significant role in determining macroscopic behaviours, 
even in effectively infinite populations. This can lead to global co-ordination in 
systems without global transport or information mechanisms, for example many 
physio-chemicaJ systems such as the Beloutov-Zhabotinski reaction. Such sys-
tems are discussed in depth by Nicolis & Prigogine [64 , 
Similar techniques may be used with evolutionary dynamics. The idea here is that 
within a large population it is not necessary (or even feasible) to know the exact state 
of the genotype of every individual within that population. By defining suitable order 
parameters which characterise the infinite limit behaviour of the system, the descrip-
tion of the full system can be reduced to a description of the dynamics of the order 
parameters. In order for this to be possible, these order parameters must be closed in 
the infinite limit. This means that in this limit, the dynamics of the order parameters 
must be dependent upon those order parameters, and not upon the underlying popula-
tion distribution. The dynamics of the Royal Road GA have been analysed using this 
technique [79], and this work will be reviewed in Section 2,2.3. 
This technique is particularly applicable to an evolutionary model of a population 
of adaptive interactive agents. In general, interactions within the population take place 
between groups of randomly chosen individuals (ranging from a minimum of two, up 
to the whole population), that is to say that each individual has no control over which 
other individuals it may interact with. The evolution of the population is thus de-
pendent on the expected composition of such interacting groups. In Chapter 4 this 
approach will be developed for a particular model by a reduction of .the system to a set 
of behavioural groups. Stochastic approximations based upon a master equation ap-
proach are then used to model the transition probabilities between such groups under 
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particular evolutionary operators. 
1.5 Aims and Methods of this Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the stability of populations of interacting agents. 
In this chapter a number of empirical studies of populations of interacting agents have 
been discussed. In all of these works, transitions between behavioural regimes have 
occurred, and in some cases the efficient or material causes of these transitions have 
been explored. This thesis will attempt a discussion of the formal causality of such 
transitions: it attempts to answer the question *why do such behavioural transitions 
occur?* with an explanation in terms of the underlying commonalties in the structure 
of all such systems. 
In the following chapters the problem of the stability of a population of interact-
ing agents is explored further. In Chapter 2, the mathematical preliminaries will be 
dealt with. Various approaches to mathematical population genetics will be discussed, 
together with their limitations. Specifically, the two main approaclies to this field will 
be discussed, the diffusion equation approach, and the statistical dynamics or ther-
modynamic approadi. These will be placed in the context of the theory of genetic 
algorithms, and of evolutionary search. Chapter 2 also contains a discussion of the 
behaviour of dynamical systems under the influence of noise. This will be shown to 
induce raeta-stability in otherwise stable systems. 
In Chapter 3, an approach to the dynamics and stability of populations of interacting 
agents will be developed, based upon the ideas discussed in Chapter 2. First, the 
evolution of a population of interacting agents under asexual reproduction and mutation 
is discussed from a diffusion equation approach. The additional non-linearities that are 
introduced are pointed out. At this point, the discussion will focus on the transition 
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from the infinite limit to an extremely large finite population, and thence downwards 
towards smaller finite populations. The stochastic deviations from the infinite limit 
dynamics will be discussed in detail; the dynamics of a finite system of interacting 
agents will be shown to correspond to the infinite limit dynamics with an additive noise 
term. Finally, Chapter 3 discusses how a statistical formulation of such a system might 
overcome some of the analytical problems discussed. 
Chapter 4 develops a simple model of a population of interacting adaptive agents. 
This is a highly simplified artificial stock market. The rationale and design criteria for 
this model are discussed, along with the detail of the model itself. Order parameters 
for the model, based on behavioural classes are put forward, and a mathematical treat-
ment of the dynamics of these behavioural classes in the infinite limit is put forward. 
The approach is from a statistical dynamics standpoint, heavily dependent upon the 
backdrop of Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 5, the empirical behaviour of the model is put forward. An information 
theoretic approach to the validation of the statistical formulation in the infinite limit is 
put forward; the predicted behaviour and the observed behaviour are shown to converge 
as population size increases. Fixed points of the statistical formulation are calculated 
by numerical methods, and the trajectory of various order parameters around their 
fixed point values are exhibited for various population sizes. Certain aspects of system 
dynamics are examined in detail; the dynamics of *boom and bust* events are analysed 
and shown to have a strong deterministic component, even in small populations. Finally, 
Chapter 5 considers the relative dependence of the system dynamics upon statistical 
and environment fluctuations. 
Chapter 6 attempts to integrate the underlying stochasticity of interacting adaptive 
systems presented in Chapter 3, with the details of the model in Chapter 4 and the 
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empirical observations in Chapter 5. An explanation is put forwards for the behaviour 
of the model; the observed behaviour is consistent with the system having at least two 
attracting regimes. One is a fixed point corresponding to the fundamental regime noted 
by Arthur et al. [5]. The other attractors correspond to risinig and falling returns; when 
the system enters the basin of such an attractor *boom and bust' dynamics are observed. 
The effects of population size on the dynamics of the system are also considered in 
Chapter 6. Three dynamical regimes are suggested for systems of interacting adaptive 
agents, although no sharp bifurcations in system behaviour are noted. This Chapter 
also contains a critique of the work presented in Chapters 3,4, and 5, and particularly 
of both the model chosen and the mathematical approach to that model. The thesis 
closes with a discussion of possible directions for future work. 
1.5.1 Contribution 
Meta-stability is an established phenomenon in the literature. This thesis demonstrates 
that a range of models and simulations of interacting groups of agents share a common 
phenomenology; periods of stability punctuated by sudden shifts in the make up of the 
group. This common phenomenology is characterised as meta-stability. The thesis pos-
tulates that the shared phenomenology is due to a shared ontology; the meta-stability 
is due to a common formal cause. This cause is identified as a dependency of the fun-
damental forces of exploration and exploitation (which underlie adaptation) on a social 
measure of utility. This acerbates the stochastic fluctuations inherent in the explorative 
and exploitative forces; these fluctuations remain a significant factor in determining a 
system's trajectory even in quite large populations. In particular, the thesis makes 
four contributions to the understanding of the dynamics of adaptation in interacting 
populations. 
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1. The thesis draws together mathematical models from various disciplines, all of 
which are in some way concerned with the dynamics of adaptation. Based upon 
these models, a mathematical approach to the dynamics of adaptive populations 
of interacting agents is formed. It is hypothesised that raetastability is caused by 
the fluctuations inherent in the adaptive process, magnified by the non-linearities 
in the system due to the interactions between agents. 
2. The thesis identifies the requirements of a computational model of metastability. 
(a) It must be simple enough to allow a degree of mathematical analysis of the 
model. 
(b) It must retain enough complexity to display meta-stable behaviour. 
3. The analysis of the computational model relies on its characterisation in terms 
of behavioural order parameters. Others, for example, Glance [33], have de-
scribed systems in terras of behaviour. However, this is a novel characterisation, 
recognising behaviours as order parameters of an underlying and more complex 
microscopic system. Such systems have previously been described using aspects 
of agent fitness as order parameters. 
4. The model demonstrates important features of adaptive interacting systems, in 
particular the relationship between stochastic and deterministic components of 
the system. This effect of population size on this relationship is examined. 
It is believed that the cross-entropic methods used to validate the correspondence 
between the computational model and its analytic formalisation may also be novel. 
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Chapter 2 
Mathematical PreUminaries 
In the previous chapter, the general field of the evolution of interacting agents has been 
reviewed. In this chapter, various mathematical approaches to the analysis of the evo-
lution of a population will be considered. These basically fall into two categories. First 
there are what might be termed the classical approaches to population genetics. These 
tend to be based on differential equations, and produce limiting results for limt_^ oo-
There are also more recent approaches to the problem, which are based heavily on 
GA theory, and use statistical dynamics formulations borrowed from thermodynamics. 
These will be described as thermodynamic approaches to population genetics. This 
chapter also considers the evolution of continuous dynamical systems when they are 
subjected to additive or multiplicative noise terms. 
The comparative review conducted in this chapter will be used to inform the devel-
opment of both the mathematical models in Chapter 3, and the experimental model 
considered in Chapter 4. 
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2.0.2 Notation 
This chapter, and the chapters that follow it, contain much mathematical analysis. 
Whilst the notation is all standard, a number of common abbreviations used are noted 
below: 
p.d.e. partial differential equation 
l.h.s. left hand side 
r.h.s. right hand side 
p.d.f. probability density function 
2.1 Classical Approaches 
Here the term 'classical* is taken to imply that the approaches are based on differential 
and partial diflFerential equation formalisations of the problems of population genetics. 
Historically, these originate with the work of Wright [86, 87], extended by Kimura 
[50, 51]. These were further extended by Moran [61], Watterson [83] and Ewens [22, 23], 
who examined waiting time problems in population genetics and an assessment of the 
accuracy of diffusion equation approximations, although this work is not reviewed here. 
The following is based on the review article by Kimura [51], which is also summarised 
by van Nimwegen [78]. The original use of these approaches has been in the analysis 
of single genes, their probabilities of fixation, the evolution of the population under 
various conditions. However, there is no fundamental reason why such an approach 
might not be used in a multidimensional case, with a number of independent genes. 
2.1.1 The Diffusion Model 
This is a treatment similar to a p.d.e. approach to the motion of particles in a po-
tential field, where there is a significant diffusion. It is an approximation, a discrete 
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time stochastic process (mutation) is modelled as a continuous time diffusion process. 
However, where the analysis remains tractable, and the system falls within limitations 
discussed in Section 2.1.7, it yields precise predictions of system evolution. 
There are a number of diff'ering ways of gaining the diffusion model. This one is 
based upon the expansion of the Taylor Series around a point in the distribution of 
gene frequencies. Another approach (which is considered in Section 3.2) is based upon 
the idea of the flow of gene frequency across a point. Both approaches lead to the same 
equation, although the former is more rigorous, and the latter more intuitive. 
Consider a population of A'' diploid individuals (that is to say, eacli individual has 
two chromosomes at each locus on its genome). Each chromosome may take the form of 
one of two alleles Ai,A2. At time* the frequency of allele Ai is x, and of is 1—x. The 
original frequency of allele i4i at i = 0 is p. Assume that the population is large, so that 
the gene frequency distribution will effectively behave as a continuous variable. The 
process of gene frequency change will be modelled as a continuous stochastic process. A 
continuous stochastic process is one in which, given any positive value e, the probability 
that a change 5x in x will be greater than e in time period t+6t is o((Si), an infinitesimal 
of higher order than St. Less formally, this means that as the time periods considered 
are reduced towards zero, the amount of change in gene frequency, x also becomes zero. 
This process is also considered to be Markovian: there is a one-step dependence of the 
present state on the immediate past state, but no further historical dependencies. 
Let (^ (p, x\ t) be the conditional probability density that at time t the gene frequency 
is X given that it was p at time t = Q. Then the probability that x lies within any range 
dx will be (^ (p, x; t)dx. Given a population of a total of 2A^ genes at the locus, the gene 
frequency will be 
f{x,t) = 4>ip,x;t)^ ( 0 < x < l ) (2-1) 
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Note the limits for which this equation is valid. At the boundary points x = 0 and 
X = 1 this is no longer valid. 
Let g{5xjX,5t,t) be the probability that x changes from x to x + 6x in the time 
period {t,t-\-St). Then 
<l>(p,x;t-\-6t) = f g{Sx,x,6t,t)(l>{p,x\t)d{5x) 
J6X 
(2.2) 
Using the Taylor Series expansion 
f{a + h)= / (a) + hf'ia) + ^f"{a) + ... (2.3) 
and writing 0(p, x; <) as <^  and g{Sx, x, (Ji, t) as g then the r.h.s. of 2.2 may be expanded 
as 
^ . - ^ 4 ( ^ , ) + M ^ ( 0 , ) + (2.4) 
hence 
(f>{p,x-t + 6t) = (f>j gd(6x) 
~Ix I ^ ^^^^^^^ 
+\^,[l>l{6x)'gd{6x) 
(2.5) 
Now / gd{6x) = 1, so the first term on the r.h.s. evaluates to <j). Subtracting 0 from 
both sides and dividing through by 6t gives 
<l>{p,x;t + 6t)-<j>{{p,x;t) 
6t 
6_ 
Sx 
^ / 5xgdi6x) 
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2 6x^ 
(2.6) 
Recall that J{6x)gd{6x) = J{5x)g{6x,Xj6t,t)d{5x), it becomes clear that as V\m5t -4 0 
is approached, the r.h.s. becomes the sum of the moments of g w.r.t. 6x\ Let 
i/^o^/^*^^^^^^'^''^^^^'*)^^^'^) = M{x,t) (2.7) 
\\myj{6x)'g{6x,x,^ = V{x,t) (2.8) 
Here M and V are respectively the first ajid second order moments, the mean and 
variance of the distribution X of the allele Ai 
Then, assuming that all higher order terms in Sx tend to zero as limit ^ 0 is 
approached, 2.6 reduces to 
= \j^iV{x,t)<l>{p,x;t)) - l^{M{x,t)<i>[p,x;t)) (2.9) 
This is the basic diff'usion equation, known as the Fokker-Planck or Kolmagorov forward 
equation. On the assumption that M{x,t) and V{x,t) are time independent, and 
writing them as Msx and Vsx respectively gives 
This simplified version of the Fokker-Planck equation suflices for the particular cases 
that Kimura [51] considers. 
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2.1.2 The Kolmagorov Backwards Equation in Population Ge-
netics 
The derivation given above considers the evolution of a population where the initial gene 
frequency across the population is known and derives a differential equation that gives 
the probability that the gene frequency takes any particular value after a fixed period 
t. It is also possible to reverse the derivation, and obtain the probability distribution 
across initial gene frequencies at time t = 0 given that at time t, the frequency x takes 
a given value. This reverse form of the equation is known as the Kolmagorov Backward 
equation. Based upon the principle of the derivation of the Fokker-Planck equation, the 
Kolmagorov backward equation will be derived [51 . 
The derivation is very similar to that of the forward equation; the only additional 
assumption being one of time homogeneity. That is to say that it is assumed that the 
underlying processes are independent of the time at which they occur. The transfor-
mation from a distribution Xi at time U to x^ at time t-i (given ti < 2^) is independent 
of ti and ^2, and is dependent only upon the intervening period t2 - h. 
<l>{p.x]t) = j g{5p,p\St)<i>{j) + 6p,x-t)d{5p) (2.11) 
Note that the time homogeneity condition now makes g independent of t. A similar 
derivation to that of 2.9 gains 
which can be written as 
^A-Y^^^MJ-^ (213) 
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The Kolraagorov backward equation can be used to derive two interesting results. 
X = 1 imphes that a gene is fixed within the population, i.e. all members of the 
population carry that gene. Denote the probability that the gene is fixed within the 
population at time t by u{p,t). Then 
5u{p,t) _Vs,SMp.t) 6u(p,t) 
which can be solved given V^ p and M p^, under the boundary conditions u(0, t) = 0 and 
u( l , i ) = 1, One might also be interested in 
u{j))=\imu{jp,t) (2.15) 
t-*00 
the limit probability of a gene being fixed. Here 5u/St = 0, and the equation reduces 
to 
under the boundary condition u{0) = 0,u(l) = 1. 
2.1.3 Random Drift in the Narrow Sense 
Suppose there exists an isolated population of diploid individuals, who all possess 
either allele Ai or A2 which have frequencies x, 1 —x within the population respectively. 
Mating between individuals is random between pairs of individuals taken from the 
population, taking 1 allele from each parent ^ Hence there are a total of 2A^ alleles 
in the population. There is no mutation, so once either allele has become fixed (either 
*Kimura's derivation is under the (biological) assumption that the population contains equal num-
bers of males and females, and that in each mating, one allele is taken from a male, and one from a 
female. Whilst this assumption is stated, it does not affect the form of the equations, which are equally 
valid in GA theory. 
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X = 0 or X = 1 ) it cannot become unfixed. Assume that there is no selection pressure 
towards either allele, and that the variance term can be approximated by the variance 
in a binomial population of 2A'' alleles, i.e. 
Mrfp = 0 (2.17) 
y,. = ' - ^ (2.18) 
Substituting into 2.10 
At time t = 0 the frequency of the gene within the population is p. The conditional 
probability density at this time takes the form of a Dirac delta function 
0(p,x;O)=5(x-p) (2.20) 
The solution method proceeds from assuming that the solution takes the form <t> = TX 
where T is a function of t alone, and X is a function of x alone. Substituting this into 
2.19, and dividing through by TX gives 
Note the form of this equation. The l.h.s. is a function of t alone, and the r.h.s is a 
function of x alone. For these two to be equal, they must both be equal to some constant, 
- A , say. Both sides may be solved independently to gain T and X. Separating gives 
(x(l - x)X) = - A (2.23) 
4NX (5x2 
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2.22 has a solution of the form 
T oc e"^' (2.24) 
while 2.23 can be expanded to 
i ( l - 1 ) ^ + 2(1 - 2 i ) ^ - (2 - 4N)XX = 0 (2.25) 
dx' Ox 
which is of the form of the hypergeometric equation 
i ( l - x)X" + [7 - (a + ^ + l)a;] X' - apX = 0 (2.26) 
where 
3 + 
"" —JZZ 
3 - N/1 + 16NX 
^ = 2 
7 = 2 
subject to the boundary condition that the solution must be finite at 2; = 0 and x = 1. 
The solution to 2.19 is complicated by the fact that there are an infinite number of 
possible values that A can take. The values of 01,^,7 imply that the set of values that 
A can take, known as the eigenvalues^ Aj is given by 
The solution to 2.25 can be expressed as the infinite weighted sura of a set of orthogonal 
functions. In this case we chose to use the Gegenbauer polynomials^ 
TIM = " - ^ ^ m + 2,1 - i , 2; i ^ ) (2.28) 
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where F is the hypergeometric function and z = 1 — 2x. The solution to 2.25 now 
becomes 
<i>ip,x;t) = '^CiTUz)e-'^ (2.29) 
The initial condition given in 2.20 can now be used to determine the weights Cj. The 
resulting weighted infinite sura of hypergeometric functions may be expressed as 
+30p(l -p)( l -2x)e -3^/C2yv) 
+ . . . (2.30) 
For t > 0 this series is uniformly convergent in both x and p, and the higher order 
terms are negligent. AsymptoticaJly the first term becomes dominant, and is a fairly 
good approximation to the solution. Now clearly 
# ( t ) = f'~ (l>(p,x;t)dx (2.31) 
gives the probability that aJleles Ai and A2 still co-exist in the population. Note the 
limits of the integral; the derivation is not valid at the absorbing boundaries. The 
exponential decay terms in 2.30 indicate that the probability 3>(t), 2.31, is constantly 
decreasing; as time goes on, the probability becomes greater and greater that either 
one of the alleles has become fixed within the population. In this case, the system 
could be thought of as having two attractors x = 0 and i = 1, either of which may be 
approached as t -¥ 00. I t is possible to show that if the original frequency of ai is p, 
then the asymptotic probability that Ai will become fixed is also p [78 . 
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2.1.4 Random Fluctuation of Selection Intensities 
Another interesting case which illustrates the power of the diffusion equation approacli, 
and whicli shows an interesting behaviour, is the case of random fluctuations in the 
selection intensity. 
Assume that the population is infinite (so the effects of random sampling may be 
ignored), and that the allele Ai is selectively neutral in the long run. That is to say 
that given a long enough time period, Ai will neither be selected for, nor against. 
Introduce fluctuations in the selective advantage of Ai over A2. Let the rate of change 
of frequency of >li be s x ( l - x ) , where s is the (varying) selection rate. Let the variance 
in the selection rate be a constant, Vg. Then 
Ms, = 0 
Substituting into 2.10 gives 
Sct> V, 
St 2^x^[^^(^-^)^^l ^'-''^ 
This equation may be solved by the substitution [51 
u = ^ e ^ ' ^ x t ( l - x ) i 
^ = log 
1 - x 
which reduces 2.32 to the heat diffusion equation over the range -oo < ^ < oo. 
6u V,6'u 2^ 33) 
6t 2 5^--
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Figure 2.1: The process of change in the gene frequency distribution under a random 
fluctuation of selection intensities. There is no long term selection pressure towards 
either allele, there is no dominance, and initiaJly p = 0.5 and = 0.0483. Based on a 
figure in Kiraura [51] 
The solution to the heat diffusion equation is well known, and takes the form 
Substituting back for u and ^ gives a solution from any initial frequency distribution. 
Given a known initial frequency p the solution can be further reduced to become 
<i>[p,x\t) = exp< 2VA 
(2.35) 
A set of solutions to this equation, over a range of values or t with an initial fixed 
distribution is shown in Figure 2.1. The important point to note is that despite the 
initial fixed frequency, and in the absence of any long term selection pressure, one of 
the two alleles can become (almost) fixed. In fact, <l> takes on a value of 0 at both 
terminals, so this phenomenon is referred to as quasi-fixation [49]. 
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2.1.5 Gene Frequency Distribution at Equilibrium 
If ^ = 0 in 2.10 one may explicitly solve for the equilibrium gene frequency distribution. 
Simple manipulation reveals that 
(j){x) <x exp f iW, 
J K 
M^{x) 
dx (2.36) 
'dx(a:) 
Suppose the forwards and backwards mutation rates are q and v respectively. Then 
Mdx{x) -qx + v{l - x) and Vdx{x) = 2.36 becomes 
^ ( x ) a x 2 ^ ^ - ^ ( l - x ) 2 ^ ' - » (2.37) 
This is an important equation. I t states that the equilibrium gene frequency distri-
bution depends on the interplay between the population size M and the forward and 
backward mutation rates q and v. Assume (as is usually the case) that q = v. For large 
populations relative to the mutation rate {2Mq :$> 1) we find a binomial distribution 
about X = 0.5, which is what one might intuitively expect for a large or infinite popu-
lation. As the population drops we find that the population distribution changes. For 
2Mq = 1 we have a uniform distribution, and for 2Mq < 1 the population distribution 
is essentially U-shaped. Here the sampling fluctuations within a small population effec-
tively overwhelm the diffusive effects, and the population is likely to become quasi-fixed 
about one allele or the other. 
2.1.6 Fixation of Mutant Genes within a Population 
An important question to be considered is the probability that a favourable mutant gene 
will become fixed within a population. I t is not the case that every time a favourable 
mutant is introduced into a population i t will survive. I f the frequency of the favourable 
mutant is p at i = 0, then by using the Kolmagorov Backward equation, the limiting 
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probability 
^ ( p ) = l i m ^ ( p , i ) (2.38) 
t—^00 
can be obtained. Since 6<f>{p)/St = 0 at this limit, 2.13 reduces to the ordinary differ-
ential equation 
2 dp2 dp 2 + ^ ' P ^ = 0 (2-39) 
under the boundary conditions 0(0) = 0,(^(1) = 1. The general solution of this is 
/o G{x)dx 
where 
. G ( x ) = e x p ( - / ? ^ ) (2.41) 
Mrfx and are respectively the mean and variance of the expected change in gene 
frequency per generation. 
The simplest case, which is of most interest here, is that of genie selection, where 
a mutant gene with selective advantage 5 in a haploid population of size i.e. a 
population which has only one chromosome per locus on the genome^. The initial 
frequency of the mutant gene is simply 1/A .^ Then Msx = sx{l - x) and Vsx = x{l -
x)/N. Hence 2.40 reduces to 
1 _ p-^iVap 
= (2.42) 
which, for I 5 I small, can be approximated by 
^This condition occurs in many lower organisms, and at certain stages of the life-cycle of higher 
organisms. 
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2.1.7 Limitations to the Diffusion Equation Approach 
Gillespie [32] discusses limitations of the diffusion equation approacli in population 
genetics. There axe two areas that these limitations fall into, problems involving unequal 
parameters, and problems involving fluctuating parameters. In general terms, these 
problems result in alternative differential equation formulations being more appropriate 
to particular problems than a diffusion equation. 
Unequal parameters 
Classical approaches to the population genetics approximate a discrete time stochastic 
process, selection under mutation, with continuous time processes that yield differential 
equations. This approach relies on various assumptions. Karlin & McGregor [45] point 
out that such a model relies on an implicit limiting argument concerning a rescaling of 
time, and the rates at which various parameters tend to zero. The resulting differential 
equation is dependent upon the relative rates at which these parameters approach zero. 
The following example (from [32]) is instructive. 
Consider a population of size n with a choice of two possible alleles, with forwards 
and backwards mutation rates u. The mean and variance of the change of frequency of 
one of the alleles is 
= 2 u ( i - x ) (2.44) 
z 
.2/A_^ a : ( l - x ) a'(Ax) 
n 
The standard approach assumes that u ajid l/n are small and of the same magnitude, 
and that time is measured in units of n generations. The limit n -> oo yields the 
diffusion 
E{dx) = 2u{l-x)dt (2.45) 
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E{dx^) ^ x{l-x)dt 
The terms E{dx) and E{dx^) are the first and second order moments of the result-
ing distribution, corresponding to the terms M and V respectively, in Section 2.1.1. 
Mathematically, 2.45 requires u = 0 ( l / n ) . I f this is not the case, then the resulting 
differential approximation may not be a diffusion, or i f it is, may lead to a different 
diffusion. For example, i f u = 0(1/y/n), then the resulting diffusion corresponds to the 
Omstein-Uhlenbeck process. The physical interpretation of this is a diffusion process 
corresponding to a set of particles under Brownian motion with an elastic force [25]. 
Given a constant mutation rate, the appropriate classical model of the system may vary 
as the population size changes, even when the population size is large enough that the 
stochastic fluctuations are negligible. Feller [24] derives a full equation showing the 
interdependence of gene frequency and population size. 
Similar arguments hold concerning the relationship between selection and rautar 
tion strengths, and selection and population size, which can yield quite different ap-
proximations to the standard diffusion approach. However, Gillespie points out that 
mathematical tractability to a large extent determines the choice of models: 
"The pre-eminent position of the neutral allele theory as an explanation 
for molecular evolution may be due more to the simplicity of its mathematics 
than to its biological underpinnings."^ 
Fluctuating parameters 
Recall the discussion of adaptation in Section 1.1.1. I t was noted that adaptive processes 
are situated in their environment. Here the effect of the environment in changing the 
relative values that parameters take is considered. For example, the binomial sampling 
^Gillespie [32]. 
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of selectively neutral alleles is held to account for genetic drift . In binomial sampling, 
the moments of order greater than two of the resulting distribution converge at a greater 
rate than the lower order moments. In an infinite l imit this implies convergence to a 
Gaussian distribution. However, there is no a-phon justification of such an assumption 
of the relative convergence rates of moments. Environmental fluctuations may have a 
bearing on sampling distributions; and thus alter population dynamics. In particular, 
Gillespie [32] considers that the power law distribution may be far more relevant in a 
variety of natural processes. Certainly the Bak-Sneppan [8, 66] model of co-evolution 
leads to phenomena distributed according to a power law (see Section 1.2.5 for discussion 
of the Bak-Sneppan model). 
2.2 Statistical Dynamics Approaches 
In this section, we will review approaches to the dynamics of populations of adaptive 
agents via an approach borrowed from statistical physics. In particular, approaches will 
be considered to the population dynamics of infinite and finite populations of agents 
under a genetic algorithm. In this approach a statistical view of the mutation, selection 
(and possibly also crossover) operators that are commonly used is taken. The actual 
genotypic state of any member of the population becomes a microscopic parameter, 
and the above operators act at a microscopic level. Statistical methods can be used to 
gauge the effects of these operators on macroscopic parameters, such as the low order 
cumulants of the fitness distribution. For certain problems, these methods have proved 
remarkably effective in explaining the evolutionary dynamics of the population. 
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2.2.1 Microscopic Dynamics of a Genetic Algorithm 
Vose and Liepens [81] put forwards a macroscopic description of the workings of a 
genetic algorithm, in terms of a pair of operators, a mixing operator M and a fitness 
operator !F, Whilst the detail of this paper lies beyond the mathematical competence 
of the author, an outline of the basic results will be given. 
The general approach of this paper is to model a genetic search process as a Markov 
process, in order to find the infinite population limit population distribution. The most 
interesting point raised by this paper is the reduction of the evolutionary operator to 
the combination of mixing and fitness operators: this allows the separation of the ex-
ploratory and exploitative aspects of evolutionary search. Moreover, the paper presents 
theorems which allow the selection of evolutionary operators in whicli these compo-
nents are separable. These theorems rely on properties of the mixing matrix, when 
transformed into a basis of Walsh functions, which have been shown [12, 35, 36] to have 
important applications in OA theory. They then go on to show that in the case where 
the fitness operator is linear, there is a single attracting fixed point to the system. 
Whilst this paper has a very interesting, and highly mathematical approach to the 
problem of genetic search, i t is not unproblematic in various respects: 
1. The approach taken is to consider a system with n possible genotypes as an n-
dimensional dynamical system under a combination of matrix operators, !F and 
M. In any realistic genetic search problem, this is analytically impractical, as the 
size of the problem scales as 0(2") , where n is the genome length. 
2. The Walsh-basis approach is very much founded upon the schemata-theory ap-
proach of Holland [42]. This has come in for recent criticism from Nimwegen et 
al. [78], who claim that rather than combine useful building blocks, crossover 
acts as a non-linear mixing operator on sites not fixed in the best member of the 
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population. This effectively increases the mutation rate. In short, doubt has been 
cast on the usefulness of the schemata approach. 
3. Whilst this paper does further the understanding of genetic searcli, i t is limited 
to cases where the fitness operator is linear. Where fitness is dependent upon 
agent interactions, the fitness operator is highly non-linear, thus limiting the 
applicability of this work in the present context. 
4. The Markov approach predicts the infinite limit population. I t is conjectured (see 
Section 3.2.6) that the finite population dynamics may show marked deviations 
from the dynamics in the infinite l imit , especially in populations of interacting 
agents, where there is a highly non-linear selective operator). 
2.2.2 Statistical Dynamics of Fitness Distributions 
Priigel-Bennett & Shapiro [69, 70] have produced an analysis of the dynamics of a 
genetic algorithm from a statistical mechanics viewpoint. The problem they chose as 
a testbed for their analysis of genetic search, is the distribution of spin-states in a 
simple Ising spin model. This is an interesting choice of problem as i t allows them to 
directly look at the role of crossover in making and breaking links between different 
parts of the genome. This leads (more generally) towards the study of representation 
within genetic algorithms. However, this paper is not discussed here primarily for those 
reasons; rather i t is the statistical mechanics approach to GA theory which is of interest 
within the present context. In their formulation, mutation plays a very small effect as an 
exploratory operator; their discussion is couched in terms of selection as an exploitative 
operator, and crossover as a mixing or explorative operator. 
Priigel-Bennett & Shapiro demonstrate a formulation of the dynamics of the genet-
ic algorithm in terms of the lower order cumulants of the fitness distribution. They 
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are able to formulate the dynamics of these cumulants in statistical mechanics terms. 
Alternately, the approach may be described as follows. The population distribution is 
transformed to a cumulant basis. Higher order terms are then discarded, and the sys-
tem is modelled as a low-order dynamical system within this new basis. This approach 
aids the analysis of the GA in two directions. 
First, as mentioned above, i t allows an analysis of the role of crossover in making 
and breaking links between interconnected parts of the genome. This analysis is based 
on the exact problem domain; the location of minimum energy states in an Ising spin 
glass system. However, the results of this analysis should be more generally applicable 
to a much wider domain. 
Second, this approach allows a comparison of the relative effects of selection and 
recombination. Prugel-Bennett k Shapiro consider the relative effects of selection and 
recombination. Where the 'interface energy' (the energy bound in the interface between 
the parental genomic elements combined to form a child)** is high, then strong selection 
is beneficial, as i t involves fewer crossovers. On the other hand, where the interface 
energy is low, then the mixing effects of crossover can be utilised in a stronger fashion 
to speed the search. 
One important aspect of this work is the adoption of a maximum-entropy approach 
(also discussed in [76]); where the order parameter does not give specific information 
about some aspect of the system needed for analysis, that aspect of the system is as-
sumed to be in a state that maximises its entropy. The close match between theoretical 
predictions and experimental results on the problem they cliose seems to indicate that 
this maximum-entropy assumption is justified in this case. 
•^ In the general case, this term appears to be the difference between the fitness of the child and a 
Hnear estimation of the child's fitness in terms of the fitnesses of its parents. 
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"That this [maximum entropy] assumption works, suggests that there is 
'microscopic disorder', that is that the GA is sufficiently mixing so that all 
strings with the same fitness are equally likely. Whether i t is a property of 
the simple system we looked at, or of classes of problems is an important 
question."^ 
Later work by Rattray & Shapiro [72] and by Rattray [71] using this approach with 
alternate GA problems (perceptron weight allocation and subset sum, respectively) also 
produces good theoretical predictions of experimental results. This indicates that the 
maximum entropy assumption may be well founded in general within GA theory. 
This paper also considers differences between infinite l imit and finite population 
dynamics, concentrating on systematic errors in the cumulants that arise when a finite 
population is modelled using the infinite limit curaulants. In particular, Priigel-Bennett 
& Shapiro [70] note that the third cumulant (related to distribution skewness) scales 
inversely with population size, so whilst i t is zero in an infinite population, i t is non-zero 
in a finite population, and in small populations has a significant effect on the evolution 
of that population. Thus, there are qualitative differences between finite and infinite 
population behaviours. 
The effect of the third cumulant is to produce an under-populated high fitness 
tail to the population distribution. There is a long tail of low-fitness individuals, yet 
relatively few with greater than average fitness; the maximum fitness becomes closer 
to the average fitness. This reduces the effectiveness of the GA, because selection is 
picking average rather than above average individuals as parents of the next generation. 
^Prugel-Bennett & Shapiro [70]. 
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2.2.3 Statistical Dynamics of the Royal Road GA: Infinite 
Populations 
The Royal Road GA is a 'toy* problem that has been used extensively in the analysis 
of the behaviour of genetic algorithms [58, 59, 29]. The binary genotype consists of 
blocks, each consisting of K sites, and has a length of L = NK. The fitness function 
is simply the number of filled, or aligned, blocks: that is to say the number of blocks 
which have all sites containing a This GA therefore has a single peaked fitness 
function, and a plateau landscape. 
The analysis that is presented here is due to Erik van Nimwegen and colleagues at 
the Santa Fe Institute [78], and builds upon the work reviewed in Sections 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2. 
Consider a population of M agents under the Royal Road GA, with an initially 
random state. The population may be partitioned into + 1 fitness classes, as the 
fitness of any member of the population may be in the integer range (0,iV). The 
analysis develops by considering the fitness distribution between these A'' + 1 classes as 
a macroscopic parameter, and developing terras for the evolutionary operator G on the 
population. 
Informally, the evolutionary operator G performs the following actions. First i t 
evaluates the fitness of each string, then i t creates a new population of strings by 
picking strings in the old population with a probability proportional to the fitness of 
the string. Finally, i t mutates every site in each string in the population with a fixed 
low probability q. More formally, the evolutionary operator G can be represented as 
the product of two operators, the selection operator 5, and the mutation operator, M . 
Rather than consider the evolution of the population state vector p( i ) , consider 
instead the transitions between strings of different fitnesses. Initially this will be done 
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in the infinite population limit M —¥ oo, where the fundamental theorem of probability 
applies; later the dynamics of finite populations will be considered from the foundation 
of the infinite population model. 
The mutation operator M 
The dynamics^ of block alignment, A^ and disalignment, D, will be discussed sepa-
rately; the mutation operator will then be constructed out of their corabination. First 
consider the dynamics of block alignment. The probability that a block in state j will 
be transformed to state i can be found using a Markov chain analysis under the as-
sumption that bits in the block have random alignments: the entries in the Markov 
transition table will be given by 
k=0 1=0 
I \ 
j 
(?*+'(!-(7)'^-'=-' (2.46) 
where S is the Kronecker delta. We shall consider state / f to be an absorbing state 
(when the block is completely filled). The Markov chain analysis allows us to calculate 
the expected time for an initially randomly seeded block to become filled. This can be 
expressed as a weighted sura of eigenvalues of the non-absorbing sub-raatrix, and i t can 
be shown that the largest eigenvalue dominates this expression. 
The entries Fij of fundamental matrix of the Markov Chain, F = ( / — T ' ) " l give 
the expected number of times that that system, starting from state j wil l visit state i 
before reaching the absorbing state K. From this we can derive 
T{q,K)=Y:Fi^Sj (2.47) 
the expected tirae until block alignraent starting frora an initial configuration 5. For 
short block lengths, this can be done in closed form. From T{q,K), we raay go on to 
^The derivations of these operators are rather involved, so we shall not derive them fully, rather 
point out the general method. The full derivations can be found in the appendices to [79]. 
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estimate the probability of aligning a block as A = llT{q, K), For small q, i t is possible 
to derive an analytic first order approximation 
A{K) = 
where 
K 
1=1 
2 ^ 
I 
(2.48) 
i -1 
j=0 
K 
(2.49) 
At this point, the problem is that the unaligned blocks fall into two types, those 
that have never been aligned before (for which the expected alignment time has just 
been stated), and those blocks which have previously been aligned, and have become 
unaligned due to mutation. The ratio of these two types of blocks is unknown, and 
there is no expression for the realignment time for a previously aligned block. Upper 
and lower bounds can be placed on the alignment probability of any block; the lower 
bound will be by assuming the block has not previously been aligned, and uses the term 
given in 2.48. The upper bound is given by assuming that any blocks has previously 
been aligned, and is now unaligned in only one bit; i.e. that a suitable one bit mutation 
will restore the alignment in any block. This gives an upper bound on the alignment 
probability of 
A, = q{l - q f - ' (2.50) 
The alignment probability of any block will therefore lie in the range A{K) <A<Ar-
In fact, i t will turn out that the results are largely insensitive to block alignment times; 
so they will be assumed to lie at the lower bound. 
The destruction operator D is much simpler, the probability that an aligned block 
will be destroyed by mutation is D = 1 — (1 — q)^. 
A and D may now be used to generate an overall term Mij, the probability that 
a block containing j aligned sites will , after mutation with a constant mutation rate 
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q across sites, end up with i aligned sites. This can be written as the sum over all 
probabilities that k unaligned blocks will be aligned, and k -\- j — i blocks will be 
unaligned. This is 
N-j k 
k=0 1=0 
\ ^ / 
/ N 
j A''{1 - Af-^-^D^{l - ny-^ (2 .51) 
This operator is valid in the limit of an infinite population; that is to say where sampling 
fluctuations play no role in the model. Here the operator M will act upon a vector P 
of probabilities that the string has j blocks aligned, to form a new vector P"*, the 
probabilities that the string has i blocks aligned after mutation. 
The Selection Operator 5 
The selection operator is somewhat simpler than the mutation operator. Recall that 
the GA is a combination of mutation and fitness proportional selection. Therefore the 
expected probability of an individual with i blocks already aligned being selected is 
proportional to the number of individuals who have that number of blocks aligned, and 
the relative fitness of those individuals within the population. This matrix is a diagonal 
matrix, and takes the form 
Sii = Sijjj-^ (2.52) 
Note that this operator is non-linear, as it depends on the mean fitness of the population 
that it acts upon. 
The Generation Operator G 
By combining the mutation and selection operators the generation operator G is gained. 
Gij = '^2 MijS.j (2.53) 
A;=0 
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In order to analyse the dynamics of this operator, a linearised version of it is constructed. 
Noting that the only non-linearity is the normaJisation factor the normalisation 
factor is taken out of the matrix 
S = ^ 5 (2.54) 
G = M.S (2.55) 
Here (/) is the mean value of / . The operator G is an ordinary + 1 dimensional 
matrix operator. The time evolution of the population is governed by 
P{t + 1 ) = G'P(O) (2.56) 
which can be expanded to 
Pdt) = ECit,PmGlm (2.57) 
J 
The constant C , may be easily solved for, since P(*) must be normalised 
C ( i , P ( 0 ) ) = [G^P(O)]" ' (2.58) 
Now G may be explicitly solved to find the fixed points of the system. Diagonalising 
G gives its eigenvalues, gi and from here the eigenvectors R^...RN can be obtained. 
Define R to be the matrix of the eigenvectors of G. Note that as the eigenvectors are 
normalised, the columns of R all add to 1. The operator & , the application of G t 
times, may be written as 
G\j = E Rik9lR;l (2.59) 
Substitute this expression into 2.57 to gain an explicit expression for the evolution of 
the system 
P,{t) = C{t,P{0))Y:Rik9lR;fPM (2.60) 
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At this point, transfer to the eigenbasis of G. One may write both the fitness distribu-
tions in the eigenbasis 
= E ^kPf^it) (2-61) 
and the constant C in the eigenbasis 
AT 
c{t,pm = 
Hence one may express 2.57 as 
5: iUk9iR-,im 
-1 r AT 
Uk=0 
(2.62) 
(2.63) 
Now it can quite easily be shown that all the eigenvalues of G are the mean fitnesses 
of their respective eigenvectors, i.e. gk = (/) at the eigenvector Rk. Hence 
(2.64) 
This gives a direct expression for the mean fitness of an infinite population at time t in 
terms of the initial distribution of fitnesses, and the linearised generation operator G 
(2.65) 
It may appear from the above equation that there are up to + 1 stable distribu-
tions that the infinite population may take on. This is not the case; in order to be a 
probability distribution, a vector must be positive definite (i.e. all its entries must be 
greater than or equal to zero). Van Nimwegen et al. show that only the eigenvector cor-
responding to the largest eigenvalue is positive definite; all the other eigenvectors have 
at least one negative entry. This is quite intuitive really: the only stable state for the 
system is the one with maximal fitness. Given that the Royal Road GA has aplateaued 
Pujiama^ landscape, we should expect that the only stable population is one centred 
'A Fujiama landscape rises smoothly to a single peak, much in the manner of classical Japanese 
water-colours of Mount Fuji. 
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about the single peak in the landscape. Henceforth order the eigenvalues (and their 
corresponding eigenvectors) in a monotonically increasing order go < 9i < • • • < g^. 
The above derivation gives results which correspond very closely with the observed 
behaviour of the Rx)yal Road GA for large populations relative to the mutation rate 
{2Mq :§> 1)8. 
2.2.4 Statistical DynEimics of the Royal Road GA: Finite Pop-
ulations 
Van Nimwegen et al.(79] not only demonstrate the dynamics of the Royal Road GA 
in the infinite case, but also in the case of finite dynamics where epochal phenomena 
and meta-stability are commonly observed. Onto the system at the thermodynamic 
limit, a noise term is added, corresponding to the stochastic fluctuations of a finite 
population. The distribution of the noise is obtained by an analysis of the moments of 
the fluctuations, and leads to a Fokker-Planck formulation of the noise term: the noise 
is thus assumed to be Gaussian, with components inversely proportional to fitness of 
the dimensions. 
Van Nimwegen et al. assume that since the actual population is a multinomial 
sampling from the generation operator applied to the previous population, mapping 
P„ = M-^(no, . . . ,nAf) to P^n = M-^(7no,. . . , m A r ) : 
p[P„ P^] = M! n ^ 7 (2.66) 
i=o m\ 
which has mean G(P„), then the form of the noise will be a multinomial. 
Recall Section 2.1.7. The effect of both convergence rates of parameters in the 
infinite limit, and of fluctuating parameters was discussed in relation to classical ap-
proaches. In van Nimwegen et al.'s formulation 
S^ee 2.1.5 for the derivation of this result. 
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1. Selection intensity is a non-linear function of the population distribution, being 
based upon mean population fitness. 
2. Their formulation is an attempt to explain the observed behaviour of the Royal 
Road GA over a range of population sizes. It is not clear that the assumption 
that the mutation rate is of the same order of magnitude as 1/M, (the reciprocal 
of the population size) is valid over the range of population sizes that they wish 
to consider. 
To summarise, van Nimwegen et al. use multinomial sampling from an infinite pop-
ulation distribution to justify an assumption that sampling fluctuations are Gaussian. 
They derive the sampling fluctuations by a classical approach, deriving the magnitude 
of the first two moments of the distribution from the properties of the generation op-
erator G. However, the arguments given by Gillespie [32] cast doubt on whether these 
assumptions are justified. I t is not clear that the sampling fluctuations can be modelled 
as a diffusion, and even if they can, it is not clear that the Fokker-Planck formulation 
is justified. Feller [24] derives a diffusion equation in two variables, gene frequency and 
population size, whidi may be more appropriate. 
From this approximation, various properties of the Royal Road GA are examined. 
First the observed intermittency in cases where there are many fixed points is explained, 
and related to the error threshold in the theory of molecular evolution. The better 
adapted to the environment a phenotype is, the more it is dependent on all the sites 
in its genotype. Although the mutational pressure remains constant; the probability of 
a single mutation having a deleterious effect on an individual's fitness increases as its 
fitness becomes more dependant upon all sites in the genome. A point described as the 
error threshold is reached, where selection is no longer able to maintain the genome close 
to the optimum due to the increasingly deleterious effects of single mutations. This is 
82 
observed in the RoyaA Road GA, and is successfully explained by van Nimwegen et al. In 
systems with large numbers of local optima, they claim that the error-threshold causes 
the system to lose the higher fitness optima, and successfully predict the timescales 
over which this occurs. 
Second, the approximation of sampling fluctuations is used to predict the length of 
time that the system spends in each epoch. This is less successful. The system spends 
longer in each of the epochs than is predicted by the model, although the model does 
predict the position of the epoclis, and the fluctuation widths correctly. The reason 
given is that there is a spontaneous symmetry breaking when the system moves from 
one epoch to another. A new epoch is almost always founded by a single individual 
discovering a new aligned block, which is then spread rapidly through the population. 
Therefore the assumption that the sites in the block are randomly distributed between 
alleles (equation 2.46) no longer holds. Van Nimwegen (personal correspondence) 
claims that an alternative formulation of the mutation operator, assuming that the 
population diverges from an initially converged population by a random walk process, 
improves prediction accuracy. He also notes that the population never fully diverges, 
because the sampling of the population tends to keep the population somewhat con-
verged [21]. No successful analytic formulation of this latter effect has yet been found. 
Finally, van Nimwegen et al. contrast the mechanism behind metarStability in the 
Royal Road GA with the view that they are transits between local optima induced 
by stochastic fluctuations. They note that there are no fitness barriers between local 
optima within the Royal Road GA, yet meta-stable behaviour still occurs. They posit an 
entropic cause to raeta-stable behaviour: the time taken to find a better local optima 
is the time to explore the plateau of the present optima, to find an edge which is 
contiguous with a higher-fitness plateau. 
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2.3 Noise in Non-Linear Dynamical Systems 
In this section, the effect of both additive and multiplicative noise on a discrete dynam-
ical system is considered. Such noise will allow the system to escape from attractors, 
thus rendering all attractors meta-stable, 
"The long time behaviour of a noisy dissipative system is thus intermit-
tent, consisting of motion near the various attractors of the system alter-
nating with transitions between the attractors. In the limit of small noise 
the time spent on the attractors becomes longer, and the transitions rarer" ^  
The approach of Knobloch & Weiss [52] is to consider the trajectory of a continuous 
non-linear system perturbed by a small noise term. This is then related to an iterative 
map under noise. The eflfect of the noise on this map is then considered. Whether the 
noise is additive or multiplicative depends on the formulation of the problem that is 
adopted. Additive noise in a time-T map (a map of the positions of a T-periodic system 
at intervals of T) becomes multaplicative noise in a return map. This is because the 
return time to any point depends on noisy parameters. 
Whilst the thrust of the Knobloch & Weiss [52] paper is to consider the effect of 
noise in iterative maps containing phase-locking phenomena, and in a simple map with 
multiple attracts (the cubic map), there are important general points made concerning 
noise in maps with multiple attractors. First, Knobloch & Weiss consider the effect 
of additive noise in directions with differing stability. They point out that in stable 
directions (negative eigenvalues) the effect of noise is oppose the contraction of a dissi-
pative system onto the attractors, forcing meta-stability. In the case of neutrally stable 
directions (zero eigenvalues) the resulting effects are similar to an unbiased random 
walk, and result in diffusion processes. In unstable directions (positive eigenvalues) the 
^Knobloch & Weiss [52]. 
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noise may slow the escape of the system. They point out that in the case of a small 
noise term, escapes usually take place across saddle nodes. Here the energetic barrier 
that has to be overcome is lowest, so the system can most easily escape. Recalling van 
Nimwegen et al.'s [79] discussion of transitions between states in the Royal Road GA, 
(Section 2.2.4) where there is no energetic barrier to be overcome, there still exists an 
entropic barrier. Whilst the system can easily escape from what is effectively a saddle 
node; it has first to find the appropriate boundary to escape over. This search time 
constrains the evolution of the system. Generalising from this, it is clear that in the 
case of a transition across a saddle node between attractors, there may be an entropic 
as well as an energetic barrier to overcome. This will be returned to later in this section. 
Second, Knobloch & Weiss discuss the nature of transitions between attractors under 
the influence of noise. Their analysis of a system containing a period map concludes 
that if the phase basins (i.e. the basins of attraction of each point in the cycle) have 
unequal size, then most escapes occur from the narrowest phase basin, regardless of the 
initial point of the system. 
Third, there is a discussion of the manner in which escapes from an attractor basin 
are conducted. For a cubic map, Knobloch & Weiss construct a conditional proba-
bility distribution based upon an escape in the future, which they then compare to 
the assumed raetarstable distribution. This shows that most escape processes have a 
relatively short tiraescale. Escape events do not occur as a result of diffusion process-
es; there is a sharp transition between motion inside the meta-stable attractor, and 
motion outside the basin of attraction. This indicates that the escape comes about 
from individual stochastic events, not the combination of events. This suggests that 
the entropic barrier to finding the saddle node to escape over may be more significant 
than the energetic barrier. 
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Fourth, there is the question of motion outside the attractor basin. For the cubic 
map, motion outside the immediate basin of attraction takes the form of a chaotic 
transient [38, 39]. It is hard to predict the basin that the system will fall into, because 
the area immediately outside the local basins of attraction consists of finely interwoven 
attractors. However, the mean time in the transient between attractors is insensitive 
to the magnitude of the noise term. 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter a number of approaches to the problem of modelling the trajectory of 
an evolutionary system have been considered. Four basic approaches have been consid-
ered. First there is the classical approach, based on the use of continuous time models 
of discrete time processes. As has been discussed, this involves assumptions on relative 
convergence rates of processes as the limit of an infinite population approaches. Sec-
ond, there is the statistical dynamics approach of van Nimwegen et al., who model the 
system in terms of a few order parameters. This approach is successful for large popula-
tions. They then model the sampling fluctuations inherent in the evolutionary operator 
for finite populations using a classical approach, based on calculating the lower order 
moments of the distribution of fluctuations from the form of the evolutionary operator. 
Assuming that the higher order curaulants are negligible, this gives a Fokker-Planck 
diffusion for the fluctuation distribution. Third, there is the microscopic approach 
adopted by Vose, which proves unwieldy in practice. Fourth, there is the approach of 
Priigel-Bennet, Rattray and Shapiro. They calculate the average distribution of the 
first few cumulants of the fitness distribution. This approach does not allow examina-
tion of the detailed structure of the trajectory of the system, which is of prime interest 
here. However, this approach does consider the problems of moving from infinite limit 
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approximations to the dynamics of finite populations. 
The underlying diflriculty that must be faced is that the sampling fiuctuations add 
noise to the system at each time step, which can have a major effect on system trajecto-
ry, especially in relatively small populations. It is apparent from the review conducted 
above, that the modelling of such fluctuations in a non-linear system is not well un-
derstood at present. There are many relevant parameters in an evolutionary system: 
changing any of these parameters can alter the distribution of the noise induced by 
sampling fluctuations. 
There are two aspects to this problem: a formal, theoretical one, and a practical one. 
Formally, questions about the distribution of noise induced by sampling fluctuations in 
an evolutionary system are of great interest. But they are also not well understood at 
all. In more practical terms, the question is what distribution of noise seems to fit the 
observed facts well, and gives models of evolutionary systems predictive power. Van 
Nimwegen (personal correspondence) observes: 
"So generally, there is not a good mathematical justification for applying 
a diff"usion equation method. Note that this is also the case for the models 
that Kimura introduced. It turns out though that the results predict simu-
lation results very well. This is why I decided to use the diffusion equation 
method; it allows you to actually calculate something, and the results seem 
to hold up well against the simulation data. So although one can make all 
kinds of formal arguments for why it should work, in the end the comparison 
with the simulations is what mainly justifies the approach," 
The relevance of this chapter is twofold. First, it prepares then way for an analytic 
exploration of populations of interacting adaptive agents that is put forward in the 
next chapter. Second, the discussion of the dependence of both the analytic model, 
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and the system's behaviour on the interdependence of a number of factors, especially 
population size, informs the experimentation presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Small, toy 
systems may not serve as adequate models of full size systems of interacting adaptive 
agents because their behaviour is not consistent over changes of scale. This is an 
important practical point. Planning of large systems of (adaptive) agents, sucli as large 
computing and telecommunications networks, may be difficult, because such systems 
may not maintain consistent behaviours across scale. The planning of sucli systems 
may face twin problems: Firstly, the systems are at the limit of analytic tractability, 
if they succumb to analysis at all. Secondly, small scale models may be limited as a 
planning tool because there is no guarantee of consistent behavioural patterns across 
changing system size. 
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Chapter 3 
Sampling Fluctuations in Finite 
Populations of Interacting Agents 
In the previous chapter the dynamics of a simple population of adaptive agents has 
been considered from a variety of standpoints. In this chapter, attention will be turned 
to the analytic formulation of an interacting population of adaptive agents. In particu-
lar, the effects of sampling fluctuations within the adaptive process on the evolutionary 
dynamics of the entire system will be examined. It is required that any derived for-
mulation be informative not only in the case of an infinite, or very large population, 
but also through a range of finite population sizes, so that the effects of the sampling 
fluctuations may be examined. 
3.1 Formalisation of an Interacting Adaptive Agent 
Population 
The immediate problem that must be considered is how the population should be 
represented within such an analytic formulation. In the previous chapter, three possible 
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approaches have been examined. 
First, there is the approach of Vose et al. [81], in which every possible population 
distribution is considered. The dynamics of the system are considered as the dynamics 
of a probability density function over the space of all possible populations, via a Markov 
system approach. This has been ruled out as computationally impractical, because the 
space of all possible populations is huge. 
Second, there is the classical population biology approaches, exemplified by Kimura 
[51], in which the frequency of an allele at a given site on the genome is considered. 
This approach is also problematic, for two reasons. First, there are likely to be a large 
number of sites on the genome, which may or may not be independent, and second, the 
fitness contributions cannot be independently assessed. This combination means that 
the resulting formulation will have a large number of variables, with many probably 
unknown interdependencies. 
Third, there are the fitness based approaches adopted by Shapiro and co-workers 
[69, 70, 76, 72, 71], and by van Nirawegen et al. [79]. Such measures are generally 
unsatisfactory in a population of interacting adaptive agents. The fitness of an agent 
is dependent upon its interaction with other agents. It is hard to see how macroscopic 
measures of the fitness of agents could be used to predict the values of those macroscopic 
parameters. This forraalisation loses the essential detail of the system; the system 
dynamics are determined by the interactions that take place. 
None of the formalisations of an adaptive agent population that have been considered 
so far appear suitable in the case of a population of interacting adaptive agents. It 
should be noted, however, that all these approaches are based around probability density 
functions. In the case of Vose, the probability that the population is in a particular 
state, in the case of Kimura, the probability that an agent possesses a given allele, and 
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in the case of Shapiro and co-workers, and van Nimwegen, the probability that an agent 
has a given fitness. The fundamental question is whether there is another parameter 
that can be used to characterise the dynamics of a population of interacting adaptive 
agents? 
3.1.1 Order Parameters for Interacting Adaptive Systems 
Essentially, we seek an order parameter for an interacting adaptive agent population. 
This is a macroscopic parameter that may be used to describe the behaviour of the 
system, without the need for knowledge of the microscopic states of the elements that 
make up the system. This type of measure originates in statistical physics, where 
macroscopic order parameters such as the energy of a system can be used instead of 
the states of every particle in the system to make predictions about system behaviour. 
In a similar fashion, statistical models of genetic systems have used measures of agent 
fitness as order parameters. It is not necessary to know the precise genotype of every 
individual in the population, merely the distribution of fitnesses, and the transition 
probabilities between fitnesses. 
The proposal at the centre of this thesis, is that agent behaviour may form an 
appropriate order parameter for an interacting adaptive agent system. In such a system, 
an agent's utility is determined by the behaviour it exhibits; agents that successfully 
interact with other agents have higher utility than those that do not. The essence of 
interaction lies in the behaviours exhibited by the interactees. 
Agent behaviour lies at an intermediate level in possible characterisations of such a 
system. It is certainly at a higher level than the detail of the precise state of the agent. 
Whether the adaptive schema is at an individual or a population level is immaterial; it is 
sufficient to be able to calculate the transition probabilities between possible behaviours 
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based on the iraplementational details of the adaptive schema. Behaviour might be 
seen to lie at a lower level than agent fitness; the behaviours that an agent exhibits will 
determine its fitness within the population. However, it must be noted that the fitness 
of an agent is based upon its interactions with other agents, and which will therefore be 
dependent upon the distribution of agent behaviours within the population. In some 
sense then, the distribution of agent behaviours is the highest level parameter that it is 
possible to find within a system of interacting adaptive agents: it is abstracted from the 
implementational details, and also determines the shape of the landscape upon whicli 
adaptation takes place. 
3.1.2 Properties of the Mapping from Microscopic Population 
to Behavioural Order Parameters 
The characterisation of a system in terms of a set of macroscopic order parameters 
entails a reduction in the dimensionality of the system space; therefore a many-one 
relationship between points in the microscopic space and points in the macroscopic 
order parameter space will ensue. In this case, we are considering an adaptive system 
where the set of order parameters (behaviours) directly feeds the fitness function. This 
is noteworthy: all individuals with the same behaviour will be selected for or against 
at the same rate. Therefore, all such points are selectively neutral with respect to one 
another. A sub-population of agents sharing any given behaviour will be free to spread 
across the set of states that give rise to any particular behaviour without any selective 
advantage or disadvantage. 
Now clearly the discussions of selective neutrality and genetic drift (Sections 2.1.3, 
2.1.4 and 2.2.4) still apply. The spread across microstates giving the same behaviour 
may be limited by selection (random genetic drift), fluctuation of selection intensities 
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(probably important in an interacting population where the speed of environmental 
changes is high compared to the evolution rate), and the existence of entropic barriers 
to the spread of a population through selectively neutral mutations. On the other 
hand, under certeiin environmental conditions, the spread of a population through a 
selectively neutral set of microstates whilst maintaining a given behaviour may prove to 
be important in keeping the system poised to be able to exploit changing environmental 
conditions. 
Recall Section 2.2.4. Van Nimwegen et al. [78] characterise the noise term in-
troduced by the reduction from an infinite population to a finite population as being 
multinomial in form; this noise is caused by taking a finite number of samples from 
an infinite distribution. This formulation of the noise will be followed here. In Section 
3.2.4 the evolutionary operator, was considered as a conflation of the exploratory 
and exploitative operators, M. and «S, respectively. In the finite case, we shall consider 
S to consist of the sum two components, Su^ a deterministic component corresponding 
to the conflation of M and <S, as discussed in Section 3.2.4 (although the formulation 
will not be in terms of differential equations, but in terms of difference equations), and 
a stochastic component f^, an additive noise term following a multinomial distribution. 
In large populations, the effect of Es will be negligible; the evolution of the system 
will tend towards the deterministic formulation Ej), As the population size is reduced, 
the stochastic component, f^, will have a relatively greater and greater effect, until a 
point is reached \vith a small population where the effect of the deterministic operators 
M and 5, acting in concert as Eo, cannot be discerned. 
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3,1.3 Observables: a Further Level of Description 
At this point, the dynamics of the system have been discussed on two levels. First, 
there is the microscopic dynamics of the system. A formulation of the microscopic 
dynamics of the system will give a complete description of the trajectory of the system. 
In practice, such a forraalisation lies far beyond the realms of analytic tractability. To 
overcome this problem, an abstraction of the system is used. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
various possible abstractions have been discussed. Such an abstraction must preserve 
the essential features of the microscopic dynamics. 
A third level of description of the system will now be introduced, the observable 
dynamics of the system. The aim of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of systems of 
interacting adaptive systems. Whilst a behavioural analysis of the system is postulated 
to successfully capture the dynamics of a model system, a behavioural analysis may 
not be possible in a real world system. In many real-world systems (e.g. economic 
systems) the behaviours exhibited by individual agents may not be observable, either 
by agents within the system, or by an outside observer. Define the collective properties 
of the system that are open to view, either by agents within the system, or by outside 
observers, as the observables of the system. In some cases, where there are no individual 
interactions in the system, only collective interactions, the observables will guide the 
actions of individuaJ agents. In other cases, agents may respond to the individual 
behaviours of other agents, but these will be hidden from other agents and outside 
observers. I t is important to consider the observable dynamics of the system in order to 
relate observed phenomena to the underlying behavioural and microscopic dynamics, 
which may be hidden from view. 
94 
3.1.4 Approaches to Behavioural Dynamics 
I f the agent behaviours exhibited within a population of interacting adaptive agents are 
to form the basis of a formalisation of such a system, the next consideration must be the 
approach used. In the previous chapter, we have observed three differing approaches, 
based on whether the system has a discrete set of possible parametric states, or a 
continuous range of states. Before considering these possible approaches, let us first 
consider whether behaviour should lie within a discrete or continuous range. 
Certainly, there are instances where the range of agent behaviours has been con-
sidered to be continuous (or, at least lying within a high precision floating point range 
in a computational model). For example, within simple economic games such as the 
IPD, the behaviour of an agent might be characterised as the probability of defection 
on any given play. However, there is a powerful case that such a real domain is not 
realistic. The set of agent behaviours does not in fact have an infinite cardinality, for 
any real world set of agents. Animal or human behaviours follow a small number of 
patterns; computer agents are limited by the precision of their arithmetic. This may be 
due to a limitation in the responses of the agents, or alternatively from a limitation in 
the sensory abilities of agents. Agents are constrained to behave in a limited number 
of ways, because they are incapable of sensing more than a limited number of differing 
states in their environment. Hence we will consider, in the abstract, both continuous 
and discrete behavioural sets, and decide upon the appropriate approach in each case. 
In the discrete case, there is only one approach: the Markov system approach, as 
used by Vose [81], and by van Nimwegen et al. [79]. In the continuous case, two 
formulations are possible, the diffusion equation type approach as used by Kiraura [51] 
and the cumulant approach used by Shapiro and co-workers [69, 70, 76, 72, 71]. 
In the continuous case, there are two possible approaches, both of which have limi-
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tations. The approach of Shapiro and co-workers [69, 70, 76, 72, 71] (detailed in Section 
2.2.2) characterises the system by the lower order curaulants of the behavioural distri-
bution. However, there may be problems inherent in such an approach. The dynamics 
of the system can be successfully reduced to the dynamics of the lower order cumu-
laiits only i f i t can be shown that the higher order cumulants have a negligible effect 
on the dynamics of the lower order curaulants. In the type of non-interacting system 
studied so far with this approach, the population distributions have always been, if not 
Gaussian or binomial, then at least uniraodal. In a population of interacting adaptive 
agents there is no guarantee that a continuously pararaeterised population may have 
a unimodal probability density function in such a parameter space. I f this is not the 
case, then the higher order cumulants may have strong effects on the dynamics of the 
lower order curaulants, breaking the premise on which the model is founded. 
There is also the diffusion equation approach of Kiraura, which may be characterised 
as an expansion of a Taylor series about a sraall increment in time, on the probability 
density function of agent behaviours (detailed in Section 2.1.1). This appears initially 
to be an attractive approach, but i t is in fact very problematic, so i t will be consid-
ered in further detail Here an alternative derivation (also presented by Kimura [51]) is 
used, which leads to the sarae result (Equation 2.10) in the context of population biol-
ogy. Unfortunately, i t would appear that the Taylor series approacli, whilst attractive, 
presents difficulties in the context of an interacting agent population. The problem will 
be further discussed in the following section. 
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3.2 The Diffusion Equation for a Population of In-
teracting Agents 
3.2.1 Notation 
In this section, a number of mathematical concepts are discussed. To aid the under-
standing of these concepts, the following typeface notations are adopted. 
Real variable e.g. time x lower-case roman 
Real space e.g (0,1) X upper case roman 
Real function / lower-case roraan 
Density function <f> lower-case greek 
Space of density functions * upper-case greek 
Adaptive Operator M upper-case calligraphic 
Random variable R bold upper-case roraan 
Other variable y lower-case san-serif 
Other space Y upper-case san-serif 
The convention adopted is that the space corresponding to a lower case variable, 
wil l , i f possible, be notated by the upper-case version of the same symbol. 
Other important conventions that are adopted within this chapter are the use of 
angled brackets, (), to denote an expectation, and the use of the symbol p to denote a 
probability. 
Consider an infinite population of interacting adaptive agents, An infinite population 
may be thought of as an infinite set; in this discussion the biological terminology will 
be followed. The term 'interacting adaptive agent' will be defined more closely below. 
At this point, the intuitive definition that this terra refers to an agent whose adaptation 
is soraehow driven by upon its interaction with other raembers of the population, will 
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suffice. This infinite population has a pair of operators acting upon i t , an exploratory 
operator M and an exploitative operator S. These correspond (in genetic terms) to 
simple rautation applied to the entire population, and fitness proportional selection 
respectively. This pair of operators will be composed to forra the evolutionary operator, 
£. 
The operator £ that will be derived below corresponds to rautation and selective 
asexual reproduction acting independently and siraultajieously. In the discrete case, 
selective asexual reproduction followed by rautation forms a first order approximation 
to the diffusion approach. The derivation of a set of diffusion equations for the case 
of an interacting adaptive population is, of course, dependent upon the relative values 
that certain parameters take, as discussed in Section 2.1.7. 
The notion of agenthood is not necessarily within the proper scope of a raathematicfd 
definition. However, a mathematical treatment of the evolution of a population of 
adaptive interactive agents requires sorae well defined definition of agenthood. Without 
any closer definition, consider an agent a which lies within a space of possible agents A. 
These terras are deliberately vague, and will be replaced by much more closely defined 
terras at the earliest opportunity. 
Definition 3.2.1 An agent, a will be characterised by its quantifiable properties. In 
particular, abstract the behaviour of an agent in the presence of other agents to a single 
real parameter, x € X, where X is the continuous range (a, 6). X will be described as 
the space of possible agents or agent space. There exists a mapping 5 : A X. 
I t is assumed that the timescale over which the interaction between agents takes 
place is sufficiently sraall with respect to the timescale over which the evolution takes 
place that the behaviour, x, of an agent can be considered constant during any inter-
action. 
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For example, consider a population of agents playing the 'matcliing pennies' geime^ 
Whatever the internal structure or decision making process which an agent goes through, 
we choose to characterise an agent by the probability with which i t plays H(eads). In 
this case an agent would be described by a single real variable x (= p{H)). 
The definition given above (Definition 3.2.1) is in a single dimension. Of course, 
there raay be more than one dimension to agent behaviour. However, care should be 
exercised to ensure that if more than one dimension of agent behaviour exists, that all 
dimensions are orthogonal. This may be difficult to prove analytically, but i t is possible 
that techniques such as principle components or curves analysis raay be able to extract 
orthogonal behavioural diraensions. This would lead to a multidimensional analogue of 
the case presented here. 
This derivation is in many ways analogous to one presented by Kimura [51]. Indeed, 
a similar derivation is presented by Kimura as an alternative to the derivation presented 
in Section 2.1.1. The difference is that Kimura is examining the time evolution of the 
probability that an individual will possess a particular gene at a given site; here we wish 
to examine the probability that an agent has a property, expressible as a single real 
parameter. By contrast, Kimura's derivation would lead to a set of n equations, for a 
population of agents with an 7i-bit binary genome. However, even i f there are no direct 
dependencies between sites on the genome, the interactive nature of the population 
will cause dependencies between site on the genome, and hence lead to a set of n 
simultaneous partial differential equations. Whilst this may have an analytic solution 
in a case where n is very sraall, in general i t is assuraed that analytic solutions to this 
problem may be hard to find. Numerical raethods raay be employed, but they raay only 
find fixed points, rather than cyclic or more complex solutions. 
^ Players simultaneously reveal a coin that they placed with one side or the other upwards. One 
player (pre-chosen) wins if they match, the other if they do not. 
99 
Definition 3.2.2 The population density function of an infinite population of agents, 
with respect to a single real agent-defining parameter x is defined as 
^(x) = lim lim ^ ° ( 3 € A „ : g ( a ) 6 ( x , x + Ax)) 
where n is the population size, and the subspaces An are chosen to ensure that liran_^oo 
exists 
The notion of a population density function is analogous to that of a probability 
density function found in probability theory. Indeed, in Section 3.2.6, the notion of 
a probability density function will be introduced (see Definition 3.13). As regards 
the interactive behaviour of agents, the population density function, <^  is a complete 
description of the population. 
Definition 3.2.3 A fitness function, / , is a mapping from an agent a to a real value, 
usually in the range (0,1). The range of values of f will be defined as F. Distinguish 
between f^ and f , by their domain 
A F 
f:x^F 
In the derivation that follows, the selective operator, 5, will be shown to have a depen-
dency upon the derivative Therefore constrain / to be smooth^ i.e. that | ^ is finite 
across the entire range X. 
In biology, the fitness of an individual with a given genotype is usually defined as 
its expected number of offspring. The biological definition gives a measure of fitness 
relative to other members of the population; i t is usual (but not universal) in GA theory 
to construct / as an absolute measure of agent fitness. The latter convention will be 
adopted here. 
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At this point, Definition 3.2.1 may be revisited, x may be redefined more closely as 
a single real parameter that encapsulates those aspects of an agent that are relevant to 
determining its fitness. 
At this point a mathematical definition of interaction may be given. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.2.4 An interacting agent is one whose fitness is dependent no only upon 
its own characteristics, but also upon the characteristics of the other agents it interacts 
with. The payoff to an agent a from its interaction with another agent b will be notated 
/p(a> b), or alternatively /p(x,y) , where x = 5(a) and y = g{b). 
Generally, individual agents may not be able to choose which other agents they 
interact with; indeed no definition has been offered of the number of agents involved in 
each interaction, or the nature of the interaction. The expected payoff will be used as 
a measure of agent fitness in the absence of specific knowledge concerning the precise 
interactions that take place within the population. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.2.5 Redefine the fitness of an interacting agent, a as its expected payoff 
{/^(a,b)) from an interaction with some other member of the population b. The fitness 
of a particular agent is now no longer f{x), but f {x,<j)); the fitness of any member of 
the population is dependent upon the composition of the entire population. 
f {X, <!>)=[ f,{x,y)c/>{y)dy (3.2) 
The controlling equation for the evolution of the population density function over 
an evolutionary time scale may now be derived. At time i , the population density 
function 0(x) will be written as <i){x,t) as necessary to avoid any danger of ambiguity. 
In a similar fashion, / (x , (^ ) will be written as / (x,<^,i). The derivation leads to a 
Fokker-Planck type equation, similar to that presented in Section 2.1.1. 
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Parameter size effects on the form of diffusion equations have already been noted 
in Section 2.1.7. Following that discussion, the exploration rate m will be assumed to 
be of the order 0 ( l / n ) , where n is the population size. The resulting operator will be 
valid when m is of this order. 
Consider now the change in <j) over a small discrete time period 6tj due to the action 
of 8, i.e. <t>{x,t + 6t) = S<f>(x,t). Over this small period there will be two sources of 
change to <^(x), one due to the other due to S. At this point in time, consider both 
these operators to act siraultaneously and independently on <j). This is the simplest 
combination of the exploration and exploitation operators possible; i t corresponds to 
asexual reproduction with rautation. The effects of genetic operators have already been 
discussed in Section 1.2.3. 
The derivation provided below is not valid at the endpoints of the range. Consider, 
therefore, a situation where the endpoints of the domain (o, b) are periodic from the 
perspective of agent behaviour. 
/ ( x , 0) may be thought of as imposing an energy surface which controls the trajec-
tory of the population. Exploitative processes will tend to shift the population towards 
areas of higher fitness (analogous to sorae forra of hill clirabing), whereas exploitative 
processes will tend to spread the population across the domain. The evolution of the 
system will be modelled as a diffusive process across this energy surface. The behaviour 
of the population over time will be derived from the following constraints: 
1. The population will flow towards areas of higher fitness at a rate proportional to 
the rate of change of fitness with respect to behaviour. Define the constant of 
proportionality as k. 
2. The rate at which the population flows away from any point will be proportional 
to the exploration (or rautation) rate, m. 
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3, The rate at which the population flows away from any point is proportional the 
population density function at that point. 
Between them, these constraints describe the actions of the explorative and exploita-
tive operators discussed in Section 1.1.2. Constraints 1 and 3 above, when expressed 
formally (see below) control the exploration operator, whilst constraints 2 and 3 control 
the exploitation operator. 
3.2.2 The Effect of the Exploitative Operator S 
Consider the time evolution of the probability of an individual lying in the range [x -
AxjX-h Ax] . Constraint 1 is taken to imply a dependence upon k and Constraint 3 
is expressed by considering the flow of population density at two points x - A x , x - f Ax, a 
small distance 2Ax apart. This provides an expression for the net flow into a rhomboid 
of width 2Ax in time A t 
2Ax<^(x, i + At) - Ax(^(x, t) 
'df{x-Ax,<l>,t) 
= | A t 
dx 
a/(x-hAx,(^, t) 
dx 
4>{x - A x , t ) 
(^(x-h A x , t ) (3.3) 
where A:/2 is a rate constant. Dividing through by A t Ax, and taking the limit A t -> 0 
gives 
df{x-Ax,<j>,t) 
dx 
dfix + Ax,t) 
dx 
<j){x - Ax,t) 
(l>{x + Ax,(l>,t) (3.4) 
Adding and subtracting a term on the r.h.s gives 
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2Ki \ di - dx + j (^ -^ ^ 
which raay be rearranged as 
^^a/(x + Ax, t) ^(x + Ax, 0 - .^(x - Ax , t) 
dx 2Ax ^ ' 
Taking the limit Ax —> 0, and simplifying the notation (since the point in time and 
space is now unambiguous) gives the differential equation 
This may be simplified to 
^ = - k l . (^.^ (3.8) 
dt dx \dx J 
This is the simplest possible equation that might govern the time evolution of a pop-
ulation across a fitness landscape, and is the controlling equation of the operator S. 
The population will migrate towards local maxiraa via a gradient ascent algorithra, as 
required by the given constraints. 
3.2.3 The Effect of the Exploratory Operator M 
In the sarae way as the above discussion has considered the action of the exploitative 
operator 5, consider now the action of the exploratory operator M. This operator has 
a very siraple action: it will act to increase the entropy of the population by dispersing 
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the population across the space. This can be considered as occurring via a diffusive 
pressure in each cell of width Ax, proportional to the population in that cell. There 
will therefore be a flow across the left and right boundaries of each cell, proportional to 
the gradient of the population density function at that boundary. Note the difference 
from the derivation of the exploitative operator, 5; constraint 2 is now expressed as a 
partial derivative, and constraint 3 appears as a constant of proportionality, m. Over 
time At this will be 
AxHx,t + At) = Ax^{x,t) + ^  _ ^ ( - . 0 ^ ) (3-9) 
This states that the change in population within any cell is the sura of the gains across 
each boundary. This may rearranged by moving the first term on the r.h.s. to the l.h.s., 
and dividing through by A t Ax to give 
,p{x,t + At)-<t>{x,t) _ m (<t>{x,tr-^i^-<l>{x,ty-^\ 
I f one now lets A x —> 0 and At —> 0 simultaneously (and simplifying the notation since 
points in time and space are now unambiguous) the action of M becomes 
This is the controlling equation of the exploratory operator M. I t corresponds to a 
Fokker-Planck diffusion in the absence of a potential field. This is unsurprising: one 
would not expect the dynamics of exploration to be altered by the interaction between 
population members. 
3.2.4 The Evolutionary Operator £ 
From a practical perspective, both the above derivations are idealistically simplistic. 
There are several important points that should be made here: 
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1. In the derivation of the exploitative operator 5, there is an assumption that the 
exploitative process is one of local hillclimbing. Agents with behaviour x will 
adopt behaviour x - |-Ax i f i t leads to higher fitness. Agents with behaviour x will 
not adopt a behaviour y if x and y are not adjacent in the space. The local nature 
of the hillclirabing precludes the exploitation of non-adjacent points in the space. 
This is a serious limitation; globally optimal behaviours cannot be reached by all 
members of the population, even if they are present within that population. 
In Section 3.1.1 the divergence between the two alternate versions of the Fokker-
Pianck equation (Equation 2.10) derived in Section 2.1.1 is alluded to. In the 
interactive case, (Equation 3.12), the selective operator (see Section 3.2.2 is 
problematic. Recall the basis of Kimura's [51] use of a diffusion equation ap-
proach. FVora an initial condition of an allele with a given frequency within the 
population, Kiraura used a diffusion equation approach to calculate the proba-
bility that the allele had a given frequency within the population at some later 
time. The underlying assumption is that the population remains in a unimodal 
distribution; the Taylor series approach associates terms in the Taylor series with 
moraents of the distribution. In the interactive case under consideration here, no 
such assumption of uniraodality exists. Of course, any distribution can be defined 
to arbitrary accuracy by means of an appropriate series of moments, so strictly a 
Taylor series approach will work. The problem lies in interpreting these moments 
in terms of the derivatives of the fitness function. In addition, a large number of 
terras may be required to obtain the required level of modelling accuracy, whicli 
tends to defeat the purpose of obtaining an analytically tractable model of the 
population dynamics^. 
^If this sort of approach were to be considered, the moment based approach of Shapiro and co-
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2. In both derivations there is an implicit assumption that i t is possible for an agent 
to traverse the behavioural range (a, b) in a smooth fashion. This is not always the 
case. For example, in an evolutionary system, a genotype-phenotype distinction 
must be made. The behaviour of an agent is dependent upon its phenotype. This 
in turn is dependent upon the genotype. Adaptation (both the exploratory and 
exploitative operators) act on the genotype. There is no guarantee that a small 
smooth change in the population density function over the genotype space will 
lead to a continuous change in the population density function over phenotype 
space or behaviour space. 
The evolution of the population is controlled by the evolutionary operator, £ , a com-
bination of the exploratory operator, My and the exploitative operator, S. In reality, 
these operators are not independent; exploration can occur during the exploitative pro-
cess. Consider two common adaptive schemes: the canonical genetic algorithm (CGA) 
as described by Holland [42], and the backpropogation algorithm within a multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) network [41]. In the former, exploration and exploitation are pro-
vided separately by the mutation and crossover operators, working at the level of the 
entire population. Here the higher order terras are brought in because the crossover 
operator is not purely selective, i t finds a point in the genotype space between two 
known good points. This is partially exploitative in that the fitness of the new point 
selected is not known a priori In the MLP, the backpropogation algorithm performs 
an iterative gradient descent on an error surface in a weight space. However, to re-
duce computational expense, this descent takes place in finite steps across the weight 
space. Exploitation and exploration are inseparable because the finite steps sample 
workers might well provide an ideal starting point. This approach has been discussed already, in 
Sections 2.2.2 and 3.1. 
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points of unknown error, although on a smooth surface, the error at the next point in 
the iteration can be estimated with a high degree of accuracy. 
Hence, in most practical adaptive schemae, a degree of interdependence between 
the explorative and exploitative operators raay exist, which gives rise to higher order 
terras. These will not be considered here. The approxiraation adopted is to consider 
these two operators as acting independently and siraultaneously upon the population. 
The controlling equation of the evolutionary operator Z will thus be the sum of the 
effects of its two constituent parts 
i = -'rx[ixV^2d^^ (^-^2) 
Note the correspondence with the Fokker-Planck equation (2.10). The first terra on 
the r.h.s. corresponds to the first order moment term; only here the rate is dependent 
upon a local fitness field. The second term is identical to that in the Fokker-Planck 
equation. The constants k,m control the respective strengths of the exploratory and 
exploitative operators in the system. As has already been mentioned, this equation is 
only valid for a population size/ exploration rate ratio of 0{l/N). Other ratios will lead 
to different diffusion formulations. This equation governs the evolution of an infinite, 
continuous time, continuous space population of interacting agents. 
3.2.5 Behavioural dynamics of an Infinite Population 
Equation 3.12 describes the time evolution of an infinite population of interacting a-
gents. There is already some indication of the expected behaviour of such a population: 
the conditions given in Section 3.2 will constrain the evolution of the system described 
by Equation 3.12. I t is well known that in the infinite time limit the behaviour of a 
system described by Equation 3.12 will tend towards an attractor of that system, be 
it a simple fixed point, a limit cycle, or some more complex type of attractor such as 
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a strange attractor. Such a system can be described by means of an 'energy* surface: 
the attractors are local minima on such a surface. Note that such an energy surface is 
different from the fitness landscape; fitness is a function of an agent*s behaviour, and 
of the rest of the population (see Definition 3.2.5). In contrast, the energy surface lies 
over the space of all possible population distribution functions. 
Ideally, one would hope that an analytic solution to Equation 3.12 could be found, or 
failing that numerical methods could be used to identify fixed points within the state 
space However, before embarking on such a computationally expensive exercise, 
dependent upon the exact circumstances (i.e. fitness function / ) , i t would be wise to 
consider the likely topology of the underlying energy surface. 
In this section, related work, principally that of Kauffman and co-workers, and of 
Priston and others will be used to try and more fully understand the likely characteristics 
of the energy surface corresponding to Equation 3.12. 
Kauffman [46] and co-workers have studied a class of models known as NK models. 
An NK model consists of A'' binary sites, each linked to K other sites. Each site 
contributes to the fitness of the entire system, based on its own state, and the state of 
the K loci i t is connected to. Therefore each locus can contribute one of 2^+^ possible 
fitnesses. As these are unknown, they are taken at random from a uniform distribution. 
The fitness of the whole system is the mean of the fitness of its constituent parts. 
These systems have been extensively studied, and their properties are well known. 
Such a system is in many respects well defined by these two parameters N and K. 
In particular, as K, the number of other sites that the fitness of a particular site 
is dependent upon, increase, the resulting fitness landscape becomes more and more 
rugged and multipeaked. Moreover, by altering K for any given A'', i t is possible to 
tune the resulting fitness landscape. 
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Sucli systems have also been used as models of co-evolutionary systems. KaufEraan 
and Miller (reported in [46]) have re-interpreted the NK model as a co-evolutionary 
model. In this case each of the sites is considered as an agent playing some co-
evolutionary game. At each time step, every agent re-assesses their current state, and 
chooses for its next play the state that will maximise its fitness under the (myopic) 
assumption that all other agents will not change their plays. In this way every agent 
simultaneously makes an adaptive step towards what they conceive of as a local optima. 
Describe this as a NK Boolean game. Equilibria in a NK network mirror pure strategy 
Nash equilibria in the NK Boolean game. At such a point every agent has a fitness 
maximising play, given that no other connected agent changes its play. 
How does a NK Boolean game or a NK system relate to a population of interacting 
adaptive agents, be it finite or infinite? In a NK Boolean game, each agent plays against 
a given number of other agents, whereas in the systems under consideration in this 
thesis, the interaction may or may not be dependent upon a set of specific interactions, 
or it may be dependent upon a more generalised group interaction. However, it is noted 
that as K, the number of interactions that the fitness of a specific site is dependent 
upon, is increased, the resulting fitness landscape becomes less and less correlated. 
Therefore, one should expect that the energy landscape underlying an infinite pop-
ulation of adaptive interacting agents may well contain a large number of local minima. 
From any particular initial population distribution, the population will flow across the 
landscape, until it asymptotically reaches a stable distribution, a minima of the energy 
surface. 
Now consider also the views expressed by Priston [31]. His concern is the dynamics 
of a neural architecture made up of a number of groups of highly connected neurons, 
with sparse connections between groups. The system is not adaptive; the individual 
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neuronal groups are set up to exhibit chaotic dynamics, and the connectivity between 
groups is under experimental control. 
Alteration of a control parameter (the mean connection strength between neurons in 
different groups) has the effect of changing the dynamics of the system through a variety 
of behaviours, ranging from stable incoherence (when the inter-group connections are 
scant), through to stable coherence and behaviours such as phase locking when the 
connections are strong. Between these two lies a set of states that Friston (following 
Kelso [47]) characterises as dynamically stable or metarstable. This is a completely 
different phenomenon to the meta-stability that is under discussion in this thesis. The 
phenomenon referred to by Priston and Kelso is the change in the dynamics of an 
attractor as some control parameter is altered, such as a Rayleigh-B6nard convection cell 
moving from a rest state to a macroraotion convective rolling state as the temperature 
of the liquid (the control parameter) is varied. In this case, the changes in the attractor 
are revealed as transient neuronal dynamics. 
Transients in dynamical systems are usually associated with the relaxation of a 
system from some initial state to an attractor. Friston suggests that whilst the system 
will remain at a single attractor, there being no adaptive or stochastic elements to the 
system; the attractor manifold has a complex form. The system can become trapped 
in a sub-manifold, in which it remains until it can escape via overcoming the entropic 
barrier that holds it there. Upon escape it will then enter another sub-manifold; the 
system will exhibit a transient associated with the entry into the new sub-manifold 
which dies off as the system relaxes into this area of the attractor. 
How does this relate to other descriptions of the dynamics of an interacting adaptive 
population? If one considered the neuronal subpopulations as individual agents, then 
he is describing a system of weakly interacting non-adaptive agents. In this case, the 
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collective behaviours that the system exhibits might well change over time in the absence 
of an adaptive force. The system would not leave an attractor, but the clianges would 
be associated with various sub-manifolds of that attractor. 
In the case of an adaptive population such entropic barriers may well also exist, but 
there will also be energetic barriers between attractors, that can only be surmounted 
by exploratory forces within the adaptive process. Behavioural clianges may well be 
induced by transitions between sub-manifolds of one attractor, as well as via the adap-
tively or stochastically induced transitions between attracators. It is questionable as 
to whether collective behavioural changes of the system caused by transitions between 
sub-raanifolds of an attractor can exist in such a way so as not to change the selective 
advantage of individual behaviours. If they can, then the complex attractor dynamics 
described by Priston are a possibility. If not, the attractor dynamics must necessarily 
be more simple; sub-manifolds of a complex attractor may become separate attractors 
in an adaptive system. 
3.2.6 Reconciling Finite and Infinite Population Approaches 
In this section a diffusion equation approach to the dynamics of a finite population of 
interacting agents will be considered. The exploratory and exploitative operators were 
discussed in Section 1.1. It was noted that both these operators could be considered as 
stochastic operators. In the limit of an infinite population, the frequency with whicli 
a given interactive behaviour, x, is observed within the population converges to the 
population density function, ^(x), of that behaviour. Not only that, but the frequency 
with which a particular adaptive change, be it caused by the explorative or exploitative 
operator, will also converge to a well defined value in the infinite limit. This allows 
the derivation of the time-evolution of a population of interacting adaptive agents, as 
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discussed in the preceding section. 
The approach taken will be based on the discussion in the preceding section. A finite 
population will be considered to adapt at discrete time intervals, At (here, At = I). The 
discrete time dynamics of an infinite population will form a Poincarr^ section through 
the continuous time trajectory. The approach taken will be to consider the population 
at time i as a population density function, expressing the present state of the system. 
For a system of n agents this population density function will be written (/>„(i). The 
evolutionary operator, € will be applied to this population density function ^(i) to form 
a probability density function <^oo(^-l-l)- This represents the population density function 
that would have resulted under ^, if an infinite population with an identical density 
function to 0„(t). The actual population at time t + 1, < „^(t + 1) is gained by taking n 
samples from a random variable R with probability density function <j>oo{t + 1). 
By considering how the approach taken for an infinite population may be adapted 
to a finite population, problems with the infinite population approach will become 
apparent. First, consider how the population density of a finite population of agents 
may be defined, in such a way that its extension to an infinite population will correspond 
functionally to that given in Definition 3.2.2. 
Definition 3.2.6 For a population of n agents, the population density function , (t>n 
will be given by 
-E^(5(aO) (3-13) 
where 6{x) is a Dirac delta function centred about x.^ It is here that the problems 
become apparent: In order that 3.13 should converge to 3.1 it is necessary that the 
population not only become infinite, but become uncountably infinite. A" is a real 
^The Dirac delta function can be considered as Iim^ a_^ o N(a:,a^), where TV is a Gaussian mean a;, 
variance CT^. By this means one can ensure that |^ remains finite at all points. 
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domain, hence it contains an uncountably infinite number of points. 
Recall the constraints put forwards at the end of Section 3.2.1. The population is 
constrained to flow towards areas of increased fitness. The combination of this con-
straint, and the third constraint (population flow away from each point at a rate de-
pendent upon the population size at that point) describe the action of the exploitative 
operator. This makes the assumption that the fitness of every point in the domain X 
is known a priori. This is simply not the case: the fitness of a point x G X can only be 
known if there is an agent with behaviour x at that time. If no such agent exists, then 
the fitness of that point is unknown, and so there is no knowledge to be exploited. 
In the uncountably infinite case, there is no problem. The exploratory operator 
produces a diffusive pressure on the population, causing the population to flow from 
regions of X with high density towards regions of X with low density. This is checked 
by the exploitative operator which forces the population towards regions of high fitness. 
The presence of the explorative operator will force <t>(x) to be strictly non zero (although 
quite possibly approaching zero) everywhere. In this sense the population will have 
knowledge of the fitness function / across the entire domain X. 
In the case of a finite, or even countably infinite population, an inconsistency be-
comes apparent. Clearly the distribution <^Ar will be zero almost everywhere. Either 
the assumption that keeps |^ finite is retained (taking the Dirac delta function as the 
limit of a Gaussian curve as the variance tends to zero), or it is not. In the former 
case, the result is an assumption that (j> must be strictly non zero everywhere along 
the range, which is known to be false, but allows the exploitation operator to transport 
the population towards local peaks in the fitness landscape. On the other hand, if this 
assumption is not made, then <f> remains strictly zero for every behaviour in X which is 
not applied by an agent. This prevents the exploitative operator from exploiting points 
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whose fitnesses are not known. 
This is a serious problem. The diffusion approadi appears tractable in the finite 
case only if an assumption is made that will give a finite case behaviour, breaking the 
premise on which the model was founded. 
The second problem is how to formulate the population density of a finite population 
of interacting agents. It might appear odd to have a population density function that 
is zero almost everywhere. However, (^Ar(<) is used only to calculate <f>oo{t + 1), whicli 
provides a probability density function to the random variable, which is then sampled 
from to give a population at the next time step, t + 1. 
There is also a third problem in producing an analytic formulation of the behaviour 
of a system of a finite number of interacting adaptive agents. Recall Section 2.1.7. In 
this section the underlying assumptions about convergence rates implicit in the deriva-
tion of the dynamics of an infinite population evolutionary system were considered. 
This section was briefly alluded to again in Section 3.2. To recap, it has been shown 
that the form of the diffusion obtained is not independent of the size of various pa-
rameters (e.g. the mutation rate) relative to the population size (although of course 
the resulting model is strictly an infinite population model applied to a very large fi-
nite population). In dealing with a finite population, one must be aware that as the 
population size changes, then the relative magnitude of the mutation rate and other 
significant parameters will also change. This means that the controlling diffusion equa-
tion will not remain constant as the population size alters. This is problematic: the aim 
of this thesis is to study meta-stability in populations of interacting adaptive agents. 
It is hypothesised that the cause of this meta-stability is stochasticities inherent in the 
adaptive process in a finite population. It is difficult to conceive how the effect of such 
stochasticities (which are assumed to be due to sampling fluctuations) can adequate-
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ly be studied when the underlying infinite population baseline is itself shifting as the 
population size is varied. 
For these three reasons it is necessary to abandon the diffusion equation approach 
as a tool for understanding the finite population behaviour of systems of interacting 
adaptive agents. Henceforth, we shall adopt a Markov approach, considering a popula-
tion whose behaviours can be described as lying in a number of discrete categories or 
bins. Eadi agent will be characterised by the behaviour that it exhibits, and the set 
of possible behaviours will be small. The system can now be described as a frequency 
vector: each component of the vector giving the frequency of agents within the popula-
tion that lie within the respective behavioural class. The exploratory and exploitative 
operators, M and 5, can now be described by matrix transformations. This approach 
has already been detailed in Section 2.2.3. Moreover, in this section the stochastic 
fluctuations within the adaptive operators in finite populations have been explored to 
some degree, and can provide a model of the fluctuations in an interacting population. 
The key difi'erences are that first, the population is now split into behavioural classes, 
and second, the interactive nature of the fitness function will add further non-linearities 
to the exploratory operator. 
In following chapters, the modelling of a particular population of adaptive interactive 
agents via a Markov system approach will be considered in detail. Further discussion 
of the approach will therefore be confined to these chapters. 
In Section 3.1.2, the stochasticieties in the adaptive process caused by sampling 
fluctuations within a finite population were alluded to. Let us therefore consider how 
these fluctuations might affect the behaviour of an interacting adaptive population. 
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3.3 Meta-stability in Finite Populations 
Consider a finite population of interacting adaptive agents. Two points have already 
been established regarding such a population. 
1. In general, the evolution of an infinite population of interacting agents can be 
formulated as a highly non-linear differential operator. The general form of this 
operator is analogous to an equation for diffusion across a potential field. 
2. In the case of a finite population, the evolution of the system can be thought of 
as having two components. 
(a) A deterministic coraponent,f corresponding to a Poincarr^ section through 
the differential operator. The image of a population distribution under this 
operator specifies the mean of the stochastic component. 
(b) A stochastic component, ^5 , sampled from a random variable with well de-
fined mean. The form of this distribution is unknown, but it may well be 
binomial in form. The variance of this distribution is bounded from above 
and below, and asymptotically converges to zero with increasing population 
size. 
Note the following two points: 
i. The form of the noise distribution has not been specified. As discussed 
in Sections 2.1.7 and 2.2.2, the relative size of system parameters and 
the reduction of the system to a finite population can both affect the 
expected distribution. 
ii. Additionally, the relationship between the deterministic and stocliastic 
components has not been specified. Whilst it might well be convenient 
to assume an additive noise, this may not be the case. 
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This combination is an alternative formulation to the following (which is a more realistic 
physical description of the operation of the system). The deterministic operator maps 
a population density function to a probability density function, which is then sampled 
from an appropriate number of times to give a new population. The advantage of the 
formulation is that it explicitly separates the system into deterministic and stochastic 
elements, where there is only one sample taken. Moreover, this formulation explicitly 
demonstrates the reduced effect of the stochastic operator as population size increases. 
Consider how this combination of deterministic and stochastic operators will affect 
the evolution of a finite population of adaptive interacting agents which has a number 
of attractors in the solution space, and consider the expected behaviour of the system. 
Before considering the behavioural patterns that result, one point needs to be made 
absolutely clear: The behaviours that are observed are dependent upon the timescale 
that they are observed over. In the case of a finite population of n agents there is a 
finite probability that the stochastic operator could result in a population far removed 
from the expected population. Whilst this probability may be very small for large 
populations, given a sufficient observational window, the probability of it occurring 
becomes significant. Indeed, given a (longer) observational period, the probability of not 
observing such an event becomes insignificant. Three behavioural phases are postulated: 
Stable Dynamics Where the population is large enough, relative to the observational 
timescale, a stable behaviour would be expected. The system will evolve from its 
initial population towards the attractor whose basin it is in. The trajectory of 
the system will be close to that expected of an infinite population. 
Meta-Stable Dynamics In a finite population, with a long enough observational 
window, the probability that the stochastic operator will move the population 
from one basin of attraction to another basin of attraction, becomes significant. 
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In this case one would expect to see stable periods of behaviour, separated by 
sudden behavioural transitions as the population moves from one basin of attrac-
tion to another. These may be observable as phase transitions in the macroscopic 
system variables. If the observational period is short, stable dynamics may be 
observed instead, if no transition occurs. On the other hand, if the observational 
period is long, but the observations are infrequent (i.e. not every evolutionary 
epoch of the system is observed), then the population may appear to demon-
strate unstable dynamics. Meta-stability is a phenomenon dependent upon the 
observation window and schedule. 
Unstable Dynamics When the population is very small, the lattice size can become 
significant in comparison the attractor basin size. Here the probability that the 
system may move from one attractor basin to another becomes overwhelming. In 
conjunction with this, it becomes hard to distinguish the boundaries of attractor 
basins; there may be few lattice points in each basin. The dynamics of the system 
are mainly stochastic here. It may not be appropriate to talk of the population 
lying within an attractor basin, as the timescales it lies in any basin may be 
minimal, and observationally it may become hard, if not impossible, to discern 
which basin the system is lying in. 
3.3.1 Finite Population Dynamics under Internal and External 
Shocks 
The finite population dynamics that have been discussed above, are driven by the 
intemal dynamics of the population, under the influence of the stochastic evolutionary 
operator, £3- many cases there is also a second force that drives the trajectory of 
the population: namely the environmental dynamic. It is this external dynamic that 
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is under consideration here, together with the interplay between internal and external 
forces, and the resultant effects on the evolution of the population. 
Populations of agents do not exist in isolation. They exist within a context. A 
network of adaptive routers exists in the context of network loadings. A market of 
adaptive traders exists in the context of stock returns. A population of situated adaptive 
robots exists in the context of a physical environment, with changing lighting, humidity, 
friction, and even changing environmental layout. This context is described as the 
environment in which agents exist. Changes in this environment will be described as 
external shocks, in contrast to internal shocks due to £s-
External shocks will directly affect the ability of agents to perform their allotted 
tasks, and thus directly affect the fitness of agents. In some systems the external 
shocks may affect all agents equally, in other systems they may affect some agents but 
not others. Even seemingly well adapted agents may be removed from the population 
if they encounter large enough environmental changes. 
External shocks will clearly have no effect on the exploratory operator, M] this 
operator acts only on surviving members of the population. External shocks will act 
only upon the exploitative operator, <S. These external shocks may have one of two 
effects, depending upon whether they operate upon the entire population uniformly, 
or whether the effect of the environment affects members of the population in a non-
uniform manner. 
In the first case, the effect of external shocks is to directly modulate the exploitative 
operator, £ . The resultant effect will be to modulate the deterministic component, 
Soi of the evolutionajy operator. This will have a global effect on the evolution at 
all population sizes. One might characterise this as not affecting the convergence of 
the population towards fit phenotypes, but altering the relative fitness of phenotypes 
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within that population. This relates directly to the discussion of evolutionary dynamics 
under varying selection pressure discussed in Section 2.1.4. Classical theory predicts 
that in the case where individual genes are selectively neutral in the long run, but 
varying randomly in the short term, fixation will eventually almost certainly occur. 
This is referred to as quasi-fixation. However, this analysis does not include any linkage 
between gene fitness and gene expression within the population, let alone the highly 
non-linear linkage postulated to exist in populations of interacting adaptive agents. It 
will therefore be interesting to observe whether quasi-fixation does actually occur in 
experimentation. 
On the other hand, if the external shocks do not affect the population in a uni-
form manner, identical members of the population may be affected differently by the 
environment. This means that identical individuals may end up with widely varying 
fitnesses. Again, this may affect the exploitative operator S, but in a very different 
manner to the above case. In this case, the exploitative operator might be thought of 
as being 'blurred*: identical phenotypes may have widely varying fitnesses. This will 
result in the selection operator being weakened as it becomes harder to discriminate 
between strong and weak phenotypes, and thus to pick the strongest genetic material 
for the next generation. In this case, one would expect the population to be driven more 
by the mutation operator than might otherwise be the case: the population will find it 
hard to hold fitness peaks'* against the mutational pressure towards a maximum-entropy 
formulation. 
'^ Obviously, in this case, a 'fitness peak' may be a heterogeneous population. 
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Chapter 4 
A Simple Stock Market Model 
In this chapter, a simple model of a population of interacting adaptive agents is de-
scribed. A mathematical treatment of this model is developed, based upon the statisti-
cal behavioural dynamics approach put forward in Section 3.1.1. Differences between 
the expected behaviour of the Simple Stock Market Model (SSMM) and the behaviour 
of the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (SFASM), upon which it is based, are considered. 
4.1 The Simple Stock Market Model (SSMM) 
In this section, a simple model of an artificial stock market is presented. At the outset, 
let it be clear that the purpose of this model is to explore the dynamics of a population 
of interacting adaptive agents. Whilst it is grounded in an economic context, it is not 
designed as an economic model, and the results should not be taken as indicative of 
any real-life economic behaviour. 
4.1,1 Design Issues 
This design of this model is subject to a number of constraints, which serve to ground 
the model in a number of areas. The purpose of this model is to explore and analyse 
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the stability of attractors in the population space of a system of interacting adaptive 
agents, and phase transitions associated with shifts between attractors, due to internal 
and external shocks to the system. To this end, various constraints are imposed upon 
the model to aid this analysis. The restrictions on the model are as follows: 
Analytical Tractability For the purposes of this study, an analytically tractable 
model is necessary. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, a number of analytic 
approaches are possible. However, there are no simple solutions. As has been 
indicated, the preferred analysis is in terras of behavioural order parameters (see 
Section 3.1.1). For analytical ease, a system is sought with a finite number of 
easily distinguishable finite agent behaviours, 
A Well Understood Problem It is important that the model should implement an 
example of a well studied problem. This ensures that it is possible to back-check 
the behaviour of the model against other simulations and models within the same 
field. One would expect that any model should exhibit the same basic behavioural 
characteristics as other models within the field. A new model is implemented 
rather than use an existing model for the reason of analytical tractability discussed 
above. 
Simple Dynamics The purpose of the model is to explore and analyse the stability of 
populations of interacting agents, and various phenomena associated with transi-
tions between attractor basins in the population space. To that end a model with 
the simplest possible dynamics that may exhibit meta-stability is sought. Two 
constraints may immediately be stated: 
Adaptive Processes In Section 1.1.1 adaptation has been described as the com-
bination of an exploratory and an exploitative force. It is desired that these 
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two forces be ajialytically separable in a mathematical treatment of the mod-
el. For this reason, the adaptive process implemented will be a genetic al-
gorithm implementing asexual reproduction with mutation. Many selective 
schemata are possible, a roulette wheel selection method will be used because 
it is analytically tractable. 
Temporal dependencies For analytical ease it is important that the model is 
stationary^ i.e. that the statistics of its behaviour are independent of any 
time shift. Beyond this, it is desirable that the model behaviour should be 
restricted to a one-step temporal dependency: the behaviour of the model in 
the immediate future is dependent only upon its present state, and not on 
any previous state. This combination of properties restricts the behavioural 
dynamics of the system to be a Markov process, which is well understood. 
For the above reasons the model chosen is a simple stock market, based heavily upon 
the Santa Fe Stock Market Model (SFASM) [5], but with a number of simplifications 
incorporated to aid the analytical tractability, and to simplify the dynamics of the 
system. The dynamics of the SFASM, and their relation to the dynamics of the SSMM 
will be considered in Chapter 6. 
4.1.2 The Nature of the Market 
The market is based around the simple neo-classical two asset model, consisting of a 
single bond and a single stock. The bond is a money equivalent. Holding the bond will 
guarantee a fixed return r at the end of each given period. The stock is a holding with 
a variable return: at the end of each trading period the stock will deliver a return, dt 
drawn from a random variable. In this case, the random variable has a normal form, 
with mean r, variance a and first order linear persistence (i.e. the returns from the 
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stock form an AR(1) stochastic process, described in Equation 4.1. e is a Gaussian 
random variable with mean 0 and variance <T^ , the mean value of the A R l process, 
3 = r, and p is the regression parameter, whicli controls the speed at whicli the series 
returns towards the mean, 5 ) . 
dt = d-Vp{dt.,-d)^€t (4.1) 
Each agent has a fixed capital, whicli can be held either in the bond, the stock, or a 
combination of both. The price of the bonds is fixed, and there is assumed to be no 
limit on the supply available to the traders. On the other hand, the stock is in limited 
supply {N units available), and the exchange rate between the stock and the bond will 
depend on the demand for the bond. This exchange rate will be referred to as the price 
of the stock, Pf 
In general terms, the dividend sequence forms an environment in which the system 
of agents is situated. The modelling of the dividend sequence as an AR(1) process is 
well grounded within economic literature [15]. In other systems, the environmental fluc-
tuation may be grounded on other distributions, in particular power law distributions, 
as discussed in Section 2.1.7. 
The market operates as follows. At the beginning of each time period the dividend 
from the stock and the price of the stock are posted, so that all agents can view them. 
Each agent then calculates their desired holding of the stock relative to the bond^ 
(The detail of this is explained in Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). Agents then submit the 
difference between their actual holding and their desired holding (i.e. a buy/sell order) 
to a market authority, known as the market maker, who fixes a price that reconciles the 
demand with the supply. Each agent then trades an appropriate proportion of their bid, 
^ Econonuc theory gives an equation for calculating the desired holding as a function of the expected 
value of price plus dividend in the next time period. 
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effectively determined by the market maker. The agent then receives a payoff consisting 
of the return on each bond the agent holds plus the new dividend on each unit of stock 
the agent holds. 
While agents have access to the present dividend and price of the stock, an external 
observer (e.g. the market maker) also has access to the volume of the stock traded in 
any particular period. The system observables (as discussed in Section 3.1.3) are the 
stock price and trading volume; these are macroscopic parameters dependent upon the 
state of the population, which give some (incomplete) information about the state of 
the population. 
4.1.3 Market Clearing 
There are many ways that a market can operate. The most common model is described 
as a double auction market; agents can submit bids (offers to buy) and asks (offers 
to sell). The sequences of bids and asks are raonotonically increasing and decreasing 
respectively, and a transaction takes place when the most recent bid and ask coincide. 
There are various forms of double auction market in the literature (see [30] for a review), 
in which the detail of how the bid and ask sequence are established and related, and 
the amount of information available to traders, vary. 
This is not the only way that a market can operate. An alternate system requires 
that all trading is conducted through a specialised agent called a market maker. This 
agent has privileged information not available to other agents, and acts to establish 
a price at which demand matches supply. At this point, the market is described as 
cleared] the market maker holds no stock itself. This system has been adopted for two 
reasons: first i t simplifies the implementation of the model, and second, i t is analytically 
tractable. 
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I t is well known that under conditions of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility (that is to say that the risk utility function takes a negative exponential form 
with rate A) and Gaussian distributions for forecasts, an agent's demand Xt for the 
stock is of the form 
Here E(p-\- d) is the return that an agent expects the stock to produce (i.e. the price 
plus dividend forecast for the next time period), as a^^^i i f the variance in an agent's 
predictions of that expectation. 
The market maJcer can calculate the clearing price of the market at each time step. 
In a market with n agents, write each agent's expectation of the next price plus dividend 
as (the expectation), and the denominator of 4.2 as Ri. The numerator in 4.2 gives 
the difference between the expected total capitaJ value of the stock plus its dividend, and 
the equivalent value of the bond plus their returns. The denominator then effectively 
gives a risk terra, placing this difference in the context of a normally distributed set 
of agent expectations, and the agent's own risk utility^. The agent's risk function is 
assumed to be constant through time in this model. 
Clearing demands that 
t x i = N (4.3) 
into which we can substitute 4.2: 
t M ± d = ^' (4.4) 
The mean expectation of the next price plus dividend, Et is defined by 
El = 5 ^ (4.5) 
^As with many similar situations, this is a 2-armed bandit problem: the sources of loss being holding 
too much stock, and holding too much bond. Here the penalty function is symmetric, and the risk 
function quantifies the agents perception of the relative utilities of loss from each source. 
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In the markets we are considering, aJl agents have identical risk functions, Ri\ the uni-
form risk function will henceforth be written as R. Moreover, the total stock available 
will be set at 1 unit of stock per agent within the market. This means that the dy-
namics of the market will be independent of the availability of stock, across a range of 
population sizes, i.e. N/n = 1. Rearranging Equation 4.5 and substituting it into 4.4 
gives 
The above equation is used by the market maker to calculate the price that will clear 
the market, given the individual agent*s expectations £|,t+i, and their risk functions 
Ri. From the price i t is then possible for the trading volume to be calculated using 
Equation 4.2 to gain the individual demands for stock from each agent. Note the as-
sumption that at the beginning of each trading period the stock is uniformly distributed 
amongst the agents. The nature of the agents, and of the adaptive process (discussed 
in Section 4.1.4) maJces i t impossible to assume any continuity of agenthood. However, 
i t ensures that the market has a uniform weighting during its evolution: the dynamics 
of the market cannot become biased towards a dependency on the actions of particular 
agents, because they control most of the stock. Whilst this gives the market a degree of 
unreality, the trading volume observable used proves very useful in separating different 
regimes existing in the market dynamics. Arthur et al. [5] relate periods of high trading 
volume to over- and under-pricing regimes, and periods of low trading volume to the 
fundamental pricing regime. The volume observable takes the form 
1=1 
Xi,t 
n 
(4.7) 
Now, by definition (see Equation 4.3) ^ is the mean of the demand distribution. Vt can 
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be rewritten as 
(".8) 
This is bounded from below by the standard deviation of the demand for stock 
Thus, one might expect to observe the trading volume in the market being correlated 
with the standard deviation of the demand for stock. 
I t is also interesting to consider the residual^ the difference between the expected 
return predicted by a rational agent, and the return that agents actually receive. The 
magnitude of the residual has been used by Arthur et al. [5] to gives an indication 
of how much the market is deviating from a rational expectations regime. When the 
market deviates from a rational expectations regime, i t is being driven by the collective 
will of the traders towards a position which is theoretically untenable. The homogeneous 
rational endogenous expectations, or h.r.e.e. price is the price that one would expect 
to be paid for the stock by a market of identical rational traders. This may be easily 
calculated. 
In such a regime, all traders are identical, and their rationality implies that they will 
all have the same demand for stock. Therefore the stock will be split equally between 
all agents. The expectation can be easily calculated from Equation 4.2, and is given by 
E,rce=p{l+r) + R (4.10) 
The residual is simply the difference between this estimate and the actual return p4-d. 
4.1.4 The Nature of the Traders 
The system consists of a number of identical agents; eacli trader is a simple rule based 
agent, which can respond to aspects of its environment to produce an action. Here the 
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environment that the agents are responding to is the collective behaviour of the market, 
and the response is a prediction of the next expected return from the stock, Ei^f This 
in turn motivates each agents demand for stock, which is met by the market maker 
imposing a clearing condition as described in the previous section (Section 4.1.3). 
Each trader has a set of sensors, represented by a Boolean string. These sensors 
indicate whether certain conditions have been fulfilled. In this simplified case we restrict 
the sensors to giving information about the present state of the market (i.e. no historical 
information, or averaging information). This greatly restricts the dynamics, and (in a 
stable population) will prevent technical or noise trading from taking place[5]. In this 
model a set of four sensor bits are used, each of which has the form 
5, = ' (4.11) 
1 otherwise 
> 
for levels Lj associated with each of the n traders. Each sensor is switched on (S,- = 1) 
only when the price-earnings ratio of the stock, expressed relative to that of the bond, 
exceeds a certain value. The implementational detail of the model is discussed in 
Section 5.2.1. 
Each trader then has a set of k rules whicli act on the sensors. Each rule acts as 
a predictive mechanism for a trader; upon certain environmental conditions being met 
(the market being in a particular state), the rule will make a prediction about the future 
state of the market, which is then used in calculating an agent's demand for the stock. 
Each rule takes the form of a trinary string, composed from the alphabet { 0 , 1 , # } . The 
symbol # is a wild card, interpreted as 'don*t care*. A rule is activated if i t corresponds 
to the sensor string, so a rule *10##' would be activated by sensor strings '1010* and 
lOir but not by *00ir. 
Each rule also has an extra pair of bits (the response bits), which determine the 
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response of the agent when the rule is activated. This response takes the form of a 
prediction of the return that the agent expects from the stock in the next trading 
period. The two response bits mediate the values of the relative and absolute change 
in the expected price plus dividend, i.e. 
Eipt^i + dt+i) = coipt + dt) + ci (4.12) 
The two response bits modify the relative and absolute predictor parameters, CQ and 
ci , respectively, according to the mapping shown in Table 4.1. 
Bit Value i CQ Ci 
0 I 1 - Co - C , 
# 1 0 
1 1+Co Ci 
Table 4.1: Mapping from response bit values to predictor parameter values. For 
example, a response bit pair 01 would give rise to a prediction E{pt+i + dt+i) = 
(1 - Co)(pt 4- dt) + C i , as per Equation 4.12. 
In the case where no rule is triggered, i.e. the sensor string does not match the 
sensory bits of any rule that a given trader possesses, that a trader will predict an 
unchanged return at the next time step, E{pt^i + dt+i) =pt + dt. 
In the simulations presented a minimal rule set is implemented; each trader consists 
of precisely k = 1 rule. Furthermore, in this market, a condition of heterogeneity is 
placed upon the traders; eacli trader has identical parameters Lj and Cj . This implies 
that in every trader Cj can take one of three values; there are a total of nine possible 
predictions (which will be described as behaviours) available to traders in the market. 
The parameters Co ,Ci are dependent upon the rules activated, which in turn are 
dependent upon the current state of the market. In this way the agents interact, because 
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their present behaviour is always dependent upon the prior collective behaviour of the 
entire population, as well as external environmental shocks. 
Each agent can therefore be represented as a trinary bit string, consisting of a list of 
the rules that i t contains. Suppose this list has / bits. As all the traders are identical in 
design, they are interchangeable. Describe the state of the system 0 as a 3' dimensional 
normal vector. Each element in the vector is the proportion of the population that has 
a particular set of rules. Such a formalisation rapidly becomes unwieldy as I increases. 
In Section 4,3 a low dimension approximation to this formalisation will be described, 
4.1.5 Comparison with the Implementation of Santa Fe Arti-
ficial Stock Market 
The Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (SFASM) has already been introduced in Sec-
tion 1.3.1, as an example of meta-stable behaviour. The Simple Stock Market Model 
(SSMM) developed in this chapter is derived from the SFASM. Here, the quantitive 
and qualitive differences between these two models will be discussed. 
In most respects the SFASM and the SSMM are identical, certainly they both rely on 
identical market clearing and pricing mechanisms. The differences lie in the construction 
of the agents and the evolutionary algorithm: the SFASM agents are far more complex, 
and the evolution is carried out in a slightly different fashion. 
SFASM agents are classifier systems, as described by Holland [42]. Each agent has 
a set of rules, similar to those of the SSMM. Each trinary rule has a sensory string, 
similar to that of the SSMM. A rule is implemented if the sensory string matches current 
conditions, exactly as described in Section 4.1.4. However, the set of sensors used by 
agents in the SFASM is more extensive than those in the SSMM, agents are able to 
detect short term trends in the price of the stock (e.g. rising or falling price). This 
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enables technical trading to take place, where agents use the short-term market history 
to predict the next return from the stock. 
The responses that are possible from the rules are also more sophisticated than 
those in the SSMM. Each rule has response parameters that enable a prediction of the 
next return to be made, based on absolute and relative return changes, exactly as per 
the SSMM. However, the simple restriction of these parameters to nine possible values 
does not occur; in the SFASM these parameters are reals lying within a given range. 
Each rule within a SFASM agent is therefore a more sophisticated version of the rules 
implemented in the SSMM, 
The SFASM agents act as classifiers: each rule has an associated strength or fitness 
parameter. Each agent forms an expectation of the next return from the stock by 
taking a weighted average of the expectation of all rules that are activated by the 
current market conditions. The weights used are the fitnesses of the activated rules; 
rules with better predictive histories will have higher fitness. The expected next return 
of eacli agent is then passed to the marketraaker, exactly as per the SSMM. However, a 
single difference arises here: in the SSMM all agents are constrained to an identical risk 
function. This is not the case in the SFASM; each agent also passes a risk parameter 
to the marketmaker. This parameter is based on the variance of the set of predictions 
that its rules have made at that time step. 
After the market maker has imposed clearing,the dividend is revealed, as per the 
SSMM. The fitnesses of the individual rules is now updated, based on a least-squares 
error function. At regular intervals agents update their rule set by applying a genetic 
algorithm, using a fitness based selection to remove the weakest members of the rule 
set, and replace them with the offspring of stronger rules via a combination of crossover 
and mutation. 
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The evolutionary algorithm is different in several respects: 
1. In the SFASM, evolution takes place at a much slower rate than in the SSMM. 
In the SSMM the population is updated after every time-step, whereas in the 
SFASM the evolutionary algorithm is only applied every 250 or 1000 time steps, 
and asynchronously across agents. 
2. In the SFASM it is not possible for agents to learn by copying the successful 
strategies of other agents. The rule-set in each agent is an isolated population; 
mixing between agents never takes place. Whilst agents can develop identical 
strategies, they must do so in isolation. In the SSMM, the copying of successful 
strategies between agents constitutes a major part of the evolutionary algorithm. 
3. The SFASM implements a sexual reproductive algorithm, using the crossover op-
erator, whereas the SSMM only uses an asexual reproductive operator. However, 
mutation is implemented in both models. 
To conclude, the SFASM is a much more complex model. The implementation of 
the agents allows a much wider and more sophisticated range of agent responses to 
prevailing meirket conditions. The evolutionary algorithm is also quite different, and 
much more sophisticated. I t does, however, appear odd that no facility to allow mixing 
between the rule-sets evolved in separate agents. This means that agents cannot choose 
to copy the behaviours of other agents, all behaviours must be evolved separately in 
independent agents. 
The purpose of the models is however quite different. The SFASM was designed as an 
economic testbed, whereas the SSMM was designed to address issues of meta-stability. 
However, the grounding of the SSMM on the SFASM should lead to behavioural simi-
larities between the two models. These will be discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
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4.2 Dynamics of the SSMM: General Issues 
There are, however, a number of features of the expected behaviour of the SSMM that 
may be discussed before a detailed model of the behavioural dynamics of the market 
is built- The discussion of these more general features will inform the more detailed 
analysis presented in Section 4.3. 
4.2.1 Fixed Points and Attractor Basins 
Consider an evolutionary operator on the population consisting of fitness proportional 
selection plus mutation. In this case fitness will be assessed as the accuracy of an 
agent's prediction of the next price, using a mean-squared error measure (discussed 
further in Section 4.3.2). The fitness of an individual agent will then be some function 
of the composition of the entire population. How this might be formalised is discussed 
in detail in Section 4.3. 
I t is possible to write down the fitness of any particular agent at time t as a function 
of the vector <f>, i.e. as a function of the composition of the entire market^. This would 
enable one to write down a matrix operator for the evolution of the market, and solve 
for the eigenvectors, i.e. the fixed points of the markef*. 
This system is a Markov system, albeit a very complex one. The sensor string 
contains no historical information, so it does not appear possible for any technical 
trading based on trend analysis to take place. Arthur et al. [5] note that under this 
condition, the SFASM remains in a fundamental (h.r.e.e) trading regime. An initial 
expectation might therefore be that similar conditions would hold in the SSMM, the 
system is expected to remain in a fundamental trading regime, where the price of the 
^Although in practice this would be a complex and time consuming operation. 
^In this case the state of the system can be written as a finite dimensional vector. In the infinite 
case one could write down a differential equation. 
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stock reflects its true or fundamental value. 
I f the time evolution of the system is followed, under any sequence of stock dividends, 
one might expect that the market would converge towards the h.r.e.e. price, the price 
that classical economic theory predicts that the market should adopt. Even if this is the 
case, and for example, the system exhibits rational (h.r.e.e) behaviour between periods 
of over or under-pricing, one should be wary of positing a single underlying causality 
to this behaviour. I t is quite feasible that a single observed behaviour (such as an 
h.r.e.e regime) might result from more than one attractor in the space of population 
distributions, in a similar fashion to the multiple nucleus-shield combinations which 
Lomborg [56] observed in the iterated prisoners dilemma game^. 
This does not imply that there is necessarily a single attractor within the space 
of population distributions. There may be multiple stable population distributions, 
each of which gives rise to a fundamental trading regime. Meta-stability may still be 
present, in the form of transitions between these population distributions, caused by 
stochastic!ties inherent within the adaptive process. 
Suppose there are a number of possible attractors, ( />i , . . . <f>mi eacli of which is a pop-
ulation distribution across the N possible trading agents; each attractor will correspond 
to a particular distribution of the infinite population of traders between the possible 
rules**. Given a particular initial population distribution (^(0), and a given sequence 
of dividends the system will evolve towards one of the attracting states. Assume 
S^ee Section 1.3.2. 
*'There may appear to be a discrepancy here because it has previously been stated that there are a 
limited number of units of the stock available. As long as the ratio of stock units to trader numbers 
remains finite in the infinite limit, then the description of the system remains vcilid. If the market has 
a large enough population of traders compared to the mutation rate of traders, then it should behave 
as an infinite system would, i.e. sampling fluctuations in mutation and selection should have no effect 
on the evolution of the population. 
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that, as per a Hopfield net, that there is a time ta corresponding to the maximal time 
for the system to reach a state from which its limit attractor is independent of the 
sequence D , i.e. the time after which the system will be so deeply within the basin of 
some attractor that escape is impossible, whatever the sequence of dividends from that 
time onwards. To affirm the existence of such a time ta is merely to say that selection 
pressure is sufficiently strong that the system will enter an attractor basin, and once it 
is close enough to the attractor, it will be unable to escape, because i t is close enough 
to an h.r.e.e. state, and will (in the limit) converge to the attractor. 
One must be clear as to what i t means for the system to be at, or close to an 
attracting point. One would not expect the agents to be identical, a stable market may 
consist of agents predicting in differing ways, and who (by the nature of their rule sets) 
are prepared to accept differing amounts of risk. Neither would one expect each agent 
to converge to a fixed holding in the stock, dependent upon the risk they are prepared 
to accept. Rather, one would expect trading to occur, albeit at low volumes, as traders 
update their optimal holdings of the stock under the influence of the run of dividends. 
Effectively, the stochastic sequence of dividends provides noise in the optimal holding 
algorithm for each agent, which is then reflected in low volumes of trading as agents 
update their positions. 
4.2.2 Observable Dynamics with a Non-Evolving Population 
Consider a population of n agents selected at random. In the absence of any initial 
bias towards any particular area of the genome space, the population will be uniformly 
distributed across the genome space. Given such a population, how will the price and 
trading volume of stock vary under the dividend series? 
For the purpose of the analysis, place a partial ordering on the levels at whicli the 
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various bits in the sensor string are triggered, i.e. Li < L2 < L;^ < The population 
can now be divided into three segments. 
1. There will be a subset of the population, X whose rule is never activated. In 
order to be activated a rule must matcli the sensor string. Any rule whicli has, as 
part of the match string, one or more O's followed by one or more I's will never 
be activated, since under partial ordering of the sensor bit trigger levels, such a 
sensor string will never occur. This portion of the population can be estimated 
using standard probability theory; in the general case for a string of I sensor bits 
p[x e X ) = 5 ^ p ( V j < i : 5j ^ 0).p(5i = 0).p(/c > i : 3A:.Sfc = 1) (4.13) 
i=l 
Assuming that there is no differential expression of alleles across sites, i.e. Vz, jvi^i = 
k) = p{Sj = A;), this can be rewritten as 
p{x &x) = Y,p{Si ^ oy.p(Si = 0). 'J'PIS^  ^ oy .p(5,- = 1) (4.i4) 
1=1 j=0 
In the present case, where all alleles are equiprobable at every site, and where 
/ = 4, p{xeX) = 11/27. 
This proportion of the population will never match the sensor string, and will 
thus always return E{pt^i -\- dt+i) =Pt + dt 
2. There will be a second subset of the population, Y whose rules can be activated, 
but which does not respond to the particular sensor string presented. I t is a simple 
task to estimate the subset of the population which will respond to a sensor string 
with k bits set. 
p(fc) = p(5i ^ 0)'=.p(5i ^ 1)'-* (4.15) 
^This ordering makes no difference to the result gained, but eases the effort needed to develop the 
analysis. 
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Under the current assumptions, the size of the subset of the population whicli is 
triggered is independent of the number of bits in the sensor string that is activated. 
One cannot easily estimate the probability that a trader is in K, because not all 
traders have equal generality, e.g. 0000 will only respond to one signal, whereas 
will respond to any signal. We shall estimate Y as the subset of the 
population not in any other subset. 
3. Finally there is a segment of the population, Z which is triggered by the sensor 
string that is presented. Equation 4.15 gives the probability of this happening 
given a sensor with the first k bits set. Note that the probability of a trader being 
activated is independent of the sensor string presented to the population. 
P{x eZ) = (4.16) 
Wi th / = 4, p{x £Z) = 16/81. This leads to an estimate of p(x € K) = 32/81 in 
the present case. 
Note that the majority of the population will not have a rule activated at any 
particular time, the probability that a member of the population will not have a rule 
activated is 1 — ( | ) ' , which is a monotonically increasing function of /, so the larger / 
becomes, the smaller the proportion of active rules within the population. 
Amongst the subset of rules that have been activated, one may easily show that 
there is a uniform distribution of expectations E{pt^i + dt+i) across the 9 different 
possible response strings. From this, one can calculate the moments of the distribution 
of responses to any price and dividend combination in the subset of the population 
whose rules are active, by consideration of all the possible cases, and making a maximal 
entropy assumption of a uniform distribution between possible responses. 
E:,^z(pM'^dt+i) = c^iPt+dt)+cI (4.17) 
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4 . , . = {l)'l^t{oo{pt + d,) + c,-E{p, + d,))' (4.18) / 1 n I 
t=0 
The design of the traders has already been discussed in Section 4.1.4. By definition, 
Co = 1 and = 0. This leads to the following expression for the expected next return: 
E{pt+i+dt+i)=pt-\-dt (4.19) 
To gain an expression for a | , recall that the active rules fall into 9 (equiprobable in 
the infinite l imit) categories. By considering all the possibilities and simplifying, the 
following expression is gained. 
<Tl = {l)'^'{Cl{p, + dt) + Cl) (4.20) 
This is an interesting result, because i t deals with the expected behaviour of a 
large population of randomly selected agents. Whilst the agents' expectations of the 
return from the stock will vary, some predicting a higher return, and some predicting 
a lower return, the mean expectation (given in Equation 4.19) will be of an unclianged 
next return. This can be substituted back into Equation 4.6. In the absence of an 
evolutionary algorithm, the population distribution will remain unchanged. Here the 
price of the stock will fluctuate about a constant level, mediated by fluctuations in the 
dividend sequence. The long-term average of the actual return and the expected return 
will converge, because the dividend sequence has a well defined mean. Hence (following 
Arthur et al. [5]), the agents expectations are rational, and on average will be upheld 
by the market. The resulting price sequence will therefore be in rational expectations 
equilibrium: the resulting price is the h.r.e.e price. 
The particular interest in this result is that i t also corresponds to what one would 
expect from an efficient market where all available information about future returns is 
immediately incorporated into the price of the stock; the best prediction of tomorrow's 
price is today's price. Here a similar phenomenon is noted, not because the agents are 
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capable of making good predictions which will be reflected in the price, but because of 
their absolute lack of predictive ability. This is because the lack of adaptation means 
that agents are unable to copy successful strategies. 
Note also that the volume observable will be bounded from below by a%. In this case, 
a higher volume than the h.r.e.e, volume should be observed, because the population 
is not homogeneous, but has a distribution across expectations, 
4.2.3 Existence of Multiple Fixed Points in the Population 
Space 
In the above section, the collective dynamics of a non-evolving population have been 
explored. Here the population dynamics of the system under an evolutionary pressure 
will be considered, according to the simple asexual schema presented in Section 1.2.3. 
Whilst one might expect to find one or more fixed points in the population space 
corresponding to the fundamental regime in the observers, no proof to this effect will 
be presented, although it is a reasonable suggestion. If the combination of mutation 
rate, selection pressure and dividend persistence is appropriately balanced, then the 
mean reverting behaviour will be sustained, and the (large) portion of the population 
that (for whatever reason) predicts that the return will remain constant will have high 
fitness. 
In the following argument, one particular possible scenario is used as an example. 
This does not affect the generality of the argument; substitution of appropriate terms in 
other examples will lead to identical results. This particular example is chosen because 
it is easily comprehensible. 
Consider a homogeneous population, whose response bits are all set, so that the 
population only responds if all sensory bits are set, i.e. pt > L3. Consider also that the 
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price is such that the traders' rules \vill be activated. The argument will be developed 
as follows. First i t will be shown that in the absence of mutation there may exist stable 
prices. FVom here it will be shown that a heterogeneous population may be stable under 
both selection and mutation. 
Lemma 4.2.1 For a homogeneous population of agentSj there exist expected price levels 
corresponding to each possible set of rule bits, provided that the sensory bits of the 
population are appropriate to the expected price level. 
Proof. 
The proof proceeds by solution for expected price levels. The appropriate sensory bit 
sets for a particular level will then be stated. 
Consider a homogeneous population whose sensory bits are sucli that the rule fires. 
The expected next price plus dividend will be today*s price plus dividend when 
E{pt^i + dt+i) = coipt + dt) + ci (4,21) 
Where Co,Ci represent the appropriate adjustment constants for the relative and abso-
lute price change under the sensory bits of whatever the population's response bits are. 
Now, all agents will respond identically. Recall Equation 4.6 
P t + i = P t = ^ 1 T — (4.22) 
V R ;1+r 
Where the homogeneous risk term is R, Substituting 4.21 into 4.22 
At equilibrium, pt+i = pt\ there is no temporal ambiguity, write the expected dividend 
as 5, and the expected equilibrium price at this dividend level as p 
_ cop + cod + ci - i2 
p = ^^'^^^ 
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Rearranging this equation gives a solution of p 
P = t ^ r i ^ (4.25) 1 + r - Co 
Now this price is the expected price of the stock in a market of homogeneous agents 
whose sensors are active. This demonstrates the behaviour of the population in the 
fundamental regime; i f the expectation is that the return will remain constant, the 
price will be dependent upon the dividend sequence. 
The mean stock price levels, poo, • - • • . . ,pir for homogeneous populations with 
appropriate sensor bits, and the relevant response bits may now be established. For 
each of the possible price equilibria,p5S,... . . • ,Pu, i t is a simple matter to work 
out the set of possible sensor bits within the genotype which will activate the rule, and 
therefore the possible genotypes within a converged population. 
Corollary 4.2,2 There exist fitness neutral areas within the genotype space. 
Proof. 
This follows from the fact that any 1 or 0 may be replaced by a # within the sensor 
bits, without altering the activation of a rule, i f the dividend remains within a limited 
range®. Hence some of the fixed points in the population space do not correspond to 
unique sensor bit strings, but rather to connected® regions of the genotype space. 
4.3 Formalisation of the Artificial Stock Market 
Here a formalisation of the expected dynamics of the simple stock market model that 
has been put forwards in Section 4.1 is presented. The fundamentaJ properties of the 
i^.e. small enough that the sensor string presented to the agents does not vary over time. 
^Under 1-site mutation. 
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behaviour of the market, and of market observables (price, p^, and trading volume, Vt) 
are considered from a statistical dynamics perspective in a large (i.e. effectively infinite) 
population, implementing the behavioural dynamics approach detailed in Section 3.1.1. 
Prom there, an argument is developed as to the expected finite population dynamics of 
the population, and of the observables of that population. 
The population can be completely characterised by a 3*^  = 729 dimensional vector 
of the frequencies of each possible genotype. However, as this is unwieldy to work 
with, a behavioural formalisation will be adopted, as put forward in Section 3.1.1. The 
formalisation described here could be generalisable to a more complex system. In this 
case, there are 9 possible behaviours that an agent can adopt. However, the system 
will be characterised by a 10, rather than 9 dimensional vector, in order to ease the 
forraalisation of the mutation operator. The entries in the vector give the frequencies 
of each of the response classes within the population. Alternatively, the entries in the 
vector may be thought of as the probabilities of a trader lying in each of the response 
classes. Split the response of no price chajige into two, the first entry reflects the 
probability of a trader having a sensory string that does not match (describe this state 
as unresponsive), and the second being the probability that an agent has a sensory 
string that matches, and then predicts an unchanged next return. This formalisation 
is adopted to ease analytic tractability, otherwise i t becomes difficult to estimate the 
transition probabilities in the mutation operator. 
4.3.1 The Mutation Operator, M 
Assume that within each response there is a uniform probability of any genotype being 
found. Define the operator ^ as the probability of a trader remaining in a responsive 
^°i.e. in any of the states apait fi-om unresponsive. 
10 
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return state, and the operator v as the probability of moving from aji unresponsive 
return state to a responsive state, under the action of the mutational operator. The 
underlying assumption used here is the 'mixing assumption* of Prugel-Bennett and 
Shapiro [70], which is discussed in Section 2.2.2. Under certain conditions, especially 
where the population size is small and the selection pressure is high, this assumption 
may be unwarranted; the population within any behavioural class may be clustered 
around some particular genotype. This point has already been raised in Section 3.1.2. 
There are four possible transitions that maintain correctness: 0 -> {0, # } , 
1 { ! , # } , # { # , ! } , # { # , 0 } . Given a # i t is unknown a priori whicli of 
the two possible responsiveness maintaining mutational trzinsitions is appropriate, but 
i t does not affect the formulation, as all correctness maintaining mutations have the 
same probability, 2/3, of maintaining correctness. Hence a simple binomial gives the 
probability of responsiveness being maintained. 
. = | a - » . ) - ' m ' ( ! ) E 
x=0 
where / is the number of bits in the response string. The derivation of i / is a little more 
involved. In a similar manner to ^, each transition that transforms an incorrect allele 
to a correct one for the system to respond, has a probability of 2/3 of occurring during 
a mutation. For a mutation to turn an unresponsive genome to a responsive genome, 
two things must happen: 
1. Al l incorrect alleles must be transformed to correct alleles. 
2. Al l correct alleles must remain correct. 
Given that there is at least one incorrect allele, the probability of i correct alleles is 
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matrix operator 
1 - 1 / I//9 . . . 
P fiaQ ^ai fiai fiai /xaa /xaa /J.ai fia2 
fiai fia2 ii(X2 
lia2 
f^0£2 
fJ'0i2 
fxa2 
Iia2 iia2 
^2 ^2 
^ 2 fJ'OCl 
(4.32) 
4.3.2 The Selection operator, S 
The fitness of an agent in with response i is given by 
/ ( i ) =1 Eiipt+i + dt+i) - (Pt+i + dt+i) (4.33) 
where a lower value of f{i) indicates higher fitness. 
Whilst the dividend at the next time step, dt^i comes from a stochastic process, the 
price at the next time step, pt+i does not; i t is due to the interaction of the agents, in 
the form of their demand for the stock. This in turn is dependent upon the composition 
of the population, and their predictions of the next return. Recall the pricing equation. 
4.6: 
(4.34) 
The expected return Et^i may be written in terms of the composition of predictions in 
the population 
N 
1=1 
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Figure 4.1: Roulette wheel selection scheme. The classes are ordered by descending 
fitness, and placed on the x-axis. The probability of selection of a given class is given 
by the corresponding portion of the area under a negative exponential function with 
selection gradient o. These areas must then be normalised to sum to 1. 
»=i 
(4.35) 
Substituting this term in 4.34 gives 
P, = (5(5=11^!^ - , ] - f (4.36) 
which explicitly shows the dependence of the next price upon the constants Co.i and ci,j 
as well as the distribution of the population between the response classes i. 
The selection method used is a variant on the Boltzmann selection method, as used 
by Prugel-Bennett & Shapiro [69]. In the Boltzraann selection method, an exponential 
weighting is given to agent fitnesses; this exponential weighting gives the relative area 
of partitions in a roulette wheel which is used to select agents. 
Here a variant on the Boltzmann selection scheme is used. Rather than directly 
use exponentially weighted agent fitnesses to construct a roulette wheel, the ordering 
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of agent fitnesses is used to construct a roulette wheel. This might be described as 
Boltzraann selection on rank. The procedure is implemented as follows. 
The population distribution Pt may be considered as a vector of the 10 response 
classes, with components Pt,i, where the response classes are in an order i , the ordering 
described in Section 4.3.1. Given that an agent may only respond in a limited number 
of ways (the 10 possible response classes), Equation 4.33 can be used to give the fitness 
of the response classes at any point in time. Because the fitness of eacli class is known, 
an ordering i* can be constructed, arranging the response classes from lowest fitness 
(most fit) to highest fitness (least fit). 
Figure 4.1 shows the nature of a roulette wheel selection scheme. The ordering 
of the classes by fitness determines the order in which they are assigned divisions in 
the roulette wheel, and the width of the roulette wheel division is determined by the 
position in the ordering and the frequency of that class within the present population. 
This is expressed mathematically in the following equation: 
Here the integral term gives the relative size of division i* of the roulette wheel, 
and the initial term before the integral is a scaling term to ensure that the divisions 
in the wheel sura to 1 (see Figure 4.1). I f two or more fitness classes share the same 
fitness, the selection probability of these classes is determined by allocating them a 
single division in the roulette wheel, with a width determined by their joint probability, 
and then splitting this division according to their relative sizes. 
Whilst this selection method is undoubtedly more complex to implement than 
the Boltzmann selection method, i t has a single advantage: The Boltzmann selection 
method is directly dependent upon agent fitness; changing the fitness of an agent (or, 
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as would be the case here, all agents in a particular response class) will change the 
fitness of every agent. This is not the case here, the selection operator is insensitive to 
small variations in the fitnesses of response classes, due, for example, to small changes 
in the dividend paid by the stock. What is of importance here, is the ordering of the 
fitness classes, from lowest to highest fitness. Given the values that CQ and Ci take, i t 
is possible to enumerate all the possible orderings z*, under various conditions of price 
and changing return. 
4.3.3 The Evolutionary Operator 
Finally, one can combine the effects of the mutation and selection operator. At a fixed 
point 
P = MS{P) (4,38) 
This equation is beyond reasonable analytic tractability. However, by making assump-
tions about the range in which p lies, one can fix the ordering i* of the equivalence 
classes for fitness (given a matrix C of values Cij which determines the response of eacli 
class). As stated above in Section 4.3.2, i t is possible to calculate the ordering of the 
response classes for any price and next return. 
Of particular interest are solutions which give stable price levels, i.e. population 
distributions for which the expected price lies within the range for which the ordering 
of the response classes is valid. This is because the SFASM [5] shows sustained over-
and under-pricing regimes edongside a fundamental regime. Whilst one might expect 
to locate a fixed point in behaviour-space corresponding to a fundamental regime, the 
behaviour of the SFASM gives rise to the possibility that other fixed points in the 
behaviour space, corresponding to over and under-pricing regimes may in fact exist. 
In practical terms, the procedure is to assume that the next return will be identical 
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to the present return. This is an assumption that the effect of the dividend sequence is 
negligible^^ Under this assumption, i t is possible to calculate all the possible orderings 
of the response classes, and the price ranges across which they are valid. I f a numerical 
solution for a fixed point in behaviour space can be found, its corresponding expected 
price can be calculated. This can then be checked to see if i t lies within the price range 
for which that fitness ordering is valid. 
At a fixed point in the behaviour, the population distribution P is fixed, hence 
the expected return will be fixed also. The ordering of the response classes z*, may be 
written down: the fittest response classes will be those that predict no change; the other 
response classes will be arranged in equal fitness pairs, predicting equal but opposite 
price movements. The ordering of these pairs will , however, be dependent upon the 
expected price level of the fixed point. The selection pressure. A, the mutation rate 
m, and the parameters of the agent coding (Co,Ci,i2) and of the market ( r) are all 
fixed. Hence one can reduce Equation 4.38 down to ten simultaneous equations in ten 
unknowns, which we may be able to solve numerically using specialist software. 
I f the dividend is clamped at its mean value, then the numerical solution will give 
the stock price and trading volume at that dividend mean. This may then be compared 
to the trajectory of the system through the price-volume space. 
4.4 Finite Population Dynamics 
The system dynamics in the effectively infinite limit has been considered above. The 
population, whilst not infinite, is large enough that sampling fluctuations can be ig-
nored. One can consider that under any given time series of dividends, the population 
^^Occasionally, the dividend sequence may be capable of changing the fitness ordering i* of the 
response classes, and triggering metarstability. 
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will be undergoing deterministic transitions between consecutive states. I t would in-
deed even be possible to rearrange the system in a continuous time form: the difference 
vector operator governing the evolution of the system would become a differential ma-
trix operator. The difference system that is under consideration at present would be a 
Poincarr6 section of the differential form. 
The move from an infinite to a finite population may have many effects. In Sec-
tion 2,2.2 i t was noted [69, 70] that a finite population can induce clianges in higher 
order cumulants of order parameter distributions. This can alter the fixed points of 
the system (consider, for instance, Equation 2.37). Small finite populations can make 
sampling fluctuations important in determining the fixation of alleles within the popu-
lation. 
In a Markov system such as the SSMM, where the trajectory of the system is de-
scribed by an operator with a one-step temporal dependence, acting on the population 
distribution, the differences between the finite and infinite population versions of the 
system are twofold. First, a stochastic element is introduced into the evolution of the 
system, and second, the system is constrained to a subset of all the possible states 
available to an infinite population. In this particular case, the formalisation of the 
system has no dependence upon population size; here the finite population case will be 
modeled as an infinite population with an additive noise term. 
The stochasticity enters the system because for a finite system, especially a finite 
system with a small number of elements, the fundamental axiom of probability no 
longer applies. This means that i t is no longer possible to derive (using the evolutionary 
operator) an expected population distribution for time < + l given the population at time 
t, and assume that the population will take on this distribution. Rather, the expected 
population distribution at time t -f-1 must be treated as a probability distribution: in 
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order to gain the population at time t + 1 this distribution must be sampled from. The 
population distribution of the sample thus obtained becomes the population distribution 
for time t+l. 
The main effect of this is the reduction of the stability of the system. To recap 
Section 3.3: Whilst the attractors of the system still are attracting, and the infinite 
l imit dynamics are unchanged, there is now a finite probability that from any given 
point in the system, the next point obtained (via the evolutionary operator acting on 
the present population of traders, followed by the sampling process described above 
being applied) will not lie in the same attractor basin. In other words, one can no-
longer talk of stability, only meta-stability. I t is now only a question of time until the 
population shifts between attractor basins. We would thus expect to see the population 
of traders undergo catastrophic shifts between particular population profiles. Of course, 
one would not expect the population to retain any particular profile even during the 
meta-stable epochs, rather to retain a profile close to (and within the attractor basin 
of) the particular attractor. 
This reduction in the stability of the system is augmented by positive feedback 
effects that are possible, due to the interactive nature of the population. Eacli trader 
determines their optimal holding based on a combination of private factors (such as 
the willingness to take risks) and a number of publicly available indicators (the last 
dividend posted and the current stock price). In turn, the stock price is governed by 
the supply and demand for the stock. Changes in the stock price can alter the response 
of traders, because the conditions that trigger their rules may alter. This in turn affects 
the demand for stock by agents, which influences the price. The positive feedback here 
may in some circumstances trigger avalanches of market and evolutionary activity. 
I f the population of traders is restricted to some finite number, S say, then each 
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element of <l> is restricted to a value i / 5 , z G { 0 , . . . , 5 } , and still subject to the normality 
condition. The sampling process described above will guarantee that the population will 
always lie on the lattice. However, there is no such restriction on any of the attracting 
fixed points within the system. I t may not be possible for the population to ever gain 
the attractor, because the attractor does not lie on the lattice. 
To conclude, the finite population dynamics of the simple neo-classical market de-
scribed above are expected to show meta-stable periods where the population lies close 
to*^ one of the infinite l imit attractor profiles. These meta-sfcable periods will be sepa-
rated by catastrophic changes, where the population rapidly shifts between raeta-stable 
profiles. Note that in the system described above, one would expect all the attractors 
to produce similar market behaviour; a tracking of the fundamental value of the stock 
by the market. In the finite case there may be fluctuations of the price around the 
fundamental value associated with the failure of the system to actually reach, and stay 
at the attractor. There may also be transient fluctuations in stock price and trading 
volume associated with the catastrophic transitions between meta-stable epochs. 
Under some convenient metric. 
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Chapter 5 
Simulation Results 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a simple model of an artificial stock market has been put 
forward. The model is a simplified version of the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market, 
which has been cut down to try to aid analytic tractability. This has involved retaining 
only those agent sensors that track the present price of the stock, removing any historical 
dependencies from the model. The adaptive process within the agents has also been 
altered, individual trading strategies now compete with each other across the entire 
population. The replacement strategy has also been altered to asexual cloning plus 
mutation. This (in the limit of an infinite population) is equivalent to a diffusion 
process across a potential field. In the previous chapter, an analysis of this simplified 
stock market model has been put forward and statistical dynamics approximations 
based upon behavioural order parameters have been used reduce the dynamics of the 
system to a tractable number of dimensions. 
In this chapter, the results of a computational implementation of this model will be 
presented, in order to allow an evaluation of the analytic approach put forward. This 
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chapter is organised as follows. First there is a qualitative discussion of the behaviours 
observed in the model. Next there is an examination of the dynamics of the model; 
comparisons are made between the observed dynamics of the model, and the dynamics 
predicted under the analytic formalisation given in Chapter 4. In this discussion the 
effects of population size upon the dynamics of the model are discussed. 
5.2 Overview of the Qualitative Features of the Sim-
ple Stock Market Model 
Recall the basic premise of this study, put forward in Chapter 1: various studies of 
systems involving the interaction of adaptive agents appear to show sudden transitions 
between behavioural regimes. These transitions appear to be the result of sampling 
fluctuations in a finite population under an adaptive pressure. The stochasticies implicit 
in the exploratory element of adaptation are compounded by the positive feedbacks 
implicit in the exploitative element; these two combine to magnify the instability of 
the system, so that sampling fluctuations remain significant in quite large populations. 
In a stock market model, such as the SFASM [5], three basic behavioural regimes are 
observed: a fundamental regime where the price of the stock agrees with that predicted 
by classical economic theory; an over-pricing regime; and an under-pricing regime. The 
transitions between these regimes appear to be sudden, and without obvious cause. 
I t is posited that the transitions between these basic regimes are caused by sampling 
fluctuations within a finite population, compounded by external shocks to the system 
in the form of an AR(1) process dividend sequence. A simple model of an artificial 
stock market has been constructed to try to further examine and understand these 
phenomena. 
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5.2.1 Implementation Details 
The market consists of a population of N adaptive agents trading against each oth-
er. At time t they produce demands for stock at time i -h 1, given knowledge of the 
current market conditions, expressed in terms of four binary sensors (see Section 4.1.4 
for details). The activation levels of these sensors 5 i , . . . , 5 4 are set at 0.5,0.7,0.9 
and 1.1 respectively, unless stated otherwise. Al l agents have a uniform risk aversion 
R set at i? = 1.3, unless stated otherwise. The agents* predictions are based upon 
the two response bits of their genome, response parameters to bits 0, # , 1 are set at 
Co = 0.9,1.0,1.1 and Ci = -0.5,0,0.5 respectively. The dividend dt is based upon an 
AR(1) process, with mean d = 10, and autoregressive constant p = 0.95 , the driving 
random variable being Gaussian, i.i.d. (all samples taken from independent identical-
ly distributed random variables) with zero mean and variance = 0.074. The bond 
has a price of 1.0 and pays an interest of 0.1. The selection process operates every 
ts = I time period, replacing the entire population with a new population drawn from 
a random sample of the old population under a roulette wheel selection scheme, where 
individuals within the population are ranked by mean squared prediction error, and 
assigned selection probabilities according to a negative exponential distribution, with 
selection constant A = -0 .01. The new population is then subjected to mutation, with 
an independent mutational probability at every site in each member of the population, 
m = 0-03. 
Simulations were conducted at a variety of population sizes, with 10, 20, 50, 100, 
200, 500 and 1000 agents in the market. At all population sizes a total of 20 replications 
of each simulation were performed. 
The results shown in this section are selected to give the reader a feel for the be-
havioural dynamics of the system, and to point out in a qualitative fashion the salient 
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features which will be analysed in a quantitative fashion in later sections. Unless specif-
ically stated otherwise, the results shown are typical of the dynamics of a population 
of the described size. 
5.2.2 Market Dynamics in Small and Large Populations 
Consider first Figure 5.1. This shows the dynamics of a population without a driving 
adaptive force. In this, and all other references to a non-adaptive population, the 
population size is 1000 agents; a larger population should have a behaviour closer to 
the infinite l imit dynamics (especially in the non-adaptive case). In all other cases the 
population is adaptive. Because the population remains constant, the dynamics here 
are driven only by changes in the dividend series. The distribution of the threshold 
levels on the sensors is sufficiently wide that changes in the dividend series do not cause 
the active sub-population of adaptive agents to vary. 
Now consider the behaviours of adaptive populations across a range of population 
sizes. Whilst simulations have been carried out at a number of differing population 
sizes, here time series are shown for large (A^ = 1000), medium {N = 100) and small 
TV = 10 populations, in order to illustrate the behaviour of the SSMM across a range 
of magnitudes of populations. Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show these times series. 
First consider system behaviour for a large population (Figure 5.2). As population 
size increases, the behaviour of the system approaches the expected behaviour in the 
infinite l imit. As the population size increases the dynamics of the price-time series more 
closely match the dynamics of the dividend time series. Within an infinite population, 
one would expect the price of the stock to reflect the dividend at any point in time, and 
thus the price series to follow the dividend series (Section 4.3.3). This is not completely 
the case here, although major shocks in the dividend series are reflected in the price 
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Price Volume 
Dividend Residual 
Figure 5.1: Time Series for the SSMM, with a population of 1000 agents. There is no 
adaptive pressure in this case, the population remains unchanged throughout the run. 
The four series shovirn are all taken from a single run of the model. Clockwise from Top 
Left, they show Stock Price, Trading Volume, Residual and Stock Dividend. 
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Figure 5.2: Time Series for the SSMM, with an adaptive population of 1000 agents. 
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Figure 5.3: Time Series for the SSMM, with an adaptive population of 100 agents. 
161 
i 
Price Volume 
Dividend Residual 
Figure 5.4: Time Series for the SSMM, with an adaptive population of 10 agents. Here 
repeated bubble and crash events, in both upward and downward directions can be seen. 
These bubble and crash events are taken as separate regimes from the fundamental 
regime, and their existence provides evidence of metarstable behaviour. 
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Figure 5.5: Time series for the SSMM, with an adaptive population of 10 agents. In 
contrast to F i p r e 5.4, no bubble and crash events are observed here. The stock price 
approximates the dividend sequence, albeit with more noise than is observed in a larger 
population, such as in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
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series. 
In the case of a small population, a very different picture (Figures 5.4 and 5.5) 
is seen. Here the population has been reduced to 10 individuals. In Figure 5.5 the 
price sequence follows the dividend sequence in an approximate manner. Sampling 
fluctuations in the population distribution obscure the dependency of the price sequence 
on the dividend sequence. In contrast, in Figure 5.4 bubble and crash events are seen, 
where the price sequence accelerates away from the fundamental regime, either in an 
upwards (over-pricing) or downwards (under-pricing) direction. This is followed by a 
crash where the price of the stock suddenly reverts back to the fundamental regime. 
The cause of such events will be studied further in Section 5.3.4. These events have 
been observed in a number of runs of the SSMM at small population sizes. Whilst 
they are most clearly visible and occur most often in the smallest population size (4 
occurrences in 20 runs at population size 10), they have also been seen at population 
sizes 20 (2/20 runs) and 50 (1/20 runs). 
These are interesting phenomena because there is no historical information included 
within the sensory information available to agents. Arthur et al. [5] claim that in the 
absence of such historical information, technical trading phenomena such as over- and 
under-pricing regimes are not possible. These claims will be evaluated in Section 6.3.2, 
in the light of the results presented here. 
The interpretation that will be placed upon these phenomena is that they are driv-
en by stochastic fluctuations within the population. Such a fluctuation can move the 
system out of a fundamental regime into an over- or under-pricing regime. This mis-
pricing regime will persist until either a second fluctuation shifts the population into 
another regime, or the price of the stock readies a level at whicli demand is limited by 
the agent's risk function. At this point any agents predicting an unchanged price will 
164 
suddenly be favoured, and the demand will slacken, precipitating a price crash. This 
phenomenon can be seen in the price boom centred around t 170. Note also the 
apparent linkage between price and volume. Informally, the volume appears low when 
the price is at a median level; increases in trading volume correspond to price trends 
away from this level. These linkages will be interpreted in terms of fundamental, over-
and under-pricing regimes in a following section (5.3.3). 
Within a medium sized population (Figure 5.3), a combination of both effects are 
seen. The price sequence follows the dividend sequence for much of the experimental 
run, but there are periods when this dividend following behaviour is not seen. For 
instance, in the period t = 100.. . 230 an over-pricing regime is observed. This appears 
to be an example of the meta-stable phenomenon that is postulated. 
A comparison between the market's behaviour with large and small population 
reveals several major differences. First, the range of variation of the time series appears 
to be inversely correlated with population size: the price range and volume range is 
much greater in a small population (Figure 5.10) than in a large population (Figure 
5.2). Second, the small population appears to exhibit far greater behavioural changes 
than the large population: i.e. the rate of change of all the time series is greater in 
the small population than the large population. Again, these issues will be explored in 
greater depth in a later section. 
5.3 The Market as a Dynamical System 
In a previous section (4.3), a statistical dynamics formulation of the dynamics of the 
SSMM has been put forwards, and the component parts of the evolutionary process 
implemented (asexual reproduction with mutation) have been examined. This formu-
lation enables the market to be considered as a dynamical system in a 10 dimensional 
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space of population distributions; the components in each dimension representing the 
proportion of the population exhibiting each of the 10 (mutually exclusive, and there-
fore orthogonal) possible behaviours. This presents the possibility of using numerical 
methods to solve for the simple fixed points of the system. 
P* - MS{P*) = 0 (5.1) 
Before attempting such a solution, the statistical dynamics formulation was validat-
ed, using information theoretic methods. 
5.3.1 Cross-Entropy validation 
I t is important to confirm the accuracy of any proposed formalisation before a com-
putationally intensive numerical solution is proposed. In this case, a simple method is 
available. The cross-entropy (sometimes known as the I-divergence or Kullback-Lieber 
distortion) provides an error measure^ for estimates of probability distributions. I t is 
given by 
D c . = £ p ( x ) l n ^ d x (5.2) 
where p is the true probability distribution, and q is the estimated probability dis-
tribution. In the discrete case, over partitions, this reduces to 
DcE=EPii^)^^^ (5-3) 
The cross-entropy is positive definite if p ^ ^, and zero i f and only \ f p = q. 
* As the cross-entropy is not symmetric it cannot be a metric. 
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In pure information-theoretic terms, the cross-entropy can be interpreted as the 
additional information rate needed to transmit a signal whose symbols have probability 
distribution p, i f only an estimate q of their distribution is available. 
Given a sequence of behavioural class population distributions from the simulations, 
the theoretical formalisation of the system can be validated by comparing the formali-
sation*s prediction for the population distribution at the next time step, with, the actual 
population distribution, using the cross-entropy measure. The hypothesis underlying 
this thesis is that sampling fluctuations in finite populations modulate the dynamics of 
populations of interacting adaptive agents: as the population size increases, one would 
expect the mean cross-entropy to tend to zero, because the sampling fluctuations will 
decrease, becoming zero at the infinite population limit. 
The existence of this convergence can be used to validate the mathematical and 
computational formalisation of the system. If the mean cross-entropy does not converge 
to zero as population size increases, then there is a divergence between the model 
behaviour and the prediction of that behaviour. This indicates either a problem with 
the mathematical formalisation of the system, or in the computational implementation 
of that formalisation to be used in finding a numerical solution. 
Here the distribution of the population between the response classes in the prediction 
is used as p and the actual distribution is used as 7 in the equation for the discrete case 
(Equation 5.3). The mean cross entropy based on every step (500 steps implies 499 
predictions) of a single run has been used to produce the results shown in Figure 5.6. 
By contrast, in Figure 5.7, the results are taken across a set of 5 runs at each population 
size. 
I t should be noted that the convergence of the model's behaviour and the analytic 
forraalisation is no guarantee of the accuracy of the analytic formalisation: i t is possible 
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Figure 5.6: Cross-entropy vs. Population size in a previous (incorrect) formalisation of 
the SSMM. Two data-sets are shown, for the mutation operator alone, and for selection 
plus mutation. The non-convergence of the latter indicates that the selection operator 
is incorrectly formulated. 
that the formalisation is incorrect, but fails to make predictions which are contradicted 
by the model. 
Figure 5.6 shows the cross-entropy convergence in a previous (incorrect) formalisa-
tion of the SSMM, Clearly, under mutation and selection the cross-entropy does not 
converge to zero as population size increases. Further checking, by examining the cross-
entropy of the mutation operator alone, reveals that the mutation operator converges to 
zero with increasing population size, and therefore is most likely correct. The assump-
tion was made that the error lay in the selection operator, either in the formalisation, 
or in the coding of the formalisation for use in a numerical solution. Further detailed 
checking revealed an error in the coding. 
Figure 5.7 shows the cross-entropy convergence of the coded forraalisation used in 
finding numerical solutions to Equation 5.3. The convergence to zero indicates that the 
formalisation and coding is probably correct. 
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Figure 5.7: Cross-entropy vs. Population size in the thermodynamic formaJisation of 
the SSMM. 
5.3.2 Fixed points of the Thermodynamic Formalisation of the 
SSMM 
Using a multidimensional simplex method within the GNU Octave computational pack-
age, numerical solutions to Equation 5.3 were found. Despite many attempts from var-
ious starting points within the population distribution space, only a single fixed point 
could be found. This point, corresponds to the fundamental value of the stock. In 
order to better understand the nature of this fixed point, an examination of the fixed 
points of operators M and S may be helpful. 
Fixed points of M 
M is a simple matrix operator, which transforms one probability distribution into 
another probability distribution. There is no temporal or historical dependencies in 
M, thus the system Pj+i = MPt forms a Markov system within any sensory regime, 
ajid can be solved by standard methods. There is only one fixed point for this system, 
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which is approached asymptotically. 
Fixed points o f <S 
The operator S at first glance appears to be much more complex in nature than M. I t 
has a highly non-linear dependency upon the probability distribution that i t acts upon. 
In this case, however, the initial appearance is deceiving: S has easily found fixed 
points. In Section 4.3.2 i t is shown that there is a stable price for any population; the 
price at which the demand will match the supply, and the price will remain constant. 
A fixed point of S necessarily corresponds to a stable price level. At this stable price 
level, a partial ordering will exist on the behavioural classes; as one might intuitively 
expect, the two behavioural classes UR and # # , which predict an unchanged price plus 
dividend, will have the highest fitness: The system will converge to some combination 
of these two classes. 
Under a pure selective force, this system is in essence very similar to a Polya Urn^ 
scheme [26], although i t differs in that the population is fixed. Intuitively, this is likely to 
lead to the extinction of one of the two high fitness classes, due to stochastic fluctuations 
within a small population. However, this effect is likely to become less important as 
the population size grows. 
There are thus an infinite number of fixed points to 5; ajiy point which lies on the 
line P(/ji -h = 1 is a fixed point. 
^In a Polya Um scheme, an urn filled with red and black balls has balls repeatedly drawn out, and 
replaced with two balls of the same colour. It can be shown that the ratio of red/black balls always 
converges, but that the convergence ratio follows a ^^-distribution. 
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Behaviour pS pM pMS 
UR 0.91940 0.835031 0.855626 
00 0.00000 0.018330 0.015868 
o# 0.00000 0.018330 0.018659 
01 0.00000 0.018330 0-015884 
#0 0.00000 0.018330 0.015488 
## 0.08060 0.018330 0.016903 
#1 0.00000 0.018330 0.015214 
10 0.00000 0.018330 0.015085 
1# 0.00000 0.018330 0.016281 
11 0.00000 0.018330 0.014993 
Table 5.1: Fixed points of the thermodynamic approximation of the SSMM, under 
selection (P*^), mutation ( P ^ ) , and selection followed by mutation ( P ^ ^ ) . Note that 
the fixed point of the selection operator is the closest point of approach of the solution 
line of S to P-^^ under a Euclidean metric. 
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Fixed points of MS 
Table 5.1 shows the closest fixed point (under a Euclidean Metric) of the set of fixed 
points of S to the fixed point of MS found using a simplex method, as detailed above. 
Inspection of the solutions in Table 5.1 suggests the possibility that the fixed point 
of MS might be a linear combination of the fixed point of S given above and the 
single fixed point of M , that is to say that i t might lie on the normal connecting the 
line describing the set of fixed points of S to the fixed point ol M. A simple search 
locates the closest point on the normal to P ^ ^ , and indeed this point is close (distance 
0.013771 under a Euclidean metric) to P^^. 
From this, and the fact that the simplex process used to find P-^^ terminates due 
to limitations of machine arithmetic^, one might assume that the difference is due to 
the termination of the simplex process. 
In fact, this turns out not to be the case: a simplex method, starting from the 
closest point on the normal from S to also converges towards solution p-^^. Hence 
the fixed point does not lie on the normal between the fixed point of the mutation 
operator, and the fixed point of the selection operator. This may be due to the extreme 
non-linearity of the selection operator. 
Given the population distribution P^-^, the stock price and volume traded at this 
fixed point may now be calculated. Substitution into Equation 4.6 gives the equilib-
rium price, and hence through Equations 4.2 and 4.7 for volume may now be made. 
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the basic statistics of the price and volume distributions 
observed across five repetitions of the market simulation at each adaptive population 
^The simplex method used in involves the calculation of a normal to a high dimensional plane. 
When the points that define the plane become very close (as the simplex converges), limitations in the 
accuracy of the machine arithmetic become significant. 
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Pop. Size Mean Std. Dev. 
10 93.205 22.009 
20 83.760 7.053 
50 87,414 12.961 
100 85.604 6.677 
200 83.104 4.834 
500 84.071 4.303 
1000 83.013 3.151 
unadaptive 86.609 0.035 
analytic 86.600 
Table 5.2: Statistics of the stock price distribution. 
size (a total of 2500 samples), in a non-adaptive population of 1000 individuals, and 
the values at the fixed point P*. 
I t might initially appear that given the above tables of statistics (Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 
5.4), a t-test could be applied to check the hypothesis {HQ) that a population shares 
the same underlying observables (price, volume, residual) as the analytic population. 
However, such a test is only valid for a set of independently dra\vn samples. This is not 
the case presented here; the observables at adjacent time steps are not independent of 
each other, the dependencies are examined in the previous chapter. The t-test statistic 
is given by 
a/y/n 
where or are respectively the mean and standard distribution of the parent distribu-
tion, X is the mean of the sample and n is the sample size. 
Due to the dependence between samples taken, i t is problematic to estimate t. Al l 
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Pop. Size Mean Std. Dev. 
10 0.958 2.233 
20 0.860 1.134 
50 1.603 1.139 
100 1.714 0.890 
200 1.118 0.619 
500 1.177 0.324 
1000 1.295 0.275 
unadaptive 1.451 0.065 
analytic 1.301 
Table 5.3: Statistics of the trading volume distribution. 
Pop. Size Mean Std, Dev. 
10 -0.667 3.198 
20 0.380 1.222 
50 -0.095 1.530 
100 0.156 0.913 
200 0.443 0.722 
500 0.279 0.568 
1000 0.431 0.371 
unadaptive 0.049 0.121 
analytic 0** 
Table 5.4: Statistics of the residual distribution. 
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the above statistics are based on 5 runs of the simulation under each condition, with 
a run length of 500. Therefore, one can certainly place bounds of 5 < n < 2500. This 
is of limited value, effectively constraining t to a range of 2 orders of magnitude. At 
the lower limit (n = 5), the null hypothesis (the simulation observable is drawn from 
the same distribution as a population with the analytic value) is confirmed in every 
case. At the upper limit, the alternative hypothesis (the simulation observable is drawn 
from a different population) is confirmed in every case except that of a non-evolving 
population. 
Note however, that across all runs under all conditions, an identical sampling sclied-
ule is followed, namely to sample at each time step. Clearly there is a correlation 
between the statistics at adjacent time steps, but an assumption of consistent bias is 
made: it is assumed that the identical sampling schedule on each run implies that all 
runs are equally biased. Therefore, the approach taken will be to consider the trend of 
the t-scores across population size under an adaptive condition. The hypothesis of this 
thesis is that sampling fluctuations cause raeta-stability, and thus transitions between 
the fundamental regime, and various raetarstable regimes (describable as over- and 
under-pricing regimes). In the system examined here, these metarstable regimes can 
be shown to lie in pairs equally spaced above and below the fundamental regime. One 
might therefore expect that over a statistically significant time period, the statistics of 
the observables might tend towards those of the fundamental regime as population size 
increases, because the stochastic fluctuations become smaller as population size increas-
es. Therefore, the t-scores will be examined for evidence of a downward trend which 
might indicate that the statistics of the observables are converging towards those of the 
fundamental regime as population size increases. This is shown in Figure 5.8. It would 
be difficult to claim any clear trends in the t-scores across population size; if anything, 
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a claim of an upward trend in the t-scores in the price and residual observables might 
be more defensible. 
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Figure 5.8: Normalised t-scores of the observable series across the range of population 
sizes for the price, volume and residual series. Here the t-scores have been normalised 
for a sample size of 1, at any estimated independent sample size, they will be a constant 
multiple of the value shown. 
What interpretation should be placed upon theses statistics? There is no clear evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that the statistics of any adaptive population studied 
are consistent with those of an infinite population at the analytic fixed point V* condi-
tion (which corresponds to the fundamental regime). The evidence is equivocal, but if 
anything tends to support the alternate hypothesis. 
This conclusion leads to an interesting disparity: in Section 5.3.1 it was shown that 
as population size increases the one-step analytic prediction of the next population 
distribution converges towards the simulation value. Yet in this section, evidence has 
been presented that the system does not converge to the one analytic point that has 
been found using numerical methods. It is certainly possible that other attractors 
in the system exist apart from a fundamental regime attractor. The system may be 
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converged about some other attractor, which most likely has a more complex structure 
than a simple fixed point. This point will be discussed further in the next chapter 
(Section 6.1.2). 
5.3.3 Phase Portraits of the SSMM 
In Section 4,3, the correspondence between population distributions at the fixed points, 
and the stock price and trading volume has been explored. Following from this, an ex-
amination of the system's trajectories in price-volume space are presented in Figure 5.9. 
Inspection of the phase portraits in Figure 5.9 quite clearly shows that as the popula-
tion size increases, the volume of the phase space swept out by the trajectory is reduced. 
This is because the fluctuations in the population caused by the stochasticities inherent 
in the adaptive process become smaller as the population size increases. Because the 
underlying fitness landscape is itself a function of the population distribution, smaller 
variations in the population distribution are unlikely to move the population out of the 
fundamental basin of attraction and into one of the other basins, corresponding to a 
meta-stable regime. 
Note also the *V' shape to the phase portraits, especially with intermediate pop-
ulation sizes (n = 20.. .n = 200). The lowest point in the corresponds to the 
theoretical fixed point. Physically, this corresponds to low volume trading around the 
fundamental value (the fixed point) with higher volume trading being associated with 
movements away from that fixed point. 
The ' V shape in the phase portraits is explained by the formalisation presented in 
Section 4.3. A fixed point in the population distribution space necessarily corresponds to 
a fixed point in the stock price: the population will be converged onto some combination 
of the unresponsive class and the unchanged return predicting class, with all other 
Figure 5.9: Phase portraits in price-volume for the SSMM. Population sizes axe given 
in the individual graphs. All phase portraits are to the same scale. 
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classes having low frequencies, maintained by the mutational operator. 
This is predicted by the analytic forraalisation. In Section 4.1.3 it was noted that the 
volume of stock traded (Equation 4.7) is bounded from below by the standard deviation 
of agent demands for stock. As the population moves away from the fundamental price, 
the variance in demands for stock is likely to increase. If agents expect an increased or 
decreased next return, then the unresponsive segment of the population will settle for 
a respectively decreased or increased demand, because of the price change. This will 
increase the variance of the population, as the mean demand is fixed (and indeed sets 
the clearing price). Hence one would expect an increased trading volume away from 
the fundamental price, leading to a *V' shaped phase portrait. 
This corresponds to the phenomenon observed by Arthur et aJ. [5]: 
"We find that if our agents adapt their forecasts very slowly to new obser-
vations of the market's behaviour, the market converges to a rational expec-
tations regime. Here 'mutant' expectations cannot get a profitable footing; 
and technical trading, bubbles, crashes and auto-correlative behaviour do 
not emerge. The efficient market theory prevails. 
If on the other hand we allow the traders to adapt to new market obser-
vations at a more realistic rate, heterogeneous beliefs persist, and the mar-
ket self-organises into a complex regime. A rich "market psychology" -a 
ricli set of expectations-become observable. Technical trading emerges as 
a profitable activity, and temporary bubbles and crashes emerge from time 
to time. Trading volume is high, with times of quiescence alternating with 
times of intense market activity. over the period of our experiments, at 
least, individual behaviour evolves continually and does not settle down. In 
this regime the traders' view is upheld." 
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5.3.4 Analysis of a 'Bubble and Crash' phenomenon 
The SSMM is a highly simplified version of the artificial market whose features are 
described in the above quote, but important common features are present. In large 
populations within the SSMM technical trading is not possible because the stochastic 
sampling in selection and mutation becomes less important. The dominant force be-
comes stability, the agents tend to predict that the price will remain constant, and the 
price fluctuations are dependent upon the dividend fluctuations. On the other hand, as 
the population size becomes smaller, stochastic fluctuations have greater and greater 
effects within the population. Small numbers of mutant agents can effect the predictive 
trend of the population towards an upward or downward prediction. This can become 
strong enough that these mutant agents are rewarded, and can take hold within the 
population^. 
If this mutant takes hold, then the price will continue to rise until it reaches a 
maximal level sustainable by a homogeneous population of the fit mutants. At this 
point the price will no longer rise, and the mutant population becomes vulnerable to 
invasion by another mutant. A self-reinforcing crash follows, as the price returns towards 
the rational-expectations regime. This can be seen most clearly with a population of 
10 (see Figures 5.10 and 5.11, where a pronounced bubble appears in time interval 
t = 350... 400, with a corresponding peak in trading volume accompanying it. Analysis 
of the actual population in this period shows this (Figures 5.13 and 5.11). Before t = 360 
the price is stable at approximately the rational expectations price of p = 87. In the 
period t = 360 to t = 380, the population balance shifts rapidly towards a population 
that predicts an upward price trend (Figure 5.13). Correspondingly, the stock price 
rises (Figure 5.11). Att = 380 the price peaks. 
^Although this will not always happen. Section 2.1.C discusses the mathematics of this process. 
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Figure 5.10: Time series for the SSMM, with an adaptive population of 10 agents. Here 
a single bubble and crash event is seen, centred about time t = 400. 
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Figure 5.11: Stock price in the bubble described in the text. The population dynamics 
during this bubble are shown in Figure 5.13. This figure is an enlargement of the price 
time series in Figure 5.10. 
Figure 5.12 shows the situation clearly, with a further expansion of scale on the 
X-axis. Two price time series are shown, the actual pricey i.e. the price that the mar-
ketmaker fixes, given the demand functions of the population of agents, and the stable 
price, the price that, given the population distribution and the dividend, is sustainable 
by the population (Equation 4.36. Whilst the actual price is lower than this price, the 
stock price will rise because demand exceeds supply. Once this price is reached, the de-
mand matches supply, and the portion of the population that predicts an upwards trend 
loses its fitness advantage. Agents that predict a stable price or a downward trend can 
now gain a foothold in the population, and their presence reduces the demand, and thus 
the stable price. The price falls, increasing the fitness of agents predicting a downwards 
trend. The balance of the population now shifts; the downwards predicting agents take 
over the population from t ~ 378 onwards. Once the price has dropped sufficiently, they 
in turn lose their selective advantage to agents predicting a stable price; this occurs at 
t ~ 400. 
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Figure 5.12: Actual and stable stock price series in the range 360 < t < 380. The 
actual price is always moving towards the stable price (which is dependent upon the 
composition of the population). 
The population dynamics underlying this bubble and crash can be observed in Fig-
ure 5.13. Immediately prior to the appearance of the t = 350-400 bubble, the popula-
tion distribution is stable, dominated by agents predicting an unchanged next return. 
The onset of the bubble corresponds to a shift in the population distribution: agents 
predicting a rising return from the stock dominate the market. This shift in population 
is interpreted as a meta-stable shift between attractors in the population space. This 
new population remains stable itself for approximately 20 trading epochs, until the a-
gents' demand for stock is limited by their risk functions. At this point supply matclies 
demand and the price stabilizes. The population is now invaded by agents predicting a 
stable or lower return. The system shifts attractor once more, and the price drops. It 
is debatable as to whether this regime change should be characterised as a meta-stable 
event. Certainly its existence can be predicted, and for a given population distribution, 
the price at which it will occur can be predicted. However, the population distribution 
is always influenced by the stochasticities inherent in the adaptive process. Finally, as 
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the price returns to the fundamental price another transition between attractor basins 
occurs; agents predicting an unchanged return dominate the population once more. 
There is a second interesting phenomenon here. Note that during the crash phase, 
as the price drops, the population is dominated by agents predicting a falling return. 
However, these agents predict an absolute fall in price only, as can be deduced from 
comparing the bottom pair of figures in Figure 5.13. Given the rate of decrease of the 
return from the stock, one would expect that the fittest class of agents would be those 
predicting large drops in stock return; in these simulations the relative response bit has 
a much greater influence on the prediction than the absolute response bit. However, 
during the crash phase, the population is dominated by agents whose response bits are 
#0. Agents with a falling return predicting relative response bit (classes 00, 0#, 01) 
do enter the population, but are unable to become established within it. 
Another interesting feature that should be noted is the fact that the stock price 
moves smoothly to the peak price, and then back down again. During this 'bubble and 
crash' event the active subset of the population changes, because the set of activated 
sensors changes, both as the price rises and then again as it falls. Yet this change 
in the active population has no effect on the progress of this transient event. This 
indicates that the population is well mixed: the distribution of response bits in the 
newly activated and de-activated segments of the population is similar. If it were not, 
one might expect to see a loss of momentum in the upwards price, because an unmixed 
population would be expected to have a maximal entropy distribution, which would no 
support such a high stock price. 
To summarise, technical trading is observed in the SSMM, in the form of self-
reinforcing predictions of price increases or decreases. Due to the intense selection 
pressures, fit mutants spread quickly through the population; in small populations 
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Figure 5.13: Composition of the population during the bubble in the population: 10 
run discussed in the text. The 10 behavioural classes have been further reduced to 3 
classes, corresponding to upwards, stable and downwards price pressures, to aid clarity. 
The left hand set of figures conflate fitness classes based on the relative price change 
response bit, the right hand set based on both bits. From top to bottom, upwards, 
unchanged and downwards return predicting segments of the population are shown. 
See also Figure 5.10. 
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these have a marked effect on the system dynamics. However, these self-reinforcing 
trends sow the seeds of their own downfall; even those agents predicting an upward 
trend have a limit on the price they are prepared to pay. When the price rises too 
high, demand drops off, the trend no longer continues and selective advantage is lost. 
A self-reinforcing crash follows. 
5.4 Internal and External Shocks to the System 
In Section 5.3 the dynamics of the SSMM have been considered. The movement of the 
market in response to a fluctuating population has been examined, and the resulting 
bubbles and crashes have been explained. In Lemma 4.2.1, the dependence of the 
market dynamics upon the dividend sequence has been laid bare. In this section, 
the relationship between the population dynamics and the dividend sequence will be 
considered, and the relative importance of the stochasticity in the dividend sequence 
and the stochasticity of the finite population will be examined. In simple terras, here 
the relative importance of internal and external shocks to the system will be considered. 
In order to perform this analysis, the cross-entropy validation method described in 
Section 5.3.1 will be employed. This method allows the magnitude of internal shocks to 
the system to be measured; comparison of the cross-entropy time series and the price 
time series; and of the dividend time series to the price time series, using a correlation 
analysis. This should allow conclusions to be drawn about the relative importance of 
internal and external shocks in determining the dynamics of the system. 
Clearly, a correlation may easily be taken between stock price and dividend, estab-
lishing the relationship between the price time series and the dividend time series. To 
establish a correlation between price movement and cross-entropy is more tricky, as 
cross-entropy is a measure of the internal sampling fluctuations within the population, 
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Figure 5.14: Correlation coefficients between price and dividend, and between the ab-
solute price first difference and cross-entropy. 
and is always positive. By taking the first difference of the price series, we have a mear 
sure of the change in stock price. The absolute value of this first difference can then be 
correlated against the cross-entropy series. The results of such a comparison are shown 
in Figure 5.14. 
This figure shows that for small populations, internal sampling fluctuations are more 
highly correlated with the movements in the price series than the dividend sequence is. 
As the population size grows, not only does the mean cross-entropy fall, as discussed in 
Section 5.3.1, but also the correlation between cross-entropy and price fluctuations de-
creases. As this happens the correlation between the dividend and price series increases. 
The conclusion is that for small populations, the driving force in the population dynam-
ics is internal: sampling fluctuations inherent in the adaptive process play an important 
role in determining system dynamics. In larger populations this is no longer the case; 
the system is driven by external forces (in this case the dividend sequence); internal 
fluctuations are insignificant in comparison. There lies an intermediate zone where the 
dynamics of the system are dependent upon both interna! and external fluctuations. 
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Figure 5.15: Distribution of cross-entropic shocks in small, medium and large popula-
tions. 
Given that in small populations a correlation between cross-entropy and system 
dynamics does exist, what distribution do such shocks take? In Figure 5.15 the distri-
bution of cross-entropic shocks is given for small, medium and large populations. Note 
that the more 'spiky* distribution in the small {n = 10) population is an artifact. In a 
smaller population, the range of possible population distribution is more limited; this 
constrains the cross-entropy to a more limited range of values, resulting in a 'spiky' 
distribution. From the distributions shown in Figure 5.15, it is clear that the cross-
entropy follows a distribution which, if not Gaussian, is at least single-peaked with a 
well-defined mean. That is to say, it is not a negative exponential distribution, which 
would correspond to power-law dynamics of internal shocks. Whilst the shocks obey a 
distribution, there is certainly a cliaracteristic scale to shock events. This is much as 
one would expect: the internal shocks to the system are caused by sampling fluctuations 
within the adaptive process. There is no opportunity for such stochastic fluctuations 
to be affected by the dynamics of the system; hence one would one expect to find the 
internal shocks obeying a power law distribution. 
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In a similar fashion, one would not expect to find the magnitudes of external shocks 
to obey a power law distribution, as the experimental design constrains the dividend 
sequence to an AR(1) process, driven by a Gaussian random variable. 
5.4.1 Dynamics of Populations of Agents with Unequal Influ-
ence 
At this point it should be stressed that the populations described consist of agents with 
equal influence: all agents have the same resources, and the same effect on supply and 
demand for the stock. In a real stock market, traders vary in their resources, as well 
as their risk functions, and the sensory information they have access to, or choose to 
utilise to help their decision making. If agents have heterogeneous effects on the market 
dynamics, then a large market may be effectively dominated by the actions of a few 
powerful traders. In these cases, even if the market contains a very large number of 
traders, then the stochastic fluctuations in the adaptive processes governing the actions 
of the few more powerful agents can have a large effect on the dynamics of the market. 
A powerful example of this can be seen in the effect of George Soros and his Quantum 
Fund in bringing about the exit of Sterling from the European Exchange rate mechanism 
on 'Black Wednesday' in 1992. Here a single powerful agent was able to force a run on 
a currency despite the intervention of central banks (also powerful agents). This is in 
no sense a claim about the decision methods used by any particular player in the world 
stock markets. Instead it is merely an observation that a few extremely powerful players 
can exert a strong influence on the market, even when the total number of players is 
extremely large. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter the results obtained in Chapter 5 will be discussed in the light of 
the general points put forwards in Chapter 3, and the theoretical predictions made in 
Chapter 4. 
6.1 The Analytic Formalisation of the SSMM 
The work presented has consisted of two elements, an experimental method, consisting 
of a computational implementation of a system of interacting adaptive agents (the SSM-
M), and an analytical component, which attempts to model and explain the behaviour 
of the experimental system. In this section the success of the model will be examined. 
To recap, the computational implementation consists of a population of interacting 
adaptive agents. Each agent consists of a single classifier rule having a six site trinary 
genome. Thus there are 729 different possible genomes. The implementation adapts via 
selection followed by mutation on the population (asexual reproduction). The popula-
tion can thus strictly be seen as a discrete time, discrete space dynamical system in 729 
dimensions. The analytical model of the system has only 10 dimensions, correspond-
ing to the nine possible behavioural responses of an agent to the current macroscopic 
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system state, with one response ( # # ) split between two response classes to facilitate 
analytic tractability. 
There are two aspects to the modeling of the SSMM that need to be considered. 
1. Does the specific statistical dynamics formalisation that has been adapted as an 
analytical model adequately capture the dynamics of the SSMM? 
2. Are the methods used to examine the analytic model sufficient? If not, in which 
areas are they inadequate? 
6.1.1 Adequacy of the Analytic Formalisation 
Consider first, whether the analytic model does capture the dynamics of the SSMM. 
In Section 5.3.1 a cross-entropic approach was used to validate the analytic model 
developed in Chapter 4. The validation demonstrated conclusively that, as an infinite 
population was approached, the one step prediction of the population at the next time 
step, and the actual population converged. It was pointed out that this is no conclusive 
guarantee that the analytic formalisation was correct, but it is highly unlikely that this 
might be so. One must therefore conclude that the analytic formalisation does capture 
the dynamics of the SSMM, at least as population size increases. The equation 
Pe+i = MSpt (6.1) 
adequately expresses the dynamics of the system. 
Furthermore, analysis of the individual events within particular simulation runs, 
such as the *bubble and crash' regime discussed in Section 5.3.4 is possible. In this 
instance, it was possible to explain the timing of the transition from the upwards 
^bubble' to the downwards 'crash' in terms of the clianging demand caused by the 
adapting population. The population converged on a distribution of agents predicting 
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increased stock prices. This led to a price increase, which was ultimately halted because 
the population was unable to sustain such price rises. This led to a change in the 
adaptive dynamics, and a corresponding crash. 
Overall, it would be fair to describe the analytic formalisation as having good short-
term predictive power, in that it can accurately predict the population distribution at 
the next time step, provided the population size is lajge enough. The forraalisation also 
possesses good explanatory power, in that it can be used to explain the dynamics of 
major events within the time series, once they have occurred. 
6.1.2 Adequacy of the Analysis of the Analytic Formalisation 
In Section 5.3.2, an analysis of the formalisation put forwards in Chapter 4 was present-
ed. It had been hoped to find the attractors of this system. Unfortunately, the system 
proved not to be amenable to an analytic solution, therefore numerical solutions were 
sought using a multidimensional simplex method. 
Only one solution was found. The stable price of this solution corresponds to the 
fundamental, or rational expectations regime. It was unsurprising that such a solution 
was found: Blume & Easeley [13] prove analytically that in a simple adaptive investment 
model, the fundamental regime is an attractor. Arthur et al. [5] also claim that a 
rational expectations regime in an attractor in the SFASM, which the SSMM is based 
upon. 
There is, however, no evidence to support the hypothesis that an adaptive popu-
lation in the SSMM lies within this rational regime. Across the statistics of all ob-
servables, there is no evidence that as population size increases, the system converges 
towards a fundamental regime. The only condition under which the system converges 
to such a regime is a non-adaptive one. Here it is possible to show analytically that the 
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population will remain in a rational expectations regime. This is confirmed empirically. 
Why does an adaptive population not converge on the fundamental regime? Arthur 
et al. [5] discuss the existence of a complex regime where rational expectations are not 
upheld. In this case, the dynamics of the population may be self-reinforcing, giving 
rise to persistent variation from the fundamental regime, described as over- and under-
pricing regimes. The population here is driven by its own internal feedbacks, possibly 
triggered by stochastic fluctuations. This will be discussed in Section 6.2. 
This is not an adequate explanation; the numerical methods used predicted the 
existence of a fixed point corresponding to a fundamental regime. Sucli a fundamental 
regime was indeed observed, although only in a non-adaptive condition. In the previous 
section (Section 6.1.1) the adequacy of the model has been discussed, and it has been 
concluded that it is sound. The salient question, therefore, is why the analysis of the 
formalisation fails to predict the existence of the attractors that the system falls into? 
The analytic method used to locate attractors is the simplex method (Section 5.3.2), 
which is used to find solutions of an equation of the form 
X - f i x ) = 0 (6.2) 
by a gradient descent method across the vertices of a simplex. This should be expected 
to find any fixed points of the system. It cannot, however, be expected to find lim-
it cycles or strange attractors, which take more complex forms, having a periodicity 
strictly greater than one. If the attractors of the system are not simple fixed points, 
then a numerical method will not find them. One could, of course attempt a numerical 
solution for a period k map 
x - / * ( x ) = 0 (6.3) 
but, given the computational load, and the fact that k is unknown, this approach 
was rejected. Also, if more complex attractors, such as strange attractors exist, such 
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an approach will still fail. In Section 3.2.5, the work of Friston [31] in describing the 
attractors of complex interacting systems was discussed. Following this, it is considered 
likely that a system of interacting adaptive agents such as the SSMM may possess sucli 
complex attractors. 
Certainly, over short time periods, interesting dynamical phenomena are observed, 
sucli as the 'bubble and crash' phenomenon discussed in Section 5.3.4. The Friston 
model [31] (following Kelso [47]), which describes a complex interactive system possess-
ing attractors with complex form, where the system can move between sub-manifolds 
of the attractor surface. Such a description may be relevant here, in Section 5.3.4 this 
phenomenon was explained by the model in terras of the population moving towards a 
price attractor that itself moved in response to the population distribution. 
To conclude, the analysis of the dynamics of the SSMM appears inadequate. This 
is primarily due to the complexities inherent in the formalisation. The system is mul-
tidimensional and highly non-linear, which limits the feasibility of an analytic solution 
for the attractors of the system. Not only that, but it appears to possess attractors 
with a complex structure which are unlikely to be discovered by a numerical method. 
6.2 Dynamical Regime and Population Size 
In Section 3.3 it was argued that three dynamical regimes exist, which were labelled 
stable, metarstable and unstable. To recap, the stable regime would exist in the limit 
of large populations: here, external shocks (in this case the dividend sequence) should 
provide the driving force for the population. The second regime was described as 
meta-stable. The conditions under which this regime was postulated to exist were 
dependent upon the population size, observational timescale and schedule, and the 
strength of the exploitative and explorative operators. Finally, a third regime, described 
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as unstable, was postulated to exist. Such a regime would be characterised by extremely 
small populations where the stocliasticities inherent in the exploitative and exploratory 
operators (internal shocks) become the driving force for the dynamics of the population. 
Here the evidence for such a characterisation, based on the SSMM presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 will be reviewed. Such evidence as exists has two components: a 
qualitative component based upon the observation of the market evolution presented 
in Section 5.2, and a quantitative component based upon the cross-entropy approach 
detailed in Section 5.4. 
In Section 6.1.2 the adequacy of the analysis of the formalisation produced in Chap-
ter 4 was discussed. There appear to be multiple regimes within the system, whilst 
the fundamental, or rational expectations regime is an attractor, the system appears 
not to converge towards it under with an adaptive population of any size. This implies 
that other attractors may well exist. One might also consider the 'bubble' phenomenon 
discussed in Section 5.3.4. This may be the result of the system switching between 
attractors, or alternatively it may result from the type of complex dynamics discussed 
by Priston [31] and Kelso [47], where a system remains within a single attractor, but 
varies it position within that attractor, because the control parameter is modulated by 
the system itself. 
Ultimately, it is unclear as to whether the dynamics of the system are best described 
as transitions between a number of separate attractors, or as the switching of the system 
between sub-manifolds of a single attractor. Indeed, both descriptions may be correct, 
depending upon the level at which the system is viewed. In the former case, one might 
wish to describe the system as meta-stable, following the convention of Kelso [47] and 
Priston [31]. In the latter case, further evidence is provided by the discussion of the 
role of shocks to the system put forwards in Section 5.4. 
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Figure 5.14 shows that the system is dominated by the effect of internal shocks 
(i.e. stochastic fluctuations) in small populations, and that the effect of these internal 
shocks decreases with increasing population size. Simultaneously, as population size 
increases, there is an increasing dependence upon external shocks to the system; in this 
case a direct correlation between stock price and dividend. One would expect this, the 
variance of the population distribution due to sampling fluctuations to scale as y/n. 
As population size increases, the population takes longer and longer to switcli between 
alternate attractor basins, because the smaller stochastic fluctuations make it more and 
more difficult for it to stray from the attractor. 
Arthur et al. [5] associate low volume trading with a rational expectations regime, 
and higher volume trading with a complex regime. Rapid switching between these 
conditions is certainly observed in small populations, for example, in Figure 5.10. This 
may be interpreted as evidence of regime switching within the system. On the other 
hand, such behaviour is observed more rarely, if at all in larger population systems. 
This is seen is Figures 5.3 and 5.2. 
Clearly, if the population size is sufficient, and one does not wait a sufficient amount 
of time, the system will not have undergone a stochastic jump across the population 
space sufficient to move it between attractors. In this case, the population will tend to be 
practically classified as behaviourally stable. Conversely, if the population is sufficiently 
small, the population will be completely driven by internal shocks (i.e. stocliastic 
fluctuations). Here the population may be unable to remain in any attractor basin for 
a significant length of time, and the behaviour will be classed as unstable. 
In the case of the SSMM, this latter behavioural pattern has not been observed. 
However, meta-stability is certainly observed in small and medium sized populations, 
and stability in large populations. It is predicted that for a larger population, meta-
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stability would be observed in a sufficiently long observational window. 
To conclude, stability, meta-stability and instability are generic properties of systems 
of interacting adaptive agents. The dynamics of the system, and the cases in whicli 
these three regimes are observed in, appear to have a high dependence upon both the 
adaptive regime and the nature of the interaction. In the system studied, there is a 
smooth transition between instability, meta-stability and stability as population size 
increases. This may not be the case for all systems, as there may exist systems which 
demonstrate sharp bifurcations between these regimes. 
6.3 Critique: Plausibility vs. Analytic Tractability 
In this section, wider issues concerning the study of populations of interacting adaptive 
agents will be discussed. In particular the success of the SSMM will be examined, both 
as a model of a stock market, and as a model of a population of interacting adaptive 
agents. 
6.3.1 The success of the Simple Stock Market Model 
Recall Section 4.1.1. The SSMM was motivated by three core design issues: analytic 
tractability, simple dynamics, and a well understood problem. At this point the success 
of the model in terras of these three design criteria will be reviewed. Other design issues 
have been easily implemented on the model, and will not be discussed further here. 
First, consider the analytic tractability of the SSMM. A statistical dynamics for-
malisation of this system has been constructed, and this has led to the identification 
of a fixed point. However, as has been discussed in a previous section (Section 6.1.2), 
there is no clear evidence that the system converges on this fixed point in any adaptive 
condition. On the other hand, the analytic formalisation adopted successfully predicts 
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the short term behaviour of the system. The root of the discrepancy has been identified 
as the inadequacy of analytic methods available. 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are strong links between the analysis of 
this system, and other dynamical and evolutionary systems. In particular, the analysis 
is based on the statistical dynamics analysis of the Royal Road GA [78]. The raeta-
stability analysis that followed has links to the analysis of noise in non-linear dynamical 
systems, particularly the work of Knobloch & Weiss [52]. Despite this, it cannot be said 
that the dynamics of this system are completely understood either from an experimental 
or an analytic viewpoint. Despite the dimensional reduction, the reduced system still 
has a relatively high number of dimensions (11, including time), and this is one of the 
main problems in analysis. At present there appears little hope of finding improved 
analytical techniques which would allow a deeper analysis of the system. In particular, 
the following questions remain unanswered: 
1. What is the nature of the complex regime that an adaptive population appears 
to reside in? 
2. Are the 'bubble and crash' phenomena, discussed in Section 5.3.4 best charac-
terised as an alternate attractor (or attractors), or as the sub-manifold of a single 
attractor, 
3. However one might wish to characterise the regimes existing within the sys-
tem, what is the distribution of waiting times between transitions between these 
regimes? How is this distribution dependent upon population size, exploitation 
and exploration rates? 
Given that these questions remain unanswered as yet, the SSMM cannot be judged as 
an overwhelming success from the point of view of analytical tractability. The SSMM 
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has good explanatory and predictive power on a short term basis, but fails to fulfill 
expectations with regard to the larger and more general issues. 
Second, consider the criterion of simple dynamics. The rationale guiding the experi-
mental design within this thesis was to try and identify a system with a limited number 
of identifiable dynamical regimes. A stock market model was chosen, because the evi-
dence in existing work, for example Arthur et al. [5] showed the existence of over- and 
under-pricing regimes accompanying the fundamental regime. It was anticipated that 
the reduced complexity of the SSMM, as compared to the SFASM would lead to a com-
bination of simple dynamics, and a more easily analysable system. These beliefs have 
proved to be only partially upheld. Certainly, a number of easily identifiable regimes 
exist; it has been possible to distinguish between a fundamental regime and a complex 
regime. 'Bubble and crash* events have also been identified which only occur in the 
complex regime, and may or may not form a third regime. The problem of analytic 
tractability is again paramount. Whilst the fundamental regime is understood to be 
an attracting fixed point of the forraalisation, no analysis of the complex regime has 
been possible, and its nature is not understood at all. Similarly, it has been possible to 
perform an analysis of the behaviour of the system during a 'bubble and crash' event. 
However, it is unclear what the relation of this type of event is to the complex regime, 
because the complex regime is not understood. 
Third, a model of a well understood problem was desired. The SSMM is a gross 
simplification of the Santa Fe Institute artificial stock market (SFASM), and is governed 
by the same market structure, clearing method and timing sequence. However, the 
simplifications occur in agent structure: the agents are heavily simplified, incapable 
of the sophistication of decision making that they have in the SFASM. There is also 
a difference in that the SFASM does not allow agents to copy each other's strategies 
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directly, whereas this occurs in the SSMM. The SSMM is far more reactive than the 
SFASM; in practice the evolutionary pace is far quicker. This aids the observation of the 
meta-stable phenomena that have been sought. With a large population, the SSMM 
displays similar behaviour to the SFASM without historical information, converging 
towards the fundamental pricing regime. This is confirmation of the correct operation 
of the SSMM. However, the existence of over- and under-pricing regimes for small 
populations is not predicted by Arthur et al. [5]. This is due to the difference in 
adaptive structure between the two models: In the SFASM, the evolutionary pace is 
much slower, and more importantly, agents choose the predictive rules that they use 
based upon their past performance. In the SSMM, each agent has a single rule, and 
these are all implemented. This makes the SSMM much more responsive to stocliastic 
variations; the slow evolutionary pace ensures that agents are likely to already possess 
good predictors; new predictors are only likely to affect agent's demand once they have 
proved their predictive ability 'off-line*, or if novel conditions prevail. This latter option 
is made less likely by the former; the appearance of novel conditions is damped by the 
predilection of agents to choose tested predictors. The suggestion is that the structure 
of the SFASM without historical information damps the stochasticity inherent in the 
system, making the system appear stable. 
6.3.2 Meta-stabilty in the SSMM and SFASM 
In an earlier discussion (Section 5.2.2) it was noted that Arthur et al. [5] claim, on 
the basis of theoretical considerations and the results that they present, that technical 
trading is not possible unless the agents are able to respond to historical informa-
tion. Therefore the system should remain in a fundamental regime if the agents have 
no historical sensory information available to them. Is this claim consistent with the 
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behaviour of the SSMM presented here? 
Initially, it would appear that the observed meta-stable behaviour in the SSMM, 
consisting of a fundamental behaviour regime punctuated by bubble and crash events 
in both upwards (over-pricing) and downwards (under-pricing) directions, invalidates 
the claim made by Arthur et a). On closer inspection, this may not actually be the 
case. As has been discussed above (Section 6.3.1), the fact that meta-stable events 
are not observed in the SFASM in the absence of historical sensory information may 
be due to the different evolutionary algorithm and slower pace of adaptation in the 
SFASM. This does not, however, explain how metarstable phenomena which appear to 
be technical trading, can arise in a system where agents do not have direct access to 
historical infonnation. 
Arthur et al. [5] explain how bubble and crash regimes can arise via a mutually 
reinforcing subset of the population. Their reasoning is mirrored in the explanation 
of bubble and crash regimes in the SSMM discussed in Section 5.3.4. However, their 
experimentation shows that in the SSMM, what they describe as a 'complex' regime, 
where bubbles and crashes can occur, cannot arise without the existence of teclmical 
trading bits in the agents* sensors, which give short term historical information about 
market behaviour. 
A possible explanation for the apparent inconsistency between the claims of Arthur 
et al. [5] and the behaviour of the SSMM is that information on the short term history 
of market behaviour is actually available to the agents in the SSMM. The evolutionary 
pace of this model is high, the population quickly responds to clianging trends in the 
market. Moreover, every agent has but a single rule, and the evolutionary algorithm 
allows agents to imitate the successful strategies of other agents. In some sense, the 
distribution of the population between the response classes gives historical information 
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about recent market behaviour. Responses that are widespread within the population 
are associated with successful prediction, and therefore give information about recent 
trends in stock pricing. Hence technical trading is possible in the SSMM, and is observed 
as bubble and crash regimes. The manner in which these regimes are dependent upon 
the evolutionary algorithm has zdready been discussed in Section 5,3.4. 
6.3.3 The Big Issue: Modelling Systems of Interacting Adap-
tive Agents 
The SSMM has proved to be a valuable testbed for ideas concerning the evolution of 
interacting adaptive systems. It has demonstrated the feasibility of statistical dynamic 
approaches to the problem, despite the substantial non-linearities involved at a very 
basic level. It has illustrated the existence of meta-stability as an important dynami-
cal regime in finite populations, and has enabled the examination of a basic adaptive 
system, namely asexual reproduction followed by mutation, which encapsulates ex-
ploitation with global choice, plus random exploration. This is one of the simplest, and 
most analytically tractable adaptive schemata. 
The demonstrated meta-stability can be applied back into many of the systems 
discussed in Section 1.3, There is now a good case for describing the regime clianges 
observed in these systems as a result of meta-stability due to the stochastic nature of 
adaptation in finite populations. The generic nature of meta-stability in finite pop-
ulations can be used to inform the design of interacting systems of adaptive agents, 
especially distributed adaptive control systems. Further work is necessary in order to 
further understand these systems, especially the waiting times in particular states, and 
the probability of transition from any given state to any of the other states. The ques-
tion is, where on the continuum between analytic tractability and implementational 
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plausibility should future work be pitclied? 
The discussion above (especially Sections 6.1 and 6.3.1) has shown the great practical 
difficulties in analysing even highly simplified versions of real-world systems. The SSMM 
is a simplified model of an artificial stock market, which in turn is restricted to a single 
stock, with no external fluctuations save the stock dividend. Even so, analysis has 
proved difficult; the practically important questions of waiting times have remained 
unanswered, and are likely to remain so. 
The approach that has been taken in this thesis has been to try and build a model 
of an entire system. Whilst the model rests on some basic assumptions, most notably 
the maximal entropy assumption of Prugel-Bennett and Shapiro [69], the approacli has 
been holistic in that it attempts to integrate all aspects of the system into the model. 
The central question that must be addressed is whether such an approach is worthwhile. 
Certainly it is a valid approach; it has enabled predictions to be made whicli have been 
tested against the empirical system in computational simulations. The problem is that 
this is a very labour-intensive approach: the computational simulations are fairly large, 
and they are time-consuming to write and debug^ The analytic formalisation that has 
been developed is £in extension of the method adopted by van Nirawegen et al. [79], and 
is certainly applicable to other systems. The devil, as always, is in the detail, although 
it is hard to see how the operators M and 5 could be easily used in another system, 
as they are tailored to the detail of the operation of this system. 
The system that has been studied in this thesis is essentially a 'toy' system; in 
many respects it is an oversimplification of a real stock market. It still does maintain 
important aspects of the behaviour of a real stock market though. However diflficult it 
^To be fair, the writing of the computational simulation was treated as a learning exercise in a new 
language (Java), and this slowed up progress. However, once the model was written, the Java GUI 
allowed the system behaviour to be easily find quickly explored over a wide range of parameters. 
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may have proved, the analysis of the working of this system has been made possible 
by the complete access to information that is a feature of computational models. In 
the computational simulations there is complete access to every aspect of the system: 
there are no unknowns. This is not the case with a real-world system as it is very 
rare that the dynamics of the system are completely understood and in many cases 
the agents themselves do not understand the causes of their actions. As has been 
discussed in Section 1.1.2, the combination of a number of agents all acting in goal-
directed manners, although with differing beliefs and goals, can underlie the exploratory 
operator. 
Do 'big' models, such as the SSMM fulfill any useful role? Do they have 'added 
value' above smaller models which only claim to model specific aspects of complex 
systems. In many cases they do, because they allow the range of dynamics of a system 
to be explored. Should they be used as the basis of analytic models? Probably not: the 
eflfort that goes into the model of a specific system may yield results about that system, 
but is likely not to be easily generalisable to other systems. Smaller, more restricted 
models may have a more canonical nature, and be more easily applied to a wider range 
of systems. 
This is not a rejection of the work presented in this thesis. The model (both analytic 
and computational) was built with a specific purpose: to examine and further under-
stand the phenomenon of meta-stability in finite populations of interacting adaptive 
agents, and its relationship with the stochastic fluctuations inherent in such processes 
due to the adaptive operators. It has succeeded in that it has contributed to the under-
standing of such systems. Based on that knowledge, new directions for research in this 
area may be proposed, and the current model, having served its purpose, is abandoned. 
It is suggested that future work should be directed very much more towards simpler 
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systems which are likely to be more analytically tractable. If anything, the SSMM is 
too complex. Further levels of system abstraction would aid tractability, and allow 
additional approaches to be taken, including symbolic dynamics, spin glass approaclies, 
and improved thermodynamic approaches. A second advantage of simpler systems is 
that they will allow easier comparison of different adaptive approaches. There is very 
little understanding of the interaction of exploration and exploitation, and the interplay 
between these fundamental forces in many adaptive algorithms. The use of simple 
systems will make this task easier. Questions along this track that remain unanswered 
(some of these are extremely fundamental questions within adaptive theory) include 
1. What is the role of the crossover operator in GA theory? Nimwegen et al. [78] 
speculate that in the Royal Road GA, crossover allows good genotypes to spread 
through the population faster than would be the case under asexual reproduction. 
Priigel-Bennett and Shapiro [69] claim that the effect of crossover is problem de-
pendent, as the representation used will determine the amount of mixing that is 
inherent in the crossover operator. What is the action of crossover in an interact-
ing population? What level of stocliasticity is inherent in crossover, and how will 
it effect the metarstability of the population's behaviour? 
2. More generally, how do different adaptive scliemata affect the behavioural meta-
stability of the population? 
3. Is it possible to alter the strength of the explorative and interactive components of 
adaptation in order to manipulate the stability of the system, and its reaction to 
clianging environmental conditions? In the case of a distributed adaptive control 
system, is it possible to optimise the system's response to a range of environmental 
conditions given constraints on required stability and reaction speed? 
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Additionally, there is a strong case for studying interacting adaptive systems with 
a spatial component: either those set within a spatial environment, sucli as problems 
in situated robotics, or those in which an interaction topology exists, such as network 
problems. These are two very important class of system from a practical standpoint. 
The latter system may also have additional behavioural complications, sucli as the pres-
ence of spatial co-ordination effects, similar to those noted in physio-chemical complex 
systems sucli as the Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction [27]. Here, local stochastic fluctu-
ations give rise to globally co-ordinated behaviour. It is important to examine such 
systems in adaptive agents. Can global co-ordination of agent behaviour result when 
local interactions are influenced by local adaptation, which in turn feeds back from local 
agent performance? 
In addition, it is expected that power-law dynamics [8] will result from the imposition 
of a topography on agent interactions. This type of dynamics is very common in such 
systems, ranging from avalanches in sandpiles [9] through to extinction events in food 
webs [63]. An understanding of the likely global impact of local events is essential for 
the successful implementation of such systems. 
6.3,4 Further Work: The Spatial Minority Game 
In the light of the above discussion, a spatial minority game is presented. This is a 
co-ordination problem between adaptive agents, based upon the work of Arthur [3] 
and Zhang [88, 18], as discussed in Section 1,3.3. The spatial co-ordination is played 
between agent on a one-dimensional torus. This allows easy control of the locality of 
interaction and exploitation. As yet, there is little work on this game, but it is hoped 
that it possesses a sufficient level of abstraction to allow a deep analysis of its workings. 
This game has a number of advantages over an artificial stock market for the anal-
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ysis of the dynamics of interacting adaptive systems. First, the interaction is mucli 
simpler, and therefore much easier to model. Second, the interaction is more explicit: 
precise control can be exerted over the interactive radius, plus the length and specificity 
of the game history that agents have access to. This is in contrast to the SSMM where, 
although the agents directly have only access to the previous price, this has a deter-
ministic relationship to the previous price and population. The model of the system as 
a Markov process is effective, but it is difficult to conceptualise. 
Third, finer control over the evolutionary process in a spatial minority game is 
possible. As in the SSMM, it is possible to alter the evolutionary algorithm, not only in 
terms of mutation and selection rates, but also the nature of the evolutionary operators. 
In addition, in a spatial game it is possible to alter the spatial factors in the evolutionary 
process, such as the radius within which the exploitative process takes place. 
Fourth, a spatial minority game has strong conceptual links to spin-glass systems 
(a well studied class of physical systems which explain the low temperature behaviour 
of paramagnetic materials). The language of spin-glass systems includes concepts such 
as frustration (the inability of all peirticles to reach their desired state), and makes 
full use of entropic and thermodynamic concepts. There is the opportunity to use the 
analyses developed for such systems to explain the dynamics of adaptive systems in 
spatial networks. 
6,4 Conclusion 
The SSMM has proved to be an interesting testbed for interacting adaptive systems. 
However, the study has suffered from the excessive complexity of the system, which has 
limited the depth of the analysis which has been possible. 
The existence of stable, raeta-stable and unstable regimes within adaptive systems 
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has been demonstrated. Even within large populations, the stochasticity inherent in 
the exploratory and exploitative processes has been shown to have a significant effect 
on the evolution of the system. In addition, the system has been shown to undergo 
a transition from being driven by internal shocks (stochastic fluctuations) to external 
shocks (environmental fluctuations) as population size increases. 
In modelling terms, the success of a statistical dynamics approach based on reducing 
the system to a manageable number of behavioural states, in conjunction with a master 
equation approach to state transitions, has been confirmed, although the SSMM lies 
at the upper limit of tractability. Whilst the limited analysis possible has precluded 
a full understanding of this system, and many of the interesting questions have been 
left unanswered, it has provided a foundation from which further work on interacting 
adaptive system may proceed. 
"Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen 
ist.2" [85] 
^He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it. 
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